☢ test - Í

(543 S.E.2d 725) (2001); Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115(3)(b) (428 S.E.2d 333) (1993); Moyer v. State, 275 Ga.App. 366, 372-373(4) (620 S.E.2d 837) (2005); State v. Wilson, 257 Ga.App. 120, 124-125 (570 S.E.2d 409) (2002); Kunis v. State, 238 Ga.App. 323, 323(1) (518 S.E.2d 725) (1999); Mao v. State, 222 Ga.App. 482, 483 (474 S.E.2d 679) (1996).” Accord, Mezick v. State , 291 Ga.App. 257, 661 S.E.2d 635 (April 23, 2008); Dean v. State, 292 Ga.App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (July 11, 2008); Henry v. State , 295 Ga.App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (January 28, 2009) (defendant 17 at time of crime, 18 at time of statement; Riley factors don’t apply); Robertson v. State , 297 Ga.App. 228, 676 S.E.2d 871 (March 31, 2009) (no application to 17-year old). Nelson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (January 25, 2008). “ When arrested the day before his interview, Nelson refused to talk to the police after being given Miranda warnings in the presence of his mother. Thus, as was the 15-year-old defendant in Attaway v. State, 244 Ga.App. 5 (534 S.E.2d 580) (2000), “he appeared to be of sufficient maturity and intelligence to understand both the seriousness of the charges and his Miranda rights.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted). The following morning, however, he told the officer that he wanted to talk to her about the case when she came to his cell to retrieve evidence in his possession. The officer conducted a videotaped interview of Nelson after she gave him Miranda warnings twice again. The interview took place after Nelson’s arrest but before formal charges were filed and lasted for less than two hours. As found by the trial court, there was no impropriety in the officer’s interrogation method. As testified to by the officer, Nelson did not request the presence of a relative or an attorney during the interview, and the officer did not induce him to give the interview through any threats or promises. Also, although Nelson testified at trial that he had been acting under duress brought to bear by the officer, he did not repudiate his earlier statement to her about what he had done. Applying the factors set forth above to the totality of these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Nelson knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and voluntarily made the statements at issue. See Swain v. State, 285 Ga.App. 550, 553 (647 S.E.2d 88) (2007); see generally State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758, 759 (632 S.E.2d 654) (2006).” Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 653 S.E.2d 23 (November 5, 2007). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting 16-year old defendant’s custodial statement. “Green … claims that the investigating officer violated OCGA § 15-11-47(a) by failing to give notice of the juvenile [defendant]’s detention to a parent or guardian. [fn: OCGA § 15-11-47(a) provides in pertinent part: ‘A person taking a child into custody, with all reasonable speed and without first taking the child elsewhere, shall: (1) Forthwith release without bond the child to the child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian upon their promise to bring the child before the court when requested by the court.’ ] The undisputed evidence established that Green was informed of the right to have a parent present during the interview, but that he did not invoke that right. The officer testified that Green ‘did not request [to have a parent present]. He just requested that at some point during the evening that he be allowed to contact a parent, didn't want him present, didn’t need him present, just wanted to give him a call.’ The recorded interview supports that testimony. Even assuming that OCGA § 15-11-47(a) was violated by the failure to contact a parent or guardian, there is no automatic exclusion of a juvenile’s statement if the parent is not separately advised; instead, the question of waiver must be analyzed under the Riley test. Riley [ v. State , 237 Ga. 124, 128, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976)]. See also Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797(3) (505 S.E.2d 731) (1998) (a violation of the juvenile code does not per se render the juvenile’s statement inadmissible). Under the circumstances, we find no error in allowing Green’s statement into evidence.” Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430, 651 S.E.2d 40 (September 24, 2007). Record supported trial court’s finding that statement by defendant, a 15-year old ninth grader, was voluntary. “Even where, as here, a juvenile is involved, the question of whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding a police interrogation. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725(III) (99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197) (1979); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 S.E.2d 922) (1976).” Defendant could read; her mother was present for the entire interview. “When [mother] Mrs. Norris twice asked whether an attorney was necessary, the detective who conducted the interview specifically told her that the decision of whether to speak to an attorney belonged to both her and [defendant], and, each time, Mrs. Norris indicated that the interview could continue.” “[Defendant] was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, she had access to food, drink, and a restroom, she did not ever refuse to give a statement, and she did not recant her confession until trial.” See factors set out in Riley in note on Williams (April 19, 2005), below. Medlin v. State, 285 Ga.App. 709, 647 S.E.2d 392 (June 6, 2007). No error in trial court’s determination that defendant’s statement was voluntary. “ When determining whether to admit a minor defendant’s custodial statement, the trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement and the following factors: ‘(1) the age of the defendant; (2) his education; (3) his understanding of the charge and the right to consult with and have counsel present during any interrogation including his right to remain silent; (4) whether [defendant] was