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for counsel; however, the statement was otherwise voluntary, and “the ‘fruit’ of a voluntary Miranda -tainted statement need not be suppressed. The rationale for not suppressing the fruits of a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda and Edwards [ v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)] is that these cases announced prophylactic rules designed to protect suspects' Fifth Amendment rights, but the rules were not themselves constitutional. [ Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298, 306-309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)]. Referring in Elstad to the admissibility of the fruit of a Miranda -tainted statement, the Supreme Court stated, ‘If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.’ Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285; [other cits]. The police in this case failed to honor Taylor's request for counsel, but they did not violate her Fifth Amendment right against coerced self-incrimination. Therefore, because the gun was the fruit of a voluntary statement, we conclude that it is admissible at Taylor's trial. See Wilson [ v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 378–379, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203(2), 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996)]; [ United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 207–208 (5 th Cir., 1986)].” Taylor disapproved “to the extent that [it] can be read as indicating that the fruits of statements obtained in violation of § 24–8–824 must be suppressed,” State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015)). Baker v. State, 238 Ga.App. 802, 521 S.E.2d 24 (June 30, 1999). Trial court properly excluded defendant’s statements as being the product of police coercion where officers threatened to arrest defendant and two others if defendant didn’t admit to owning drugs found in house. 1. Statements resulted from custodial interrogation. “ Handcuffed and surrounded by several police officers, [Defendant's] freedom of action was clearly curtailed so as to establish custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097-1098(V)(A) (7th Cir., 1993); see Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 302-303(2)(c), 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997). While [defendant] was in custody, Officer Davis interrogated him by express questions and also by words and actions designed to elicit an incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 240, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997). Because Officer Davis failed to warn [defendant] of his Miranda rights, his oral statements were inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Metheny v. State, 197 Ga.App. 882, 884-885(1)(b), 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990).” 2. Oral statement was product of coercion and thus involuntary. “In light of the handcuffing of Matthew, the direct threats to Matthew that they would jail his relatives if he did not confess, the spontaneous observation by a third party that the police were pressuring Matthew to confess, and the actions of the officer in beginning to pull a gun in the emotionally charged and volatile atmosphere where police were demanding that Matthew confess, evidence supported the court's finding that under the totality of the circumstances police coercive activities resulted in an involuntary confession.” 3. Reading Miranda prior to later, written statement didn’t remove taint from prior involuntary statement. “At this point a presumption arose that the coerced admission tainted the subsequent written confession. This presumption is overcome only if there was a break in the stream of events between the coerced statement and the subsequent confession such that the coercion surrounding the first statement sufficiently dissipated so as to make the second statement voluntary. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967).” “The Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), that an unwarned admission does not automatically bar a later confession preceded by proper warnings. However, if actual coercion attended the first statement, then the subsequent confession is normally rendered inadmissible under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 928 (11th Cir.1985); cf. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285.” “Evidence supported the court's finding that same coercion also attended the subsequent written confession. Not only did the written confession immediately follow the coerced admission, but it took place at the same location under the watchful eye of the officers who had just forced the first confession. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1467-1468. Moreover, before reading him Miranda rights, Officer Davis had wrested a commitment from Matthew that he would put the just stated admission in writing. Cf. Mobley v. State, 164 Ga.App. 154, 158(6), 296 S.E.2d 617 (1982). The reading of the Miranda rights did little to dissipate the coercion present throughout the encounter.” Cotton v. State, 237 Ga.App. 18, 513 S.E.2d 763 (March 3, 1999). “Although the actual words spoken by defendant to give consent are suppressed under a Fifth Amendment analysis, that exclusionary rule does not apply to the fruits of the voluntary but Miranda tainted statement. Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 376-378(1), 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 204(2), 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996). See also Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 407-408(6), 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994); Buttersworth v. State, 260 Ga. 795, 797(2), 400 S.E.2d 908 (1991).” Here, trial court determined that defendant was in custody when he told officer where drugs were in car; Court of Appeals accepts unappealed determination that statement is inadmissible, but holds that drugs found as a result are admissible. 12. IMPEACHMENT Gregory v. State, 277 Ga.App. 664, 627 S.E.2d 79 (January 27, 2006). Defendant was charged with vehicular homicide