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24. PRIOR TESTIMONY Grant v. State, 302 Ga.App. 661, 691 S.E.2d 581 (March 8, 2010). Defendant’s own “testimony during the preliminary hearing, presented at his criminal trial during which he took the stand and testified, simply is not hearsay and does not fall within the confines of OCGA § 24-3-1(a).” Crutchfield v. State, 291 Ga.App. 24, 660 S.E.2d 878 (April 10, 2008). While incarcerated for traffic charges, Crutchfield testified for his friend Bartlett at Bartlett’s trial for meth possession. Crutchfield testified that he possessed the meth in question, whereupon Crutchfield was charged with possessing the meth . At Crutchfield’s trial, defendant objected to State’s tender of his testimony from Bartlett’s trial, contending that it was an involuntary custodial statement. Held, trial court properly admitted the former testimony. “‘A voluntary confession of guilt, not improperly induced, is always admissible against the party who makes it; and the general rule on this subject is not changed by the fact that the confession happens to be made under oath[,] while the party is being examined as a witness in another trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sheppard v. State, 68 Ga.App. 127-128 (22 S.E.2d 347) (1942). This rule has been applied to prior in-court testimony, see Dawson v. State, 153 Ga.App. 130 (265 S.E.2d 74) (1980) (admission of defendant’s incriminating in-court testimony made during trial of another was not error); Sheppard, supra at 128 (defendant’s prior testimony in his brother’s trial held admissible), deposition testimony, see Jardine v. Jardine, 236 Ga. 323(3) (223 S.E.2d 668) (1976) (wife’s deposition testimony as to her drug use was admissible in later hearing for modification of child custody), and grand jury testimony, see State v. Butler, 177 Ga.App. 594, 595 (340 S.E.2d 214) (1986) (defendant’s testimony before grand jury was admissible in defendant’s later trial), where the defendant testified as a witness voluntarily and without claiming or attempting to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. See Butler, supra; Jardine, supra; Sheppard, supra. Thus, Crutchfield’s prior testimony was admissible in the later proceeding against him. The fact that Crutchfield was incarcerated on an unrelated traffic offense when he gave the incriminating testimony does not alter the result.” Williams v. State, 284 Ga.App. 255, 643 S.E.2d 749 (February 21, 2007). No “error in the admission of Williams’s own testimony in the 1978 trial, since his statements therein were competent evidence in the case-in-chief. See Foster v. State, 157 Ga.App. 554, 555-556 (278 S.E.2d 136) (1981) (admissions in judicio are competent evidence in subsequent proceeding).” Thompson v. State, 271 Ga. 105, 519 S.E.2d 434 (May 17, 1999). At defendant’s trial for felony murder and related offenses, no error in admitting defendant’s prior testimony against his co-defendants in their prior trial. “‘ What a witness voluntarily testified [to] at a former trial of another party for the homicide is not privileged on a trial of the witness himself for the same homicide. It may be given in evidence against him as an admission.’ Burnett v. State, 87 Ga. 622, hn. 4, 13 S.E. 552 (1891). See Dawson v. State, 153 Ga.App. 130, 265 S.E.2d 74 (1980); McDowell v. State, 78 Ga.App. 487, hn. 1, 51 S.E.2d 546 (1949); Sheppard v. State, 68 Ga.App. 127, 22 S.E.2d 347 (1942). See also 23 CJS Criminal Law § 884.” 25. PROBATION Nelson v. State, 259 Ga.App. 584, 578 S.E.2d 173 (February 11, 2003). “‘Generally, a probationer has no Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to questions relevant to the status of his or her probation.’ Simpson v. State, 252 Ga.App. 1, 2, 555 S.E.2d 247 (2001). Where, as here, the information obtained from Nelson was not elicited for purposes of charging him with a new crime, but merely to ensure that Nelson was complying with the conditions of his probation, the use of Nelson’s admission in the revocation hearing (which is not a criminal proceeding) did not violate Miranda.’” Simpson v. State, 252 Ga.App. 1, 555 S.E.2d 247 (October 21, 2001). Revocation of defendant’s probation affirmed; defendant’s probation officer was not required to read Miranda warnings prior to questioning defendant about compliance with his conditions of probation. “Generally, a probationer has no Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to questions relevant to the status of his or her probation. ‘A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.’ Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S. 420, 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).” Defendant here admitted to his probation officer that he had smoked marijuana, however, “there is no indication that the information obtained from Simpson during his interviews with his probation officer was elicited for the purpose of charging him with a new crime. And, there is no evidence that he was charged with one. To the contrary, it appears that Simpson's probation officer was simply trying to assure that Simpson was complying with the conditions of his probation. Accordingly, the use of