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incident occurred in Dekalb County, the Atlanta officer summoned a Dekalb officer. When the defendant attempted to leave, the Atlanta officer held him down and handcuffed him to a gurney. He remained thus until the Dekalb officer arrived, and gave the Dekalb officer essentially the same statement. Defendant was not Mirandized before giving either statement. Held, the first statement was non-custodial, but the second was custodial. “Moyer was handcuffed when the DeKalb officer arrived, and remained in handcuffs while the DeKalb officer questioned him. The trial court admitted the DeKalb officer’s testimony, reasoning that the questioning was not custodial because the DeKalb officer believed Moyer to be a victim when he began his questioning. We disagree. The subjective beliefs of law enforcement officers are not controlling for purposes of Miranda warnings. [Cit.] The correct inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would perceive that he was in custody. Id. When Moyer attempted to leave the hospital, the Atlanta officer held him down and handcuffed him to the gurney. Moyer remained handcuffed until the DeKalb officer arrived and questioned him. Moyer was clearly ‘restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest,’ and a reasonable person in Moyer’s situation would perceive that he was in custody. Thus, the DeKalb officer should have given Miranda warnings and the trial court erred in denying Moyer’s motion to suppress the statements he made to the DeKalb officer.” Harmless error, however, as the second statement was cumulative of the first. Ray v. State, 273 Ga.App. 656, 615 S.E.2d 812 (June 15, 2005). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant was not in custody when he made his statement which lead to a consensual search of car and apartment, where incriminating evidence was discovered. Defendant “voluntarily drove his car to the station,” where the officer questioned defendant about his roommate’s involvement in several robberies. “Ray was very nervous, began to cry, and said he knew what the detective wanted to hear but could not bring himself to tell him what he wanted to know.” “‘Even if the police have probable cause to arrest at the time of the interview and secretly intend to charge the suspect at some future time, such facts are immaterial to a determination of whether the suspect was in custody at the time of the interview, except when and to what extent the police communicate their future intent to arrest during the course of the interview. Miranda warnings are not required simply because questioning takes place in a building containing jail cells. A suspect must be in a custodial situation for Miranda to apply; a suspect is not entitled to Miranda warnings, as a matter of right, unless he has been taken into custody or has been deprived of freedom of action in another significant way.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga.App. 604, 605(1) (497 S.E.2d 236) (1997).” Accord, Huskins v. State , 294 Ga.App. 653, 669 S.E.2d 680 (November 18, 2008). Brown v. State, 273 Ga.App. 577, 615 S.E.2d 628 (June 8, 2005). Without reading Miranda warnings, officer sought to interrogate defendant about thefts from vehicles, and aggravated assault, but defendant denied active involvement in the incidents. Officer then “‘pointed out to [Brown] since he obviously didn’t want to talk about the incident, that I already ... had been told that he had fired a weapon and that we would – that he had thrown it out on the side of the road and that we would go back and find the weapon.’ [Officer] testified Brown responded that ‘[the police] wouldn’t be finding any gun, or something to that effect.’” Held, trial court erred in finding that the statement was not the product of interrogation. “The critical inquiry in this case is … whether [Officer’s] statement to Brown that he already knew Brown fired the gun and then threw it out the window was the ‘functional equivalent’ of an interrogation. We find that on its face, the statement appears to be the type condemned by our Supreme Court as a ‘psychological ploy’ – stating the guilt of the accused as a fact – constituting the functional equivalent of an interrogation.” See Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Kennedy v. State , 246 Ga.App. 236, 238(2), 540 S.E.2d 229 (2000). Statement was voluntary under a due process analysis, however, and its admission was harmless error as it was not, itself, incriminatory, and defendant admitted at trial to firing the weapon. See Metheny v. State , 197 Ga.App. 882, 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990). State v. Parks, 273 Ga.App. 682, 616 S.E.2d 456 (May 20, 2005). Trial court erred when it found that defendant was in custody when he gave his non- Mirandized statement, and thus excluded the statement. Defendant voluntarily followed officers to police station, driving his own vehicle. “He met with two detectives in a second-floor interview room with a door that could not be locked, although access to the department offices (but not the elevator to the second floor on weekdays) was limited by card key. The interview between Parks and the detectives was videotaped. During the interview, he was told several times that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. Parks never attempted to leave or to stop the interview. After Parks made certain statements during the interview, the detectives left the room, conferred, and concluded that they had probable cause to arrest Parks. They re-entered the interview room, informed Parks that he was under arrest, and read him his Miranda warnings. Parks declined to speak further with police and requested a lawyer.” Trial court improperly focused on deception by officers, who falsely told defendant that witnesses had picked him out of a line-up. “The trial court appeared to believe that deception was only permitted ‘after Miranda’ and that the police should have given Parks warnings before using deception to question him. But ‘use of trickery to