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statement is suppressed as the result of the fruits doctrine, the defendant need not have standing to object to the search in which that evidence is found. 3 LaFave, supra at § 9.5(b), pp. 476-477. It is sufficient that the defendant has standing as to the confession, which, in this case, Vergara does. Sims v. State, 243 Ga. 83, 85(2) (252 S.E.2d 501) (1979) (the only person with standing to complain of the admission of fruits gained from an illegally obtained confession is the person who made the confession).” Opinion treats the drug charge as related to the murder charge. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (February 2, 2007). Trial court properly declined to suppress defendant’s custodial statement. “ Even where an arrest is unlawfully made inside a residence without a warrant, a subsequent statement made outside the residence need not be suppressed on Federal constitutional grounds. Pittman v. State , 277 Ga. 475(4), 592 S.E.2d 72 (2004).” State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758, 632 S.E.2d 654 (July 13, 2006). Violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel in obtaining statement makes statement inadmissible, but does not exclude fruits of the statement if otherwise voluntary. Trial court thus erred in suppressing fruit of defendant’s voluntary statement, produced as a result of officer’s psychological ploy, although statement itself was inadmissible because defendant had invoked his right to counsel. “The State correctly conceded the inadmissibility of the statements themselves, because of Woods’ prior unambiguous request for an attorney. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 271(1), 553 S.E.2d 598 (2001). As the trial court recognized, however, ‘ the “fruit” of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona is not subject to the exclusionary rule. [Cits.]’ Taylor v. State, supra at 276(4), 553 S.E.2d 598.” As to voluntariness: “‘Police appeals to the defendant’s sympathies, such as by the now-famous “Christian burial speech” ploy [employed here], “do not automatically render a confession involuntary[.]” [Cits.]’ 2 LaFave, Israel, and King, Criminal Procedure § 6.2(c), p. 459 (2nd ed.1999). Such an emotional appeal, like the use of trickery or a psychological ploy, does not make a confession involuntary if, as the trial court found here, the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 728(3), 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004); DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789(8), 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997). ‘And absent any evidence that the police investigative techniques were designed to induce the “slightest hope of benefit or ... fear of injury,” the resulting statements are not rendered involuntary ... under OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cits.]” DeYoung v. State, supra. The State presented unrefuted evidence that Woods was neither threatened with the remotest fear of injury nor promised any hope of benefit.” Compare Vergara (February 25, 2008), above. Baker v. State, 277 Ga.App. 520, 627 S.E.2d 145 (February 8, 2006). After improperly making traffic stop of defendant Baker, officers arrested him on drug charges. Officers then took Baker to home he shared with defendant Drescher, where four officers confronted her with Baker in handcuffs and asked to search home. Her consent resulted in finding of drugs in her purse. Held, Drescher’s consent was “fruit of the poisonous tree” of evidence wrongfully seized from Baker. In determining whether subsequently-obtained evidence was “fruit of the poisonous tree” or was sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to be admissible, “[t]he relevant factors include the temporal proximity of an illegal seizure and consent, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. [Cit.] The question of whether consent is the product of free will or the preceding illegality must be answered under the facts of each case; no single fact is dispositive. [Cit.] In this case, officers transported Baker from the scene of the stop to Drescher’s home. There was no significant lapse of time between the unlawful detention of Baker and the consent given by Drescher. The only intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and Drescher’s consent to search her home were the discovery of drugs in Baker’s truck at another location, and his statement, in response to police questioning during the illegal stop, that he might have marijuana at Drescher’s house. Nothing in the record indicates that police had any other basis for believing there were illegal drugs in Drescher’s home. The effect of the unlawful detention had not dissipated and the officers’ conduct had no arguable legal basis. [Cit.] Therefore, we hold that Drescher’s consent was the product of the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not sufficiently attenuated. [Cit.] The trial court erred in denying Drescher’s motion to suppress evidence taken during a search of her home.” Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 480, 606 S.E.2d 671 (November 16, 2004). “[E]ven if a defendant receives proper Miranda warnings, and even if an incriminating statement is ‘voluntary’ for Fifth Amendment purposes, it ‘is nonetheless inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment if it is the product of an illegal “seizure.”’ Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 472(2) (277 S.E.2d 18) (1981).” Defendant failed to raise this argument in trial court, however, and so waived it. Taylor v. State, 274 Ga.App. 269, 553 S.E.2d 598 (October 1, 2001). Interim review in defendant’s capital murder prosecution. Trial court properly denied motion to suppress gun, located by police as a result of defendant’s custodial statement. The statement was obtained in violation of Miranda , as police failed to honor defendant’s unambiguous request