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custody. See Axelburg [ v. State, 294 Ga.App. 612, 615(1) (669 S.E.2d 439) (2008)]. Accordingly, the evidence authorized a finding that a reasonable person in Anguiano's position would have believed that he was free to terminate the interview and leave.” State v. Austin, 310 Ga.App. 814, 714 S.E.2d 671 (July 13, 2011). In drug and weapons prosecution, trial court erred in part by granting motion to suppress statements made by defendant. Responding to a report of shots fired in a neighborhood, officers encountered a belligerent Austin. “Austin was handcuffed for purposes of officer safety after he took on what appeared to be a fighting stance while being questioned by an officer, but he was explicitly told at that time that he was not under arrest and that the handcuffs were for both the officers' safety and his own. Accordingly, a reasonable person would not have felt that he or she was under formal arrest at that point.” Austin then offered to show police the gun he had fired; when he took them to his bedroom, still handcuffed, they not only found the gun but also the marijuana on the dresser; this, says the Court of Appeals, changes the equation: “an officer then said to the still- handcuffed Austin, ‘You know that you can't have [marijuana] in your house. Why don't you let me know where [any additional marijuana] is and we'll go ahead and grab it now.’ After the officers seized the marijuana from the dresser, one then inquired as to other guns or drugs in the house. Only then did Austin inform the officers as to the locations of his additional firearms. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have considered him or her self in custody following the discovery of the marijuana in plain view. See Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 191, 193(3), 528 S.E.2d 232 (2000) (‘A reasonable person in Jackson's position, having just confessed to involvement in a crime in the presence of law enforcement officers would, from that time forward, perceive himself to be in custody, and expect that his future freedom of action would be significantly curtailed.’ (citations omitted)). Accordingly, consistent with the trial court's decision, any of Austin's statements made thereafter should be excluded.” Hale v. State, 310 Ga.App. 363, 714 S.E.2d 19 (June 30, 2011). Convictions for DUI and improper passing affirmed; defendant was in custody when alco-sensor administered, but still admissible without Miranda warnings because defendant asked for test himself. Arrest. “[B]ecause Hale was informed of the officer's intent to place him under arrest, a reasonable person in Hale's position would believe that his or her freedom of action had been more than temporarily curtailed, which thereby placed him in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 225(3) (498 S.E.2d 262) (1998) (‘[H]aving been informed that she was going to jail, a reasonable person would have believed that the detention was not temporary. Therefore, the failure to give the Miranda warnings renders evidence regarding the field sobriety tests inadmissible.’); State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 476 (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (‘[A]bsent the officer making any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that she was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation, the officer's “belief” that probable cause exists to make an arrest does not determine when the arrest is effectuated until the officer overtly acts so that a reasonable person would believe she was under arrest.’). Voluntariness. But even though Hale was in custody for purposes of Miranda, the trial court did not err in admitting the results of the portable alco-sensor test because the portable test was administered in response to a demand from Hale, not the officer, thus making this situation clearly distinguishable from other custodial settings triggering the protections of Miranda and more akin to a spontaneous outburst from an unwarned suspect [fn] or a test conducted pursuant to the Georgia Implied Consent Statute. See State v. Carraway, 251 Ga.App. 469, 470 (554 S.E.2d 602) (2001) (noting that breath tests administered under the Georgia Implied Consent Statute do not infringe upon a suspect's right against self-incrimination, making Miranda inapplicable); State v. Lord, 236 Ga.App. 868, 868 (513 S.E.2d 25) (1999) (same); see also Kehinde v. State, 236 Ga.App. 400, 400 (512 S.E.2d 311) (1999) (urine test); State v. Moses, 237 Ga.App. 764, 764 (516 S.E.2d 807) (1999) (blood test). See generally State v. Coe, 243 Ga.App. 232, 233–34(2) (533 S.E.2d 104) (2000) (explaining that the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated ‘by the choice granted by the Georgia Implied Consent Statute whether to submit to a chemical test of bodily substances such as blood, breath, or urine’).” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 09-11121, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310, 2011 WL 2369508 (June 16, 2011). In juvenile’s delinquency petition, North Carolina Supreme Court erred in failing to consider juvenile’s age in determining whether he was in custody when he made statement to police at school. “Petitioner J.D.B. was a 13–year–old, seventh-grade student … when he was removed from his classroom by a uniformed police officer, escorted to a closed- door conference room, and questioned by police for at least half an hour” about recent home break-ins. “There, J.D.B. was met by [Investigator] DiCostanzo, the assistant principal, and the administrative intern. The door to the conference room was closed. With the two police officers and the two administrators present, J.D.B. was questioned for the next 30 to 45 minutes. Prior to the commencement of questioning, J.D.B. was given neither Miranda warnings nor the opportunity to speak to his [guardian/]grandmother. Nor was he informed that he was free to leave the room.” After being told he faced juvenile detention, J.D.B. gave a statement admitting involvement in the break-ins. After delinquency petitions were filed,