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how slight such restraint may be. Clements v. State, 226 Ga. 66, 67(2) (172 S.E.2d 600) (1970). This remains the law.” A different definition applies for purposes of Miranda , however: “whether a challenged detention involves the degree of restraint associated with a formal arrest. In [determining this], we apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonable person would feel so restrained as to equate the detention to a formal arrest. [Cit.] Notably, a ‘reasonable person’ has been defined as one ‘neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances.’” Henley v. State, 277 Ga. 818, 596 S.E.2d 578 (May 3, 2004). Defendant told police investigating his son’s death that the child may have had a heart attack. Defendant agreed to accompany the police to the station. Officers “took Henley’s statement in an interview room at the station. Their initial questions were aimed at acquiring background information about the child and the family. During the interview, Henley volunteered that he asked [victim] for his belt after the two had a confrontation. At that point [an hour into the interview], [officer] stopped the interview and read Henley his Miranda rights, whereupon Henley signed a written waiver. After executing the Miranda waiver, Henley confessed that he hit the child with a belt at least 50 times that evening. It was then that he was placed under arrest.” Held, defendant’s pre- Miranda statements were non-custodial: “Henley voluntarily agreed to ride with the officers to the police station to answer their questions. [Cit.] Detective Hughes testified that he did not consider Henley a suspect at the beginning of the interrogation, and Detective Hilton ‘had no idea what [Henley’s] particular involvement was.’ Furthermore, the detectives’ initial questions concerned only the family history and the victim’s background, and were unlikely to elicit incriminating information. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 857(3), 452 S.E.2d 494 (1995). We conclude that a reasonable person under these circumstances would have felt at liberty to end the questioning and leave. It follows that the trial court did not err in admitting Henley’s pre- Miranda statement.” McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493, 591 S.E.2d 788 (January 12, 2004). Notwithstanding officers’ statements to defendant that he wasn’t under arrest, “a reasonable person in McDougal’s situation would have believed he was in the custody of police. McDougal agreed to accompany detectives to the Smyrna police station, and he was not handcuffed or searched. However, upon arrival at the police station, he was led through two locked doors into a secure interview room. When asked about a gun at the beginning of the interview, he tried to avoid answering the question by stating that he was a convicted felon, something the officers had learned during the car ride to the station. Detective Lee then confronted McDougal with his recent possession of a handgun, and the detectives reminded him several times during the interview that he could be arrested for such a charge. Detective Lee expressly told McDougal that they already had enough evidence about the gun that he ‘[did not] have to let [him] go home today.’ The detective would make no commitments to McDougal about whether he would be arrested. That McDougal was not free to leave was further reinforced by Detective Lee’s statement to McDougal that he was not going to be released in time for his 2:00 p.m. appointment. In these circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that Detective Lee’s permission was required before the interview could end and he could leave the police station.” Trial court should have granted motion to suppress statements. Distinguished in Jones (October 29, 2004), above, and Bell (April 25, 2006), above. Accord, Mayberry v. State , 267 Ga.App. 620, 600 S.E.2d 703 (May 27, 2004); Clay (March 19, 2012), above. Meadows v. State, 264 Ga.App. 160, 590 S.E.2d 173 (November 14, 2003). Trial court could find that defendant’s statement was not given while “in custody” when he was interviewed by police officer while hospitalized. “‘ Miranda warnings are required only when one’s freedom has been restricted so as to render [him or] her in custody of the State. However, the determination of whether one is in custody depends upon the objective circumstances attending the particular interrogation.... In determining whether Miranda warnings were required in a given situation, it is not relevant that investigators (1) might have focused their suspicions upon the person being questioned, or (2) have already decided that they will take the person into custody and charge them with an offense, so long as that individual is not in custody.’ (Footnotes and citations omitted.) Hardin v. State, 269 Ga. 1, 2-3(2) (494 S.E.2d 647) (1998). [Defendant’s] movement was restrained not by [officer], but by virtue of [defendant’s] injury. Undisputed evidence was presented that despite this injury, [defendant] was coherent and willing to talk with [officer] and was not coerced. ” Accord, Alwin v. State , 267 Ga.App. 236, 599 S.E.2d 216 (April 23, 2004) (Defendant questioned while seeking treatment for stab wound at emergency room; “‘[t]he fact that a defendant is in pain or taking pain medication does not, in and of itself, render any statement made involuntary. Nor does the circumstance of a defendant being hospitalized and undergoing treatment require such a finding.’ Myers v. State, 275 Ga. 709, 713(3) (572 S.E.2d 606) (2002)”). Zackery v. State, 262 Ga.App. 646, 586 S.E.2d 346 (August 4, 2003). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed. Defendant was neither under arrest nor being interrogated, but was being detained pending the execution of a search warrant when he