☢ test - Í

automatically an arrest for Miranda purposes simply because an officer is armed. See Franklin v. State, 143 Ga.App. 3, 5(2), 237 S.E.2d 425 (1977).” Tolliver v. State , 243 Ga.App. 180, 531 S.E.2d 383 (March 16, 2000). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to officer at scene, as defendant was not then in custody. Officer was called to scene of an altercation between motorists, involving a handgun. “Pursuant to his normal procedure, [Officer] Honeycutt spoke with all the parties to gain an understanding of what had transpired. Tolliver told Honeycutt that he had ‘[taken] out his pistol and pointed it at the [Edwardses] to try to scare them off’ after it appeared to him that ‘[they] were trying to ram him’ and that the pistol had discharged accidentally. Honeycutt never read Miranda warnings to Tolliver. After a Jackson–Denno hearing, Honeycutt was allowed to testify to Tolliver's statement at trial. The statement contradicted later testimony from Tolliver that he never pointed his weapon at the [victims] Edwardses but only held it pointed upwards before he swerved and it discharged.” “‘As a general rule, one who is the subject of a general on-the-scene investigation is not in custody ...’ though he may not be free to leave during the investigation. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mason v. State, 177 Ga.App. 184, 185(1), 338 S.E.2d 706 (1985); see also Shy [ v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 819-820, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975)]. The evidence before the court did not show that a reasonable person in Tolliver's position would have felt restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest when he spoke with Honeycutt. Therefore, we find no error in the court's admission of his statement to Honeycutt.” Sims v. State, 242 Ga.App. 460, 530 S.E.2d 212 (February 22, 2000). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to police, taken when he was not in custody. “Sims was asked to come down to the police station for questioning in an interview room, was told that he was free to leave, and in fact left after questioning without being charged or detained. He was not ‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda. See Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga.App. 604, 605–606(1), 497 S.E.2d 236 (1997).” Hightower v. State, 272 Ga. 42, 526 S.E.2d 836 (January 31, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant wasn’t in custody when he made statement to police. “The questioning took place at the police station. However, the officers did not demand that Hightower submit to interrogation at that or any other site. Instead, it is undisputed that he willingly responded to a request to come to the station, where he cooperated fully by responding to the officers' general questioning which was calculated to determine whether he was completely innocent, merely a potential witness or an actual suspect. Hodges v. State, [265 Ga. 870, 873(2), 463 S.E.2d 16 (1995)]; Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 287(1), 313 S.E.2d 95 (1984). There is no evidence that the officers placed any explicit or implicit limits on Hightower's right to terminate the questioning and to leave at any point that he wished. The lack of restraint on his movements while at the station was not an illusion, as the police in fact permitted him to depart after each session of interrogation. Under this evidence, we must affirm the trial court's finding that Hightower was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. McAllister v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 228(1), 507 S.E.2d 448 (1998); Hodges v. State, supra at 872(2), 463 S.E.2d 16. Therefore, admission of his non-custodial statements was proper.” Turner v. State, 241 Ga.App. 431, 526 S.E.2d 95 (November 22, 1999). Physical precedent only. Defendant’s conviction for vehicular homicide affirmed; trial court properly admitted statements defendant made to officer while in the hospital before he was arrested, without Miranda warnings. “‘A person is not entitled to Miranda warnings as a matter of right, even though that person is a suspect, unless that person had been taken into custody or has been deprived of freedom of action in another significant way.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313(1), 444 S.E.2d 767 (1994); Syfrett v. State, 210 Ga.App. 185, 186, 435 S.E.2d 470 (1993). Here, Turner was not in police custody. The investigating officer testified that Turner's involvement in the collision may have rendered him a ‘suspect,’ but at the time of the hospital interview, the officer did not have probable cause to arrest or detain Turner and had no intention of doing so. … From the record, it appears that any restriction on Turner's freedom was due to his status as a hospital patient. In fact, Turner was not taken into police custody until a week after his statement to the investigator .” Threatt v. State, 240 Ga.App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276 (November 1, 1999). Defendant was not in custody such as to require Miranda warnings, just because officers illegally entered defendant’s home. Officers entered the apartment when defendant’s wife opened the door, looking for a suspected drunk driver, but with no probable cause for arrest, no warrant, no consent, and no exigent circumstances. “Although the police officer briefly questioned Threatt from a position a couple of feet inside his apartment, we find nothing in this encounter which would have caused a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of action had been more than temporarily restrained by the questioning.” Statements suppressed instead based on Fourth Amendment violation.