☢ test - Í

pending warrants against him. In fact, the officers told Jones that he would be going home after the interview. The interview was held in [officer’s] office, not in a secured interview room, and there is no evidence of any locked doors. Jones was cooperative, and … he never asked to stop the interview or to leave.” At the end of the statement, defendant was allowed to leave; he was not arrested or charged until over a week later. Distinguishing McDougal (January 12, 2004), below. Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459, 604 S.E.2d 133 (October 4, 2004). Defendant’s statement was non-custodial: although she was taken to the police station in handcuffs, she voluntarily went with the investigator, was told she was not being arrested, and was only handcuffed for officer safety because the investigator was driving an unmarked vehicle with no protective shield. At the station the handcuffs were removed “and she sat in a sitting room rather than an interrogation room. Before any questioning began, she was again told she was not under arrest and she could leave after giving her statement.” She was driven home after the statement, and not charged with murder until two weeks later. Accord, Smith v. State , 281 Ga. 185, 640 S.E.2d 1 (December 11, 2006). Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 299, 602 S.E.2d 574 (September 13, 2004). After a shooting at a club, in which the shooter also managed to shoot himself, officer located defendant at a nearby hospital. Officer obtained defendant’s bloody clothes, then interviewed defendant about his story as to how his injuries occurred – a story not involving the shooting at the club. Officer did not read Miranda warnings or arrest defendant at that time; defendant had not been released from medical care. Held, trial court properly admitted this non- Mirandized statement, as defendant was not in custody at the time, notwithstanding that “he was unable to leave the hospital due to his physical condition and the fact that his clothes were in police custody.” Distinguished from Reinhardt v. State , 263 Ga. 113, 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993), where statement was deemed to be custodial: “in that case, a doctor told the defendant that he could leave the hospital, but the police took the defendant into an isolated room for questioning and asked him to remove his pants and shoes.” Accord, Moyer v. State , 275 Ga.App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 637 (September 2, 2005); Jennings (November 5, 2007), above. Distinguished, Carder (December 11, 2009), above (officer had hospital personnel detain defendant when she refused treatment; trial court properly suppressed subsequent non-Mirandized statements). Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (June 1, 2004). Trial court was not required to consider defendant’s age (17 ½) or past legal experience in determining whether a reasonable person in his situation would have thought he was free to leave when interrogated by detective. Trial court’s finding that defendant was not in custody was thus not unreasonable under prevailing Supreme Court precedent. Note, “fair-minded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody. On one hand, certain facts weigh against a finding that Alvarado was in custody. The police did not transport Alvarado to the station or require him to appear at a particular time. [Cit.] They did not threaten him or suggest he would be placed under arrest. Alvarado’s parents remained in the lobby during the interview, suggesting that the interview would be brief. [Cit.] In fact, according to trial counsel for Alvarado, he and his parents were told that the interview was ‘not going to be long.’ During the interview, [officer] focused on [co- defendant’s] crimes rather than Alvarado’s. Instead of pressuring Alvarado with the threat of arrest and prosecution, she appealed to his interest in telling the truth and being helpful to a police officer. [Cit.] In addition, [officer] twice asked Alvarado if he wanted to take a break. At the end of the interview, Alvarado went home. All of these objective facts are consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. … Other facts point in the opposite direction. [Officer] interviewed Alvarado at the police station. The interview lasted two hours, …. [Officer] did not tell Alvarado that he was free to leave. Alvarado was brought to the police station by his legal guardians rather than arriving on his own accord, making the extent of his control over his presence unclear. Counsel for Alvarado alleges that Alvarado’s parents asked to be present at the interview but were rebuffed, a fact that -- if known to Alvarado -- might reasonably have led someone in Alvarado’s position to feel more restricted than otherwise. These facts weigh in favor of the view that Alvarado was in custody.” While consideration of the suspect’s age and prior experience might be appropriate in a determination of the voluntariness of a statement, they are inconsistent with the Court’s goal of creating an objective test of custody determination. “We do not ask police officers to consider these contingent psychological factors when deciding when suspects should be advised of their Miranda rights.” Besides, “[I]n most cases, police officers will not know a suspect’s interrogation history.” Four justices dissent, arguing that defendant was clearly in custody in these circumstances. Evans v. State, 267 Ga.App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671 (May 25, 2004). Distinguishes statutory definition of arrest as found in OCGA § 17-4-1 and “‘arrest’ for purposes of constitutional analysis” such as requires Miranda warnings. “The provisions of OCGA § 17-4-1 were made part of our original Code of 1863 [Cit.] and have long been interpreted as meaning an arrest is accomplished whenever the liberty of a person to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter