☢ test - Í

840 (733 S.E.2d 266) (2012) (citations omitted). Landers v. State, 285 Ga. 575, 679 S.E.2d 343 (June 1, 2009). Allegation in indictment that the offense (here, murder) took place “in the County and State aforesaid,” was sufficient to allege venue where only one county was mentioned in the indictment. Accord, Leverette v. State , 291 Ga. 834, 732 S.E.2d 255 (October 1, 2012); Stephens v. State , 291 Ga. 837, 733 S.E.2d 266 (October 15, 2012); Grace (September 22, 2014), above. Jones v. State, 297 Ga.App. 843, 678 S.E.2d 483 (March 27, 2009). DUI conviction affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion to quash; accusation in probate court contains sufficient allegation of venue if it alleges venue in the proper county. Although OCGA § 40-13-29 limits traffic jurisdiction of probate courts to offenses occurring “outside of municipal corporations,” that jurisdictional limit is not the same as the venue requirement. “[T]he issues of venue and jurisdiction are separate concepts. See Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1557 (6 th ed., 1990) (‘Venue does not refer to jurisdiction at all.’).” Accord, Knapp v. State , 297 Ga.App. 844, 678 S.E.2d 501 (May 11, 2009). Yates v. State, 278 Ga.App. 422, 629 S.E.2d 422 (March 23, 2006). DUI conviction reversed; counts of accusation containing no allegation of venue should have been quashed on defendant’s motion. Merely stating “State of Georgia, County of Henry” at top of page was not sufficient, absent language within each count alleging that the offense occurred “in the county aforesaid.” Distinguishing Dixon v. State, 252 Ga.App. 385, 556 S.E.2d 480 (2001). “See generally Howard v. State, 252 Ga.App. 487, 488(2) (555 S.E.2d 884) (2001) (as a general rule, we do not impute allegations set forth in one count of an indictment to a separate count, absent specific reference to the allegation sought to be imputed).” Accord, Werner v. State , 280 Ga.App. 853, 635 S.E.2d 234 (July 31, 2006) (same, but count identifying solicitor “as prosecuting attorney for the state and county aforesaid” was sufficient); Gordy v. State , 287 Ga.App. 459, 651 S.E.2d 471 (August 22, 2007) (same as Werner ); Landers (June 1, 2009), above. Short v. State, 276 Ga.App. 340, 623 S.E.2d 195 (November 14, 2005). Rape, armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Accusation need not specifically allege that venue is satisfied pursuant to OCGA § 17-2-2 because offense took place in moving vehicle; standard venue allegation is sufficient. Code section is not an “exception” to venue requirement that must be specifically pled. Court rejects defendant’s analogy to pleading exceptions to statute of limitation. Houston v. State, 267 Ga.App. 315, 599 S.E.2d 278 (May 7, 2004). Defendant’s demurrer to speeding citation should have been granted where charge brought in City Court of Atlanta, and only allegation of venue in citation was that offense occurred in Fulton County. 31. VICTIM See also subheadings DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY STOLEN OR DAMAGED/OWNERSHIP and MISNOMER, above Cole v. State, 334 Ga.App. 752, 780 S.E.2d 406 (November 19, 2015). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for Medicaid fraud and theft by taking; trial court erred by denying special demurrer on other grounds, but indictment wasn’t insufficient for identifying patients by initials, rather than full names. Indictment alleged that defendant submitted numerous fraudulent Medicaid claims over three years, totaling almost $300,000. “Generally, ‘if [a charging instrument] charges the defendant with committing a crime against a person, the injured person should be identified in the [charging instrument].’ State v. Kenney, 233 Ga.App. 298, 299(1)(a), 503 S.E.2d 585 (1998). In this case, however, the indictment does not charge Cole with committing a crime against a person but against the State of Georgia. Indeed, Cole concedes that the patients listed in the exhibits are not the victims of the alleged crimes of Medicaid fraud and theft by taking. Thus, Sellers v. State, 263 Ga.App. 144, 145–146, 587 S.E.2d 276 (2003), and Driggers v. State, 295 Ga.App. 711, 717(4)(a), 673 S.E.2d 95 (2009), which found that an indictment’s identification of a victim by initials was not sufficient to withstand a special demurrer, are distinguishable. The omission of individuals’ names from an indictment is not a ground for sustaining a special demurrer where, as in the case of these patients, the individuals ‘are only collaterally involved in the alleged offense.’ State v. Kenney, 233 Ga.App. at 299(1), 503 S.E.2d 585(a). Further, contrary to Cole’s contention, the indictment did not identify the patients solely by their initials; rather, the inclusion of additional information, that is, each patient’s date of birth and the last four digits the patients’ unique Medicaid identification number, ensured that each patient was specifically identified. In contrast to Sellers, the record does not show that ‘the initials ... could apply to any [person] having [the same] initials.’ Sellers v. State, 263 Ga.App. at 146, 587 S.E.2d 276. Notwithstanding its identification of the patients, in part, by their initials, the indictment was sufficient to allow Cole ‘to prepare [her] defense intelligently and to protect [her] from double jeopardy.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. English, [276 Ga. 343, 346(2)(a), 578 S.E.2d 413 (2003)]. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the indictment was sufficiently detailed as to the patients’ identities.”