☢ test - Í

Sams v. State, 239 Ga.App. 715, 521 S.E.2d 848 (August 27, 1999). At defendant’s trial for habitual violator, trial court’s finding that defendant was not in custody was supported by evidence: “The evidence which supported this finding was Officer Rosine's testimony that he did not coerce defendant into coming to the police station; that defendant was free to leave during questioning and that, although defendant was questioned while behind closed doors, defendant was neither physically restrained nor unable to leave the interview room.” Accord, Sims v. State , 297 Ga. 401, 774 S.E.2d 620 (June 29, 2015) (defendant not in custody when he rode in front passenger seat of police car, not restrained or handcuffed, and gave statement in an interview with open door, unguarded; officer specifically told defendant he wasn’t under arrest). Lancaster v. State, 240 Ga.App. 359, 522 S.E.2d 30 (August 17, 1999). Court properly admitted defendant’s statement to arresting officer that he had had eight or 10 beers before driving; although officer clearly was suspicious that defendant was DUI, “[i]n this case, Officer Harper did nothing that ‘would have reasonably communicated to [Lancaster] that he was in custody.’ Metheny v. State, 197 Ga.App. 882, 884(1)(a), 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990).” Accord, Richardson v. State , 299 Ga.App. 365, 682 S.E.2d 684 (July 24, 2009) (“‘roadside questioning during the investigation of a routine traffic incident generally does not constitute a custodial situation.’ (Footnote omitted.) Razor v. State, 259 Ga.App. 196, 198(3) (576 S.E.2d 604) (2003).”); Phillips v. State , 287 Ga. 560, 697 S.E.2d 818 (July 12, 2010) (defendant’s “statements giving a false name and indicating that he did not have a driver's license with him” at roadblock not custodial). 10. FINDINGS OF FACT Brown v. State, 294 Ga. 677, 755 S.E.2d 699 (March 3, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No error in denying motion to suppress custodial statements although “the order denying the motion to suppress … des not explicitly state that the statements were made voluntarily.” “[T]his Court has previously noted ‘our preference for trial courts to make findings of fact, if the evidence warrants them, substantially as follows: I find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was advised of each of his Miranda rights, that he understood them, that he voluntarily waived them, and that he thereafter gave his statement freely and voluntarily without any hope of benefit or fear of injury. (If the defendant denies having been advised of any one of his Miranda rights or says that he requested an attorney, specific findings as to the point in controversy should also be made.)’ Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 664, 666(6), 492 S.E.2d 868 (1997).” “‘[W]e would remind the trial courts of this state of our preference for findings of fact which comport with the form suggested in Berry v. State, [254 Ga. 101, 104–105(1), fn. 6 (326 S.E.2d 748) (1985).]’ Id. See also Nelson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 686, 687(2), 431 S.E.2d 464 (1993).” 11. “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE” See also SEARCH AND SEIZURE – SEARCHES – FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE, below State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015). In murder prosecution, trial court erred by applying “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to OCGA § 24-8-824; that code section does not embody a “broad exclusionary rule” under which “the court must suppress not only illegally acquired evidence but also evidence derived from the tainted primary evidence.” Trial court suppressed defendant’s first two statements to police under 24- 8-824 as being expressly obtained by hope of benefit – officers promised to protect defendant from murder charges if he told the truth. But trial court held that third statement was sufficiently attenuated from the first two statements as not to be tainted by them. 1. Trial court’s conclusion that the third statement wasn’t tainted by the first two was wrong. Trial court ruled “that any taint from Chulpayev's previous statements obtained in violation of that statute was ‘clearly eradicated’ by the passage of five months between his October statements and his April statements and the Miranda warnings given to Chulpayev before the post-arrest interview.” “[T]he trial court's conclusion was erroneous, because the court's analysis overlooked the police's ‘exploitation of [the] illegality’ between October 2012 and the post-arrest interview, and the mere passage of time does not cleanse the primary tainted evidence of its taint or prevent that taint from infecting its fruits.” In the interim, officers used information provided in the first two, involuntary statements to find incriminating evidence against defendant – tracking devices in the victim’s car, and proof that defendant accessed the devices to track victim on the night of his murder. “This search was the direct result of the police's use of Chulpayev's earlier statements, as demonstrated by the search warrant affidavit, which attributed the information about the trackers exclusively to Chulpayev's October 2012 statements to Detective Williams. The record shows no intervening circumstances or voluntary acts by Chulpayev or anyone else between October 2012 and the Audi search sufficient to eliminate the connection to the previous statements.” “Chulpayev's arrest on April 12 was likewise based almost entirely on Chulpayev's prior statements, the GPS trackers found in the Audi search, and the resulting tracker records. Again, the record shows no relevant intervening circumstances. The fruit of Chulpayev's detention, therefore, must also be treated as the fruit of his prior statements, unless the causal connection was otherwise eliminated. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (‘[A] confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the