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his public defender moved to suppress his statements and the evidence derived therefrom,” arguing that the statements were custodial and not voluntary. North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed finding that J.D.B.’s age shouldn’t factor into determination of whether he was in custody, but U.S. Supreme Court disagrees: “[W]e hold that so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test. [fn] This is not to say that a child's age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. … It is, however, a reality that courts cannot simply ignore.” Rejects dissent and State contention “that a child's age has no place in the custody analysis, no matter how young the child subjected to police questioning. We cannot agree. In some circumstances, a child's age ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect's position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’ Stansbury [ v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam) ]. That is, a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go. We think it clear that courts can account for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis.” “So long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances ‘unknowable’ to them, Berkemer [ v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)] , nor to ‘anticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncrasies’ of the particular suspect whom they question, [ Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)] (internal quotation marks omitted).” Rejects criticisms that age consideration is subjective, or leads to consideration of other psychological factors such as intelligence, education, or prior interrogation history. Alito writes for Roberts, Scalia and Thomas in dissent. Dunson v. State, 309 Ga.App. 484, 711 S.E.2d 53 (May 5, 2011). Physical precedent only. Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s statements, finding that defendant was not in custody. “The investigating officers did not inform Dunson of his Miranda rights prior to the pre-arrest interview. Instead, they told him that he was a suspect, but that he was not under arrest and could leave at any time. Dunson agreed to speak with the officers, who transported him to the police station because he did not have other transportation. During the interview, which took place in an administrative office, the officers again assured him that he could leave if he wished. Dunson continued speaking with police and eventually made several incriminating statements. After hearing the evidence, the trial court determined that these statements were not subject to Miranda. We find no error. Given the totality of the circumstances, including that Dunson was not formally arrested, agreed to talk to the police, and was advised that he could leave the interview if he wished, the trial court was authorized to conclude that Dunson was not ‘in custody’ at the time. See Axelburg [ v. State, 294 Ga.App. 612, 614-615, 669 S.E.2d 439 (2008)]. The fact that Dunson knew before the interview that he was a suspect is not determinative, particularly in light of the officers' assurances that Dunson could leave the interview. See id. at 615, 669 S.E.2d 439. The testimony of one officer that he thought Dunson should be arrested if he tried to leave, is likewise not determinative. See Hardin v. State, 269 Ga. 1, 3(2)(a), 494 S.E.2d 647 (1998). An officer's knowledge or belief impacts the custody issue ‘only if [it was] somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation.’ Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); see also Hardin, supra. The trial court was authorized to conclude that the officer's belief in this case did not impact custody.” Durrence v. State, 307 Ga.App. 817, 706 S.E.2d 180 (February 11, 2011). Child molestation convictions affirmed; “we find no error in the trial court's ruling that Durrence was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made [his] statement. Durrence was interviewed in a DFCS office, and he came there voluntarily. Although he was not expecting [GBI Agent] Purdiman, the agent introduced himself as a GBI agent and stated that he wanted to discuss the allegations against Durrence. Purdiman told Durrence that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and did not have to make a statement. There is no evidence that he was physically restrained or otherwise prevented from leaving the DFCS office until after he admitted to criminal conduct. Accordingly, the evidence authorized a finding that a reasonable person in Durrence's position would have believed that he was free to terminate the interview and leave.” Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 695 S.E.2d 604 (June 7, 2010). Interim review of death penalty prosecution. 1. Fact that defendant was taken from his home in the early morning hours, “handcuffed, placed in a patrol car, and taken to the [police department]” did not make his subsequent statement to police custodial, given that he was not restrained during the two-hour interview; was told that he “was not under arrest for anything,” and agreed to talk; the detective was “neither hostile nor accusatory”; the detective’s question about whether defendant “would be attending his college class tomorrow … would indicate to a reasonable person in Sosniak’s position that he was not” being arrested; and defendant, despite saying he was exhausted and wanted to go home, made no effort to do so. 2. “‘[A] police officer's subjective view that