☢ test - Í

they were part of a confrontational technique that yielded an admission from the defendant”) . Distinguished, Windhom v. State , 315 Ga.App. 855, 729 S.E.2d 25 (May 11, 2012) (officer’s testimony about his comments during interrogation, repeating alleged statements by victim, improperly admitted). Axelburg v. State, 294 Ga.App. 612, 669 S.E.2d 439 (October 31, 2008). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual battery reversed; trial court erred in failing to redact video recording of defendant’s non-custodial statement to police wherein interrogating officer repeatedly accused defendant of lying, based on officer’s expertise as a “certified forensic interviewer.” “[T]here are instances when a police interrogator's comments during an interview require redaction because they contain the officer's opinions and conclusions on an ultimate fact and impermissibly invade the jury's province,” citing Holland v. State , 221 Ga.App. 821, 472 S.E.2d 711 (1996) (trial court should have excluded interrogator’s comments “that the defendant's stepdaughter would not have ‘just dream[ed] ... up’ molestation allegations; that defendant's actions were an ‘abnormal’ and ‘wrong’ way of showing affection to the stepdaughter; … that the defendant was lying in the interview,” etc.). Officer here cast doubt on defendant’s primary defense (that he was sleepwalking when he molested victim) and defendant’s general credibility. Distinguishing Georgia Supreme Court decisions admitting comments that “appear[ed] to reflect only an aggressive interrogation technique designed to test the truthfulness of [the defendant's] denial of [the requisite intent],” e.g., Hames v. State , 278 Ga. 182, 598 S.E.2d 459 (2004); Rowe v. State , 276 Ga. 800, 582 S.E.2d 119 (2003). Distinguished, Roberts v. State , 313 Ga.App. 849, 723 S.E.2d 73 (February 1, 2012) (officer’s accusation that defendant was lying, without claims to expertise, need not be redacted). 14. JACKSON-DENNO HEARING See PROCEDURE – JACKSON-DENNO HEARING, below 15. JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS, STATEMENTS TO Rai v. State, 297 Ga. 472, 775 S.E.2d 129 (July 6, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s statements to jailhouse informant; contrary to defendant’s argument, informant was not acting as a state agent. “A jailhouse informant may be considered a government agent in this context where he ‘was acting under the instructions of [the] government.’ Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538, 546(12), 331 S.E.2d 561 (1985). See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264(II), 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) (jailhouse informant who was paid for eliciting incriminating statements from defendant after his arrest and indictment was government agent, and defendant's statements to him were inadmissible as fruits of interrogation conducted in violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Specifically, an informant may be classified as a government agent only if there is both (1) an agreement between the informant and government authorities to exchange incriminating information for payment, lenient treatment, or some other benefit and (2) some action by the informant designed deliberately to elicit incriminating information. Higuera–Hernandez [ v. State, 289 Ga. 553, 556-557, 714 S.E.2d 236 (2011)]. Thus, ‘[a]n inmate who acts upon the expectation of an unpromised reward does not thereby become an agent for the state.’ Baxter, 254 Ga. at 546, 331 S.E.2d 561; accord Burgan v. State, 258 Ga. 512(5), 371 S.E.2d 854 (1988).” While informant here hoped to recover cash seized by police, evidence supported finding “that Walmer himself initiated all contacts with [police]; that they did not instruct Walmer to get information from Rai or request that he do so; and that they made no promises and offered no benefits in exchange for information regarding Rai.” Higuera-Hernandez v. State, 289 Ga. 553, 714 S.E.2d 236 (July 11, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; testimony by cellmate, about defendant’s statements while in custody, didn’t violate defendant’s right to counsel absent evidence that defendant was working under an express agreement with the State at the time the information was gathered. “The overwhelming majority of federal and state jurisdictions recognize ‘that an informant must be a government agent before the protections in Massiah are implicated and further recognize that this agency inquiry is separate from whether the informant ‘deliberately elicited’ information. [Cits.] ... Although there are some differences in the approaches of the various jurisdictions, they are unified by at least one common principle: to qualify as a government agent, the informant must at least have some sort of agreement with, or act under instructions from, a government official.... And several courts have expressly held that the analysis does not change even if the government is aware of the entrepreneurial inmate's self-seeking tendencies and government officials believe — or even hope — that the inmate will elicit information from the defendant. [Cits.] ... Various jurisdictions also agree that a person's past service as a government informant in unrelated cases does not necessarily mean that the person is a government agent in the case at hand. [Cits.] ... [S]uch evidence is simply something the factfinder can consider in its discretion. [Cits.] ... [Three federal circuits go further and] hold that an informant is not a government agent in a given case unless he has been instructed to obtain information from that defendant; any general agreement to obtain information about crime is deemed irrelevant. [Cits.] Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 182–186(II)(B)(4) (Tex.Crim.App., 2003). Likewise, placement of an informant with such ‘past service’ into the defendant's cell may be a factor in some jurisdictions but is not in many others. Manns v. State, supra at 187(II)(B)(4). Furthermore, an informant's receipt of a benefit or reward for the information may constitute