☢ test - Í

uttered those fateful words, “You’ve got me.” Defendant made the statement when officer reached for a jacket hanging on a wall. The statement was admissible. Black v. State, 261 Ga.App. 263, 582 S.E.2d 213 (May 14, 2003). Child molestation conviction affirmed. “[A] person is not in a state of custody merely because he is a prime suspect at the time he is interrogated by the police…. Black asked the officers to call him if any charges were filed and left the police station. Obviously, therefore, he knew that no charges were pending. Given that knowledge, as well as the interview’s brevity, his agreement to speak with the officers, and the lack of any evidence of coercion, the trial court’s ruling [that defendant was not in custody] was not clearly erroneous.” Accord, Freeman v. State , 295 Ga. 820, 764 S.E.2d 390 (October 6, 2014) (fact that interview form indicated defendant was a “suspect” at time statement was made didn’t mean he was in custody). Pinckney v. State, 259 Ga.App. 309, 576 S.E.2d 574 (January 9, 2003). Interlocutory review in prosecution for child molestation. Statement given in following circumstances was not custodial: defendant voluntarily met with two police officers at his own residence. Because others were at the apartment, defendant agreed to sit in officers’ unmarked police car. Car was not locked. Officers sat in front, defendant in rear. The officers were not overbearing. “At the end of the interview, the officers thanked Pinckney for his honesty and told him he was free to go.” “‘The issue of whether one is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact, and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.’ In resolving this issue, the relevant inquiry is whether ‘there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him “in custody”.’ Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714) (1977) (per curiam). ‘In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293) (1994). ‘Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' Id. at 324… A “reasonable person” test applies to determine whether an individual not formally arrested is nevertheless in custody for Miranda purposes. This occurs if, but only if, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest. A reasonable person has been defined as one neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances.” Accord, Crider v. State , 319 Ga.App. 567, 737 S.E.2d 344 (January 17, 2013) (DUI suspect not in custody though she admitted to officer she had been drinking and should not have been driving). State v. Wilson, 257 Ga.App. 120, 570 S.E.2d 409 (August 21, 2002), reversed on related grounds (improper application of test for admissibility of minor’s statement to an adult defendant), Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant was in custody at time statement was given, and thus suppressing statement for lack of Miranda warnings. Police had probable cause to arrest, and considered defendant their prime suspect. Defendant knew the police thought he had done something wrong. Police repeatedly told defendant he didn’t need a lawyer, but wouldn’t let his brother in DFCS building where interrogation was conducted. Defendant was questioned for three hours although he had been awake for 18 hours at beginning of statement, hadn’t eaten all day, and had recently been hospitalized for pneumonia. See also Attorneys – Right to Counsel, above. Distinguished in Dillard (March 3, 2005), above (meeting only took 15 minutes; trial court’s factual finding that defendant not in custody not an abuse of discretion). Driver v. State, 248 Ga.App. 439, 546 S.E.2d 549 (March 5, 2001). DUI and habitual violator convictions affirmed. Deputy Sheriff responded to a call concerning a one-car accident. The accident occurred right across the street from the defendant’s brother’s house, and the officer found the defendant there. The deputy asked the defendant whether he had been driving and the defendant replied that he had not been the one driving. The deputy continued talking with other members of the household. The defendant returned from the back of the house and stated, “I am not going to let my brother go to jail for this.... I was driving the car.” The deputy then placed him under arrest and read him implied consent. A subsequent breath test showed a blood alcohol level of .131 grams. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement into evidence because he was not advised of his Miranda rights. Held, the trial court properly admitted defendant’s pre- Miranda statement that he was driving his brother-in-law’s car because a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have assumed he was in custody when the deputy asked if he had been driving. Lyons v. State, 244 Ga.App. 658, 535 S.E.2d 841 (June 15, 2000). Interlocutory appeal in DUI prosecution; trial court could find that driver wasn’t in custody when field sobriety evaluations administered. “An investigatory stop is not