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he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.’ [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).] Agent Fitzgerald’s warning to Street was only halfway adequate. It omitted the advice that anything Street said could be used against him in a court of law, and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him. This is one instance in which halfway is not close enough for government work.” Distinguishes cases where full warnings were given, but in different order than stated in Miranda: California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curiam) (“‘The Supreme Court characterized the lower court as holding that the warnings, which included every element required by Miranda, were deficient ‘simply because of the order in which they were given.’ Id. at 361, 101 S.Ct. at 2810. … the Court understandably rejected that overly picky application of Miranda. ”) and Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (defendant advised of all rights, but in different order than referenced in Miranda ; “the Supreme Court did say in that case, ‘[w]e have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.’ Id. at 202, 109 S.Ct. at 2880.”). 18. MIRANDA WARNING, LACK OF Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (March 19, 2012). Interim review of capital murder prosecution; trial court erred in holding that defendant’s custodial, non- Mirandized statement was generally admissible because voluntary. “[T]he trial court misconstrued the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667) (2004), and held that [the statement] is generally admissible even though it was obtained in violation of Miranda, because it was voluntary. Although the Supreme Court in Patane held that the suppression of the physical fruits of a defendant's unwarned but voluntary statements is not constitutionally required, id. at 634, it reiterated that ‘the Miranda rule creates a presumption of coercion, in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief.’ Id. at 639(II). Accord Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 215(2) (675 S.E.2d 1) (2009). Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that Statement 4 is admissible in the State's case-in-chief and not merely for impeachment purposes in the event Clay testifies.” 19. MIRANDA WARNING, RE-READING Ingram v. State, 329 Ga.App. 117, 763 S.E.2d 891 (September 23, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s custodial statement. Interviews by two different officers, with thirty minute break, were “part of a continuing interrogation,” so no second Miranda warning was required. And “there is no merit to the argument that additional Miranda warnings were required because [second officer] Black raised a new topic—the possibility that Ingram was involved in the armed robbery—without giving a new Miranda warning. See Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 86(3) (402 S.E.2d 41) (1991) (‘a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege’) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Baez v. State, 297 Ga.App. 893, 678 S.E.2d 583 (May 15, 2009). Officer was not required to re- Mirandize defendant before continuing interrogation begun by another officer “a few hours” earlier. “It is well-settled that ‘once a defendant has been informed of his Miranda rights, he should be reminded of those rights prior to each subsequent interrogation.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Wallace v. State, 253 Ga.App. 220, 222(2) (558 S.E.2d 773) (2002). ‘If, however, one investigating officer is replaced by another with no significant lapse in time, it is not considered a subsequent interrogation, but a continuation of the original interrogation.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Id.” Also citing “ Carswell v. State, 279 Ga. 342, 343-344(2)(a) (613 S.E.2d 636) (2005) (it was of no consequence if Miranda rights were not read to appellant in second interview, which was part of series of interviews over a span of 12 to 14 hours); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga.App. 840, 844(4) (371 S.E.2d 869) (1988) (in view of continuous nature of interrogation, failure to repeat Miranda warnings did not render inadmissible the defendant's statement made one hour after initial interview concluded).” Accord, Sosniak v. State , 287 Ga. 279, 695 S.E.2d 604 (June 7, 2010); Ingram v. State , 329 Ga.App. 117, 763 S.E.2d 891 (September 23, 2014) (interview by one officer, begun after half-hour break from interview by another officer, didn’t require re-reading of Miranda warning where trial court found the two interviews were “part of a continuing interrogation”); Walker v. State , 296 Ga. 161, 766 S.E.2d 28 (November 17, 2014) (no requirement to re-read Miranda before second interview, “some five or six hours” after the first). Carswell v. State, 279 Ga. 342, 613 S.E.2d 636 (May 23, 2005). Defendant gave five statements in a 12-14 hour span; he contends that the second one was not Mirandized , was thus involuntary, and that the following statements were the products of that involuntary statement. Held, trial court correctly concluded that the statements were voluntary, given the totality of the circumstances. Record is unclear whether Miranda warnings were read before second statement, but