☢ test - Í

officer’s testimony that, during defendant’s custodial statement, officer told defendant, “[Y]ou and I both know this is not exactly what happened[.] You are holding something out, apparently you got mad and lost your temper or whatever.” 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, officer’s testimony wasn’t an improper statement of opinion, but simply a recitation of what was said during the statement, and proper to provide context to defendant’s statements. “As we have explained before, ‘law enforcement interrogations are, by their very nature, attempts to determine the ultimate issue and the credibility of witnesses.’ Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 723(3), 642 S.E.2d 640 (2007). ‘Comments made in such an interview and designed to elicit a response from a suspect do not amount to opinion testimony, even when [testimony reflecting] the comments is admitted at trial.’ Roberts v. State, 313 Ga.App. 849, 851(2), 723 S.E.2d 73 (2012) (citations omitted). See also Brown v. State, 316 Ga.App. 137, 139(1), 728 S.E.2d 778 (2012).” Accord, Dubose v. State , 294 Ga. 579, 755 S.E.2d 174 (February 24, 2014); Hoke v. State , 326 Ga.App. 71, 755 S.E.2d 876 (March 10, 2014); Oliphant v. State , 295 Ga. 597, 759 S.E.2d 821 (June 16, 2014) (“the officer was clearly not offering opinion testimony on the ultimate issue but was merely informing Oliphant as to the probable cause for his arrest”). 2. Officer’s testimony was not “too prejudicial to be admitted.” “Here, Butler abandoned his original story in the course of the second interview and eventually admitted to having struck Jamira. The circumstances in which Butler changed his story were relevant to a proper consideration of his credibility and an assessment of his admissions, and the comments made by Investigator Spooner during the second interview were among those circumstances. Indeed, the comments about which Butler complains reflected ‘an aggressive interrogation technique designed to test the truthfulness of [Butler's original story],’ Hames v. State, 278 Ga. 182, 184(3), 598 S.E.2d 459 (2004) (citation omitted), and those comments were followed shortly by an admission that Butler had hit Jamira in the abdomen three or four times. As such, the testimony by Investigator Spooner about those comments had some probative value. See Brown, 316 Ga.App. at 140(1), 728 S.E.2d 778.” And the prejudicial effect of the officer’s comments was minimal. “It hardly would have surprised anyone observing the trial to learn that Investigator Spooner was not satisfied with the original story that Butler had offered and believed instead that Butler was not telling the whole truth about what had happened to Jamira, and any rational juror could have surmised as much without being told explicitly.[fn] … Such comments upon the patently obvious generally pose little, if any, danger of prejudice, and they ‘are not, we think, comparable to the specific and detailed commentary ... found inadmissible in Axelburg [(October 31, 2008), see below ] and Holland [ v. State, 221 Ga.App. 821, 825(3), 472 S.E.2d 711 (1996)] . ’ Roberts [ v. State, 313 Ga.App. 849, 852(2), 723 S.E.2d 73 (2012)] (citations and footnote omitted).” Accord, Dority (November 20, 2015), above. Windhom v. State, 315 Ga.App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (May 11, 2012). Armed robbery conviction reversed; trial court erred by denying mistrial where officer testified to alleged statements of victim. “Here, the relevant testimony is hearsay from the victim that based on the way that Windhom and the robbers acted during the robbery, the victim and, implicitly, the officers, believed that the robbers and Windhom had acted in concert. The ultimate issue in this case is that very question. … Furthermore, unlike the interrogation comments cases, here, the testimony came in as sworn testimony, not just recorded interrogation comments; the officer was testifying live about Windhom's statement when he added his own unsolicited recollection of the interrogation questions he asked Windhom, which included the victim's hearsay statement. We cannot even be sure whether the officer's testimony accurately reflected his actual ‘aggressive interrogation technique.’ See Towry v. State, 304 Ga.App. 139, 146 (695 S.E.2d 683) (2010 (distinguishing sworn testimony of a trial witness from comments on a video recording of the interrogation). Also, the victim did not testify to the same information that the officer reported. She did not testify that Windhom's or the robbers' behavior during the robbery made her believe that Windhom was an accomplice.” Towry v. State, 304 Ga.App. 139, 695 S.E.2d 683 (May 20, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted recording of defendant’s custodial statement, including “certain comments by the interviewing investigator that he claims reflected negatively upon his character and that impermissibly bolstered the credibility of [victim] J.L. and other witnesses. … Notably, the investigator's comments in the video recording were not the sworn testimony of a trial witness, but instead ‘reflect[ed] only an aggressive interrogation technique designed to test the truthfulness of [Towry's] denial’ of wrongdoing. Hames v. State, 278 Ga. 182, 184(3) (598 S.E.2d 459) (2004). See also Rowe v. State, 276 Ga. 800, 803(2) (582 S.E.2d 119) (2003) (detective's comments during interview were ‘nothing more than police questioning aimed at eliciting responses from a defendant in custody’).” Accord, Roberts v. State , 313 Ga.App. 849, 723 S.E.2d 73 (February 1, 2012) (“ Comments made in such an interview and designed to elicit a response from a suspect do not amount to opinion testimony, even when a recording of the comments is admitted at trial .”); Brown v. State , 316 Ga.App. 137, 728 S.E.2d 778 (June 7, 2012) (in child cruelty prosecution, no error in admitting officer’s comments during custodial statement, where he used profanity, “questioned Brown's abilities as a mother and, at one point, stated that he would likely find [victim] L.B.'s body in a dumpster one day if the child was ever reunited with Brown.”); Dority (November 20, 2015), above (“ interrogation comments had probative value where