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agent of police. “The … administrator … admitted that, in conjunction with such investigations, she often conferred with the officer about possible criminal charges, as well as questions to ask during an interview. As she testified: ‘[N]ormally I’ll ask the questions and if I miss something or if I didn’t ask a good question then ... [the officer will] tell me later or I can ask him later about it, ... go back and ask them another question to get more information or something that ... I missed.’ Furthermore, she and the officer knew that different ‘rules’ would apply if the police became involved, so they decided that the officer should not ask questions. And the fruits of the investigation were ultimately turned over to the police. Given the totality of these circumstances, we cannot reverse the juvenile court’s finding that the second assistant principal acted as an agent or instrument of the police in interviewing T.A.G.” 2. Police officer a “participant” in interrogation. Officer was brought in to juvenile’s second consecutive interview, having already admitted to robbing another student, but denying a second robbery. “During the interview, and in front of T.A. G., the officer advised the assistant principal on what type of criminal charges might be brought against T.A.G.” “Police involvement … need not be substantial to remove the case from the intermediate group of governmental actors described by Young [ see below ] . See [ State v. K.L.M., 278 Ga.App. 219, 220-221, 628 S.E.2d 651 (2006)]. On the contrary, any involvement or participation by law enforcement officers brings a case within Young ‘s third category, implicating the exclusionary rule. See id. Although an officer’s mere presence in the room, without more, might not constitute police participation, at least some evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the officer was more involved here.” Based on “ State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488 (216 S.E.2d 586) (1975), which addressed the application of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law – and the associated exclusionary rule – in the public school setting. Analyzing whether evidence seized by a high school principal should be excluded from a student’s criminal trial, the Court noted that three groups of persons exist: private individuals; governmental agents whose conduct constitutes state action covered by the Fourth Amendment; and law enforcement personnel who are governed by both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule. Young, supra, 234 Ga. at 493(2). The Court explained: ‘With reference to searches by private persons, there is no Fourth Amendment prohibition and therefore no occasion for applying the exclusionary rule. [Cite] The third group, law enforcement officers, of course, are bound by the full panoply of Fourth Amendment rights and are subject to the application of the exclusionary rule. But the intermediate group, including public school officials, plainly are state officers whose action is state action bringing the Fourth Amendment into play; but they are not state law enforcement officials, with respect to whom the exclusionary rule is applied.’ Id. at 493-494. Under Young, if the school official acts without law enforcement involvement, the exclusionary rule does not apply, even if the official’s conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 494. The violation results not in evidence suppression, but in some other remedy afforded by law, such as a civil damages claim. Id. at 494. If police personnel become involved in the school action, however, a Fourth Amendment violation results in exclusion of the evidence. See id.; State v. Scott, 279 Ga.App. 52, 55(1) (630 S.E.2d 563) (2006); K.L.M., supra, 278 Ga.App. at 220-221. And ‘[f]or purposes of Young, a police officer assigned to work at a school as a school resource officer should be considered a law enforcement officer, not a school official.’ Scott, supra, 279 Ga.App. at 55.” Allen v. State, 283 Ga. 304, 658 S.E.2d 580 (March 10, 2008). Trial court properly found that minor defendant’s statement was voluntary: “Allen was 15 years old and in the ninth grade when he gave his statement. Police located him with the help of his mother who instructed officers not to question her son until she, or an attorney, could be present. Allen asked for his mother a number of times before questioning began, but ultimately he decided to proceed with the interview and talk to detectives without her. [fn] Detectives read the juvenile advisement of rights to Allen, who said he could read fairly well. Detectives also told Allen he would be held at a youth detention center because he was charged with murder, but they made it clear to him that he was under arrest and would be going to the detention center whether he talked with them or not. Allen signed a document acknowledging his rights and waiving them. The interview lasted approximately 90 minutes, during which time Allen made incriminating statements placing himself at the scene and acknowledging his participation in the robbery. He never repudiated his statements. If, during the course of the interview, he did not understand something, he said so and was given another explanation. [fn] Given the totality of the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the refusal to exclude Allen’s statement. See generally Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 229 (282 S.E.2d 301) (1981) (whether juvenile waived his rights is not determined by age or mental disability alone). The fact that Allen’s mother was not present was a factor for the trial court to consider, but it was not determinative on the issue of voluntariness. Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 605, 610-611 (481 S.E.2d 203) (1997).” Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). “[T]he explicit nine-factor analysis set forth in Riley [ v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 S.E.2d 922) (1976)] , which is the same analysis found in Reinhardt [ v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115(3)(b) (428 S.E.2d 333) (1993)] , applies only to the confessions of juveniles and not to those of adults. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 260(3) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000); McDade v. State, 270 Ga. 654, 656(3) (513 S.E.2d 733) (1999); Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 858(2) (268 S.E.2d 339) (1980). To the extent the following cases state or imply otherwise, they are overruled: Henley v. State, 277 Ga. 818, 821(3) (596 S.E.2d 578) (2004); State v. Roberts, 273 Ga. 514, 515(2)