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taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in some significant way). (Punctuation omitted.) Hodges v. State, 265 Ga. 870, 872(2) (463 S.E.2d 16) (1995). Instead, the issue is ‘whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Stansbury, supra, 511 U.S. at 322(II). Here, the record shows that Bass went to the police station voluntarily to be interviewed by the investigating detective; he arrived ‘long before’ the detective and waited for him; the interview occurred at the beginning of the detective’s investigation; and the detective did not regard Bass as being in custody during the interview. Bass does not contend that any restraint was placed on his freedom of movement or that he was otherwise prevented from leaving the interview at his discretion; and his arrest came at the end of the interview after the detective received more medical information in conference with colleagues.” Durham v. State, 281 Ga. 208, 636 S.E.2d 513 (October 16, 2006). Trial court properly concluded that defendant’s un- Mirandized statements were not the product of custodial interrogation. “[Defendant] gave the first statement to police officers who were sent to the hospital to investigate the injuries to the victim and who questioned [defendant] about the incident because she arrived with the victim and identified herself as his wife. [Defendant] was in a private waiting room and the evidence established that she was not a suspect at the time and was free to leave. In this first statement she claimed that the victim was shot by a man in a drug-related incident. Subsequently, after police developed information from the crime scene that the shooter could have been a woman, [defendant] was asked and voluntarily agreed to give a follow-up statement at the police station. She was not under arrest when she told police that the shooter was an unknown woman.” Subsequent statement was Mirandized . All were properly admitted. Harmon v. State, 281 Ga.App. 35, 635 S.E.2d 348 (August 10, 2006). Trial court’s finding that defendant was not in custody at time he gave statement was not clearly erroneous, although he “was approached by four police officers at his home, taken to the police station in a police vehicle, and questioned in an ‘interrogation room.’” “Here, Harmon voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station and was never handcuffed. While he rode in a police vehicle, he was taken to the lobby of the police services building, where the detectives had their offices, rather than the booking area. The interview took place in an unlocked room. Harmon went to the police station voluntarily, and he was not restrained and never asked to leave while he was being interviewed. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that Harmon was not in custody and admitting his statement.” (Citations omitted.) Cited with approval, Axelburg (October 31, 2008), above. Montgomery v. State, 279 Ga.App. 419, 631 S.E.2d 717 (May 16, 2006). “[A] pat-down search, even a forcible one, does not amount to ‘custody’ that would trigger the duty to read a Miranda warning. Whately v. State, 196 Ga.App. 73, 78(5) (395 S.E.2d 582) (1990).” Connell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 413, 631 S.E.2d 456 (May 16, 2006). Officer made a traffic stop after seeing defendant drinking beer while driving. Officer also had information that defendant was carrying drugs. Defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, where officer found a rock of crack cocaine. Defendant admitted the cocaine belonged to him. Held, trial court properly admitted evidence of this statement, as defendant was not in custody at the time. Fact that officer had probable cause for arrest is not dispositive. “Indeed, the officer did nothing to restrain Connell’s movement during his investigation or otherwise indicate to Connell that he was under arrest.” Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 629 S.E.2d 213 (April 25, 2006). “Bell, a 22-year old, agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was released from handcuffs. His first statement was obtained shortly after his arrival at the station. He did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Although he was told several times that he was free to leave, he agreed to remain at the station. He was made comfortable during his stay and was not denied access to the telephone. Applying an objective standard, we agree with the trial court that a reasonable person in Bell’s situation would not have believed he was physically deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Thus, Bell was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when his first statement was given. See Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237(2) (626 S.E.2d 491) (2006). Compare McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493(1) (591 S.E.2d 788) (2004) (defendant who was not permitted to leave the station to keep an appointment, and was told that the officers had enough evidence to keep him there, was in custody for purposes of Miranda ); State v. Shephard, 248 Ga.App. 433(2) (546 S.E.2d 823) (2001) (where police entered home of intoxicated DUI defendant without a warrant and awakened him from a ‘dead sleep,’ statements made in a patrol car without benefit of Miranda warnings were ruled inadmissible).” Accord, Axelburg (October 31, 2008), above. Quedens v. State, 280 Ga. 355, 629 S.E.2d 197 (March 27, 2006). 1. Defendant’s statement was non-custodial: taken at her residence during execution of a search warrant, “she moved about her home without restriction, she made and