☢ test - Í

[defendant] was permitted during the course of the interview to take two bathroom breaks, unaccompanied by police. Though the interview room was accessible only through two locked doors, there was no evidence that [defendant] could not have left had he so requested. [Defendant] was never threatened or promised any hope or benefit for his cooperation. At the conclusion of the interview, one of the investigators offered to drive [defendant] home after attending to some unrelated matters, and [defendant] accepted the offer. [Defendant] was arrested less than an hour after his return home. At the police station, he was read his Miranda rights, at which time he remarked, ‘I wasn’t advised of this earlier because I wasn’t under arrest, right?’” Accord, Turner v. State , 287 Ga. 793, 700 S.E.2d 386 (September 20, 2010) (locked doors alone don’t indicate custody absent evidence that defendant couldn’t have left upon request). Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 646 S.E.2d 212 (June 4, 2007). Interview was not custodial: “ The testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that the detectives’ encounter with Vaughn was low-key and non-threatening. He ‘voluntarily agreed to ride with the officers to the police station to answer their questions. [Cit.]’ Henley v. State, [ v. State, 277 Ga. 818, 820(2) (596 S.E.2d 578) (2004)]. Although the detectives told Vaughn that he could drive himself, he chose to ride with them because his personal vehicle was at a repair shop and he only had access to his employer’s van. ‘The questioning took place at the police station. However, the officers did not demand that [he] submit to interrogation at that or any other site. Instead, it is undisputed that he willingly responded to a request to come to the station, where he cooperated fully....’ Hightower v. State, 272 Ga. 42, 43(2) (526 S.E.2d 836) (2000). Vaughn was not frisked, and he was allowed to retain a pocketknife which he showed the detectives. At the time of the interview, they did not believe that there was probable cause to arrest him, but he was a suspect. Although the detectives attempted to elicit incriminating information, whether Vaughn was a ‘suspect at the time of the questioning is not dispositive of the custody issue.’ Henley v. State, supra. ‘“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest.” [Cit.]’ Hodges v. State, 265 Ga. 870, 872(2) (463 S.E.2d 16) (1995). The record does not contain any indication that Vaughn ‘informed the officers that he wanted the interview to end, that he wished to speak with counsel, or that he wished to leave the station. After [he] made his statements, he was driven home by an officer.’ Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 836, 837-838(2) (607 S.E.2d 559) (2005). Under these circumstances, ‘we must affirm the trial court’s finding that [Vaughn] was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. [Cits.] Therefore, admission of his non-custodial statements was proper.’ Hightower v. State, supra.” Accord, Ramirez (November 6, 2007), above. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298 (11 th Cir., December 20, 2006). “As some of our sister circuits have decided, a seizure does not necessarily constitute custody for Miranda purposes. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 672 (2d Cir., 2004); United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir., 2000); United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir., 1988) (en banc). The standards are different. The Fourth Amendment seizure analysis uses the ‘free to leave’ test: a person is ‘seized’ when ‘a reasonable person would [not] feel free to terminate the encounter’ with the police. Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir., 2006). By contrast, a person is in ‘custody’ for Miranda purposes only when there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ [ California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)].” Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 637 S.E.2d 652 (November 20, 2006). Trial court properly determined that defendant was not in custody when he gave his statement about the child victim’s injuries: defendant was voluntarily transported to the police station, not handcuffed; patted down for weapons for officer safety; “Scott was told that he was not being singled out, that [officer] would ask for statements from all the adults in the apartment;” officer testified he could have terminated the interview and been returned home at any time; and “[a]t no time did Scott indicate a reluctance to continue the interview or request to speak to anyone outside the building.” Bass v. State, 282 Ga.App. 159, 637 S.E.2d 863 (October 31, 2006). “Bass asserts that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement to police because the police, while having probable cause to arrest, interviewed him without warning him of his Miranda [cit.] rights. We disagree. Whether a police officer focused his unarticulated suspicions upon the individual being questioned is of no consequence for Miranda purposes. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293) (1994). This is so because Miranda was fashioned to redress the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government’s suspicions when the questioning commenced. Id. at 114 S.Ct. 1529. Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. Id. at 1530. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the individual was formally arrested or restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest, not whether the police had probable cause to arrest. See id. at 1529. See also Lobdell v. State, 256 Ga. 769, 773(6) (353 S.E.2d 799) (1979) ( Miranda does not apply unless a person is