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obtain a confession does not render the confession inadmissible so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. And absent any evidence that the police investigative techniques were designed to induce the slightest hope of benefit or fear of injury, the resulting statements are not rendered involuntary and inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789(8) (493 S.E.2d 157) (1997). More importantly, the use of trickery or deception does not bear on the issue of whether Parks was in custody or reasonably believed himself to be in custody . See Richardson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 711, 713(1) (595 S.E.2d 565) (2004). Rather, trickery may compromise the voluntariness of a statement if it constitutes ‘the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.’ (Citations, footnote, and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 715(1).” Dillard v. State, 272 Ga.App. 523, 612 S.E.2d 804 (March 3, 2005). Trial court could find that defendant was not in custody when interviewed by officers in her high school principal’s office. “The principal … summoned Dillard to the office, and a 15-minute meeting ensued between Dillard, the two officers, and the principal. Dillard appeared to be reasonably intelligent and appeared to understand the officers. The officers showed her the photographs and asked her if she knew who was pictured, and Dillard stated that she was one of the people shown. The officers’ manner was conversational and Dillard did not appear frightened. Dillard was not in handcuffs, she had not been told that she was not free to go or under arrest, and she was never threatened or promised anything. She never asked to terminate the meeting or objected to the questioning. Thereafter, Dillard agreed to accompany the officers to the police department for further questioning. Some evidence therefore existed on which the trial court could have concluded that Dillard’s freedom was not restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The trial court’s decision to admit the statement was not clearly erroneous.” Distinguishes cases where trial court, in its discretion, found defendant to be in custody: Wilson (August 21, 2002 ) , below ; State v. Lucas, 265 Ga.App. 242, 593 S.E.2d 707 (2004). Bond v. State, 271 Ga.App. 849, 610 S.E.2d 609 (February 15, 2005). Officers approached campsite occupied by defendant and his friends after officers observed apparent drug use there. Finding what appeared to be a weapon, they handcuffed the campers while awaiting the arrival of the officer who would decide whether to arrest the campers. Officer testified that campers were not under arrest at that time, but were only cuffed for officer safety. Defendant was the only camper who didn’t have drugs found on his person. “Bond was neither searched nor interviewed before Wilson arrived, and Wilson had Bond’s handcuffs removed before speaking with him. Bond then told the officer that he had used cocaine and marijuana earlier that evening. This statement provided Wilson with probable cause to believe that Bond was, at least, a party to the crime of possession of cocaine. [Cit.] Wilson’s subsequent search of Bond was lawful as incident to his arrest.” Trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Defendant was not in custody at time statement was made. Unclear how long Bond and others were handcuffed prior to Wilson’s arrival. Poole v. State, 270 Ga.App. 432, 606 S.E.2d 878 (November 15, 2004). “We find that a reasonable person in Poole’s situation would not ‘have believed he was physically deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.’ (Citation omitted.) [ State v .] Brannan [222 Ga.App. 372, 474 S.E.2d 267 (1996)]. He voluntarily accompanied the police to the station, was not under arrest, was not forced or coerced to give the sample by his own admission, and was returned to his home after providing the [handwriting] sample. As a result, the trial court did not err by denying Poole’s motion to suppress based on its conclusion that he was not in custody at the time he gave the handwriting sample. See Vaughn v. State, 261 Ga. 686, 687(2) (410 S.E.2d 108) (1991) (defendant not in custody even though he was a suspect at the time he was invited to station to make a statement).” Accord, Harmon (August 10, 2006), above. Note, compelling the giving of a handwriting exemplar does not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it is not “testimonial” in character, Gilbert v. California , 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). Mullins v. State, 270 Ga.App. 271, 605 S.E.2d 913 (November 1, 2004). Defendant’s statement was not custodial: “The record shows that Mullins voluntarily appeared at the police station to turn himself in because he had heard that there was a warrant for his arrest for murder. The officer interviewing Mullins told him that he was not presently charged with murder. Mullins then told the officer that he would fully cooperate until he was charged with something, and that once he was charged he would ‘restrain from saying anything.’ At the time of the interview, Mullins was a suspect, there was a BOLO (‘be on the lookout’) for him and the police would not have allowed him to leave the station after entering it. He was never told, however, that he was under arrest, and he voluntarily appeared at the station of his own accord. There was no warrant for Mullins’ arrest at the time he gave his statement.” Jones v. State, 270 Ga.App. 233, 606 S.E.2d 288 (October 29, 2004). Statement was not custodial: “although the officers considered going to Jones’s place of employment to speak with him, they allowed Jones to contact them. He came to the station voluntarily. Jones was told at the outset that he was not under arrest, and the evidence showed that there were no