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some evidence of a prior agreement if the ‘benefit had already been promised at the time the informant elicited the information; if not, later receipt of a benefit is of no consequence. [Cits.]’ Manns v. State, supra at 188(II)(B)(4). As this Court has stated, ‘“[a]n inmate who acts upon the expectation of an unpromised reward does not thereby become an agent for the state.” [Cit.]” Burgan v. State, 258 Ga. 512, 515(5) (371 S.E.2d 854) (1988).” Record here shows no detective and witness Calderon “did not have any agreement and that Calderon had not been promised any payment, lenient treatment, or other help in return for any evidence that he might produce.” 16. JUVENILE/MINOR DEFENDANT Seminal case: Riley v. State , 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976) (see Gonzalez (May 22, 2003), below). Jackson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 469, 779 S.E.2d 700 (November 13, 2015). Rape and false imprisonment convictions affirmed; no error in admission of defendant’s custodial statement. Defendant contends that, as a 17-year old, he was entitled to speak with his step-father, who was just outside the interview room, but was prevented from doing so. “But at the hearing, Jackson also acknowledged that he understood his rights at the time of the interrogation and he understood that he was waiving them. Jackson also acknowledged that he spoke with his step-father in the two-minute break between the first interview and the second. [fn] Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by finding that Jackson was advised of his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily waived them without any hope of benefit, coercion, or fear of injury.” Price v. State, 297 Ga. 79, 772 S.E.2d 683 (May 11, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting 17-year old defendant’s custodial statement. “The evidence at the hearing showed that appellant was arrested one month after the shooting occurred. Authorities arrested appellant at approximately at 6:00 A.M. and took him to the sheriff's department where he was placed in the office of one of the investigators working on the case. While appellant waited, he was not handcuffed or shackled. There was no evidence presented that appellant asked for and/or was denied food or drink or denied access to restroom facilities during his wait. Appellant's interview began at 9:50 A.M. that same morning. Two officers participated in appellant's interview. Appellant told the officers he had completed the eighth grade.[fn] Both officers testified that appellant's rights were read to him and that appellant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. At the beginning of the audio-recorded interview, appellant acknowledged that he had been read his rights, that he understood his rights, and that he wanted to speak with the officers. Appellant never asked for a lawyer and never invoked his right to silence. The investigators never promised appellant anything or threatened him in any way. The interview concluded at approximately 10:12 A.M. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court's decision to admit appellant's custodial statement was erroneous. See Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672(2), 653 S.E.2d 23 (2007) (custodial statement made by youth one month shy of his seventeenth birthday upheld as voluntary).” Bowman v. State, 324 Ga.App. 734, 751 S.E.2d 532 (November 15, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement, applying the Riley test. Defendant was 16 years old when he gave the statement. Contrary to defendant’s argument, defendant wasn’t required to be present when his guardian gave consent for officers to interview him. “‘That [Bowman] was interviewed outside the presence of his [guardian], although a factor to be considered by the trial court, did not preclude the admission of his statement.... [Bowman] was only [four] months shy of the age of seventeen, at which time he would not have been considered a juvenile by the criminal justice system. Rather, [Bowman's] age and other factors ... are consistent with his statement having been voluntarily made following a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court, upon due consideration of the totality of circumstances, did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement into evidence.’ *3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Killings v. State, 296 Ga.App. 869, 872(2) (676 S.E.2d 31) (2009).” Boyd v. State, 315 Ga.App. 256, 726 S.E.2d 746 (March 28, 2012). Armed robbery and related convictions reversed; trial court erred in admitting juvenile’s custodial statement. “[Detective] Osterberg had not revealed to Boyd that he might be charged with serious felony offenses, such as armed robbery and various weapons violations, [fn] before the officer entreated him to ‘straighten out what in the hell happened this evening.’ When Boyd did not immediately respond, Osterberg pressed Boyd to go ahead and ‘get it straightened out now.’ Boyd continued to hesitate, but then responded ‘Yeah.’ As our Supreme Court has noted ‘the method that police used in the interrogation whether they made threats or promises, is a significant factor in evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver....’ [ State v. Rodriguez, 274 Ga. 728, 729, 559 S.E.2d 435 (2002)]. Osterberg's statement, while not an outright promise, [fn] could easily have caused a juvenile offender, uninformed about what serious charges he might be facing, and knowing that the shotgun was not loaded, to believe that the situation could be ‘straightened out’ if he talked to the officer. Further, it is apparent