☢ test - Í

Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (March 19, 2012). Interim review of capital murder prosecution; trial court properly found that officer’s unintelligible reading of Miranda required exclusion of custodial statement. “After his arrival at the police department, Clay was read his Miranda warnings by Investigator Hogue prior to being questioned by him. However, our review of the videotape of [this statement] [fn] supports the trial court's findings that Investigator Hogue read the Miranda warnings in such a ‘“super-speed”’ manner that the warnings likely could not have been identified ‘as anything more than gibberish’ without having a prior familiarity with Miranda. It is axiomatic that a rendering of the Miranda warnings must be intelligible before a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the rights involved. See State v. Floyd, 306 Ga.App. 402, 405–406 (702 S.E.2d 467) (2010).” Also relevant here: expert medical testimony “that Clay was experiencing the effects of his drug-induced coma at the time and, thus, could not understand his Miranda rights or make a valid waiver of those rights.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court properly found that defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid though defendant refused to put it in writing. Evidence otherwise showed waiver to be knowing and voluntary. “Nor does Humphreys's refusal to sign a Miranda form render his statement involuntary and inadmissible. Kelly v. State, 250 Ga.App. 793, 794 (553 S.E.2d 175) (2001). See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286) (1979) (‘An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.’). It is certainly the better practice for law enforcement officers to record the reading of Miranda rights to a defendant and the subsequent waiver of those rights, particularly in a case such as this where the defendant refuses to sign a waiver form. Nevertheless, given the testimony of the detective who interviewed Humphreys and the audiotape of his statement submitted as evidence at the Jackson-Denno hearing, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Humphreys was properly advised of his Miranda rights and that his statement was given voluntarily. The statement was, therefore, properly admitted at trial.” Accord, In re: L.A. (June 19, 2008), below; Sosniak v. State , 287 Ga. 279, 695 S.E.2d 604 (June 7, 2010) ( quoting Spain v. State, 243 Ga. 15, 16(1) (252 S.E.2d 436) (1979), “There is no constitutional requirement that waiver of constitutional rights be in writing.”); Crawford v. State , 288 Ga. 425, 704 S.E.2d 772 (January 10, 2011); Herbert v. State , 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (March 18, 2011) (waiver valid though defendant didn’t check or initial each statement therein). Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (February 23, 2010). Florida Miranda warning did not fail to “clearly inform” defendant “prior to custodial questioning, that he has, among other rights, ‘the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.’” Tampa Police Department Miranda form read in part: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.” Florida Supreme Court “found that the advice Powell received was misleading because it suggested that Powell could ‘only consult with an attorney before questioning’ and did not convey Powell's entitlement to counsel's presence throughout the interrogation.” U.S. Supreme Court disagrees: “The four warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but this Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curiam) (‘This Court has never indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (safeguards against self-incrimination include ‘ Miranda warnings ... or their equivalent’). In determining whether police officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, we have said, reviewing courts are not required to examine the words employed ‘as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably “conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda .”’ Duckworth [ v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989)] (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S., at 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806).” The warning at issue here “reasonably conveyed Powell's right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.” Stevens and Breyer dissent. In re: L.A., 292 Ga.App. 101, 663 S.E.2d 420 (June 19, 2008). No merit to juvenile’s contention that Miranda warnings must be given in writing, not orally. Accord, Davis v. State , 292 Ga.App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (June 26, 2008) ( citing Spain v. State , 243 Ga. 15, 16(1), 252 S.E.2d 436 (1979)); Humphreys v. State , 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010); Wallace v. State , 296 Ga. 388, 768 S.E.2d 480 (January 20, 2015). United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298 (11 th Cir., December 20, 2006). Officer’s brief mention of two of the four Miranda warnings was insufficient to make statement admissible. “The Miranda opinion itself clearly sets out the required elements of the warnings: ‘He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything