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Byrd v. State, 236 Ga.App. 485, 512 S.E.2d 372 (February 16, 1999). “Byrd alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because a GBI agent read aloud the entirety of Byrd's confession to the similar transaction. During this confession, Byrd mentioned that he had been ‘arrested three weeks ago for theft by receiving on some air conditioning units.’ According to Byrd, this statement placed his character in issue. We disagree. ‘It is no valid ground of objection to the admission into evidence of an incriminating statement made by the accused in a criminal case that the language indicated that the accused had committed another offense.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Postell v. State, 226 Ga.App. 843, 845, 487 S.E.2d 422 (1997); Colquitt v. State, 196 Ga.App. 817(1), 397 S.E.2d 164 (1990). Moreover, the trial court gave curative instructions.” 21. PLEA NEGOTIATIONS See new OCGA § 24-4-410 McMahon v. State, 308 Ga.App. 292, 707 S.E.2d 528 (March 8, 2011). Conviction for making a false statement affirmed; evidence of defendant’s conversation with assistant DA didn’t violate rule against admission of plea negotiations. “McMahon argues that this testimony violates OCGA § 24-3-50, which, she contends, makes inadmissible any statements made during the course of plea negotiations. But the statute provides, ‘[t]o make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.’ We have interpreted the statute to mean that ‘confessions made during plea negotiations with the prosecutor are not admissible, because they are made in the hope that the defendant will get a better deal than he would otherwise. [Cit.]’ Gray v. State, 240 Ga.App. 716, 718(1) (523 S.E.2d 626) (1999). Here, however, the record does not show that McMahon made her request in the context of plea negotiations. And McMahon's request not to be prosecuted is not a confession.” Overruled, State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015). 22. PORTIONS, ADMISSION OF Bowe v. State, 288 Ga.App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (November 9, 2007). Trial court erred in failing to sever co-defendants’ trials, as it prevented co-defendant Baker from tendering portions of his statements to police which were exculpatory as to Baker and incriminating to Bowe. Baker contended that Bowe coerced him into participating in string of armed robberies for which they were jointly tried. Neither defendant testified at trial, but State tendered incriminating portions of Baker’s prior statements. “Although the excluded portions of the statement were self-serving hearsay, ‘[w]here a part of a conversation, which amounts to an incriminatory admission, is admitted in evidence, it is the right of the accused to bring out other portions of the same conversation, even though it is self-serving in its nature, or exculpatory, in that it justifies, excuses, or mitigates the act.’ West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 569 (37 S.E.2d 799) (1946).” Billings v. State, 278 Ga. 833, 607 S.E.2d 595 (January 10, 2005). Trial court did not err in allowing State to present only portions of defendant’s videotaped statement. “As for the statements omitted from the edited videotape, [defendant] was entitled to offer into evidence any relevant portion of the videotape not offered by the State but he failed to do so. See OCGA § 24-3-38 (when admission offered in evidence by one party, other party has right to have whole admission and all conversation connected therewith admitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the edited videotape. See Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665(2) (581 S.E.2d 538) (2003).” Brown v. State, 270 Ga. 601, 512 S.E.2d 260 (February 8, 1999). “The trial court correctly edited Brown’s statement so as to delete all of the irrelevant and inadmissible references to allegations of [victim’s] commission of prior acts of molestation [of defendant’s five-year-old daughter]. See Waller v. State, 102 Ga. 684, 686(2), 28 S.E. 284 (1897), overruled on other grounds, Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 610(2), 216 S.E.2d 855 (1975); OCGA § 24-2-4.” The deleted references constituted improper victim character evidence. See note on this case under Evidence – Character – Victim’s Character, above. 23. PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS Taylor v. State, 293 Ga.App. 551, 667 S.E.2d 405 (September 16, 2008). Trial court properly prevented defendant from presenting her prior consistent statement to officer, made at time of arrest. “The general rule … is that a witness' testimony cannot be fortified or corroborated by her own prior consistent statements. See Stephens v. State, 156 Ga.App. 859, 860(3), 275 S.E.2d 758 (1980). ‘It can scarcely be satisfactory to any mind to say that, if a witness testifies to a statement today under oath, it strengthens the statement to prove that [she] said the same thing yesterday when not under oath.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 162 Ga.App. 271, 274(5), 290 S.E.2d 518 (1982). Because the testimony at issue was merely cumulative of that provided under oath by Taylor, the trial court did not err in excluding it.”