☢ test - Í

even if not, all of the statements “were part of a continuous series of interviews,” so reading the warnings before the first statement was sufficient. Defendant told officer conducting interviews that he hadn’t been forced to make any statements, had not been treated unfairly or coerced into making statements, and “acknowledged that he had a background in law enforcement, was familiar with Miranda rights, and was a high school graduate.” Extended length of interviews did not make them involuntary, given that “he agreed to speak with the officers; that he signed a form indicating that he agreed to waive those rights before the first interview; that he was given access to food and drinks; that he had experience in law enforcement and was familiar with his Miranda rights; that, during the course of the day, Carswell repeatedly stated that he was comfortable and had been treated fairly; that he stated that he was not under the influence of any alcohol or drugs and that he understood his rights; that the officers stated that Carswell did not appear to be under the influence of any alcohol or drugs and that he appeared to understand his rights; that Carswell stated that he had not been coerced or threatened in any way; and that he was a high school graduate.” Accord, Davis v. State , 292 Ga.App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (June 26, 2008) (re-reading of Miranda warning not required for second statement, taken one hour after first, Mirandized statement); Mangrum v. State , 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009) (same as Davis , two hour break); Freeman v. State , 328 Ga.App. 756, 760 S.E.2d 708 (July 16, 2014) (re-reading not required where “there was no significant time gap between the two interviews,” one with GBI interviewer, second one immediately following in a different interview where they were joined by police investigator). Brown v. State , 242 Ga.App. 858, 531 S.E.2d 409 (March 17, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; where defendant was Mirandized upon arrest at his home, officers were not required to repeat the warnings upon questioning at the police precinct following transport, citing “ Sutton v. State, 264 Ga. 222, 223(2), 443 S.E.2d 481 (1994) (the Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent's failure to repeat Miranda warnings to defendant prior to the later interrogation, which resulted in incriminating statements, did not render the statements inadmissible since the agent reminded the defendant that he previously had been advised of his rights).” 20. OTHER OFFENSES, REFERENCE TO Martinez v. State, 315 Ga.App. 727, 728 S.E.2d 255 (May 1, 2012). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses affirmed; no error in admitting portions of defendant’s statement to police admitting prior drug trafficking. “The portions of the statement challenged by Martinez ‘were an integral part of a criminal confession, and such statements are not rendered impermissible because the language used therein indicates that the accused has committed another and separate offense.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 79, 80(3) (440 S.E.2d 637) (1994). Accord Washington v. State, 268 Ga. 598, 599–600(2) (492 S.E.2d 197) (1997); Greer v. State, 199 Ga.App. 106, 107(1) (403 S.E.2d 825) (1991).” Cunningham v. State, 279 Ga. 694, 620 S.E.2d 374 (October 3, 2005). Trial court did not err in admitting parts of defendant’s custodial statement that implicated him in other crimes. “Cunningham contends the trial court erred by admitting his unredacted taped statement to the police because that statement impermissibly placed his character into evidence. In the statement Cunningham explained that in the hours leading up to the crimes he purchased crack cocaine, bought and sold pills in order to purchase more cocaine, then sold some of the crack cocaine he had purchased to the victim and smoked it with the victim. The portions of his statement challenged by Cunningham ‘“were an integral part of [his] criminal confession, and such statements are not rendered inadmissible because the language used therein indicates that the accused has committed another and separate offense. (Cits.)” [Cits.]’ Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 79, 80(3) (440 S.E.2d 637) (1994). Moreover, evidence as to whether a defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time a crime was committed is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible as such even though it may incidentally place the defendant’s character in evidence. Ramsey v. State, 233 Ga.App. 810, 812(2) (505 S.E.2d 779) (1998).” Accord, Taylor v. State , 282 Ga.App. 469, 638 S.E.2d 869 (November 17, 2006). Jewett v. State, 264 Ga.App. 571, 591 S.E.2d 459 (December 5, 2003), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). “‘ It is no valid ground of objection to the admission into evidence of an incriminating statement made by the accused in a criminal case that the language indicated that the accused had committed another offense .’” Griffin v. State , 243 Ga.App. 282, 531 S.E.2d 175 (March 14, 2000). Convictions for kidnapping, rape and robbery affirmed; trial court properly admitted custodial statement, “even though it implicated Griffin in the commission of other crimes.” “When portions of the statement being challenged form an integral part of a confession, such incriminating remarks are not rendered inadmissible because a defendant admitted to the commission of another or separate offense. Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 79, 80(3), 440 S.E.2d 637 (1994).”