☢ test - Í

State v. Grube, 293 Ga. 257, 744 S.E.2d 1 (June 3, 2013). Reversing 315 Ga.App. 885, 729 S.E.2d 42 (2012), trial court erred in granting special demurrer to indictment for computer pornography and related offenses based on indictment’s identification of victim. Offenses involved police officer posing as a child in internet chat rooms; the indictment indentified “the victim as ‘“Tiffany,” a person believed by the accused to be a child’ and ‘“Tiffany,” a person he believed to be a 14–year–old girl.’” 1. Demurrer wasn’t “an improper speaking demurrer. See State v. Holmes, 142 Ga.App. 847, 848, 237 S.E.2d 406 (1977) (demurrer which seeks to add facts not on the face of the indictment fails as a speaking demurrer). Because Grube only challenges his indictment on the ground that the reference to the victim as ‘Tiffany’ fails to sufficiently identify the victim, the merits of Grube's challenge can be determined without reaching matters outside the four corners of the indictment.” 2. Indictment sufficiently identified victim. “[I]dentification of a victim by use of an alias or other name by which the victim is generally known sufficiently informs a defendant of the victim's identity and apprises the defendant of the nature of evidence he or she must be prepared to meet. This is especially true when identification of the victim is accompanied by language which highlights or explains the use of the alias or alternative name. … While the better practice may have been for the indictment to include both the alias by which Grube knew the victim and the fact that Tiffany was an alias or a fictitious persona created by undercover officers, the indictment as drafted apprises Grube of the essential elements of the charges against him, identifies the victim by the only name by which the victim is generally known to him, and informs him that Tiffany is not a 14–year–old girl. [fn] That the victim may also have been a fictitious persona created by an undercover officer is a fact to be proved at trial, and its absence from the indictment is not a material defect.” In cases like this one involving internet stings, “[a] requirement that the officer's true identity be included in the indictment would do nothing to further the goal of apprising the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet at trial.” Distinguishing Dennard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000) (another internet sting case; trial court erred in denying demurrer to indictment which “failed to identify the victim by any means and failed to inform the defendant, explicitly or implicitly, that the victim was not an actual child or person.”). Accord, State v. Cohron , 324 Ga.App. 137, 749 S.E.2d 416 (October 4, 2013). Boggs v. State, 304 Ga.App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 June 30, 2010). Defendant’s robbery conviction affirmed; no fatal variance where no witness refered to homeless victim by first and last name. “[T]he state did present testimony reflecting that a man had his backpack taken by force on September 1, 2007, in Chatham County, Georgia, by Sanchez and Boggs. Moreover, Boggs referred to the victim by last name during the course of his own testimony. Because the testimony showed that the victim referred to at trial was the same victim identified in the indictment, no fatal variance existed in this case. See Montfort [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 29, 30-31(2) (635 S.E.2d 336) (2006)]; Parks v. State, 246 Ga.App. 888, 889(1) (543 S.E.2d 39) (2000); Harris [ v. State, 197 Ga.App. 695, 696 (399 S.E.2d 284) (1990)].” Clark v. State, 278 Ga.App. 412, 629 S.E.2d 103 (March 23, 2006). Physical precedent only. No fatal variance because victim’s surname was incorrectly stated in indictment. “ If the victim named in the indictment and proven at trial are two different people, then a fatal variance has occurred, but a fatal variance generally has not occurred if the two names refer to the same individual, ‘such as where a mere misnomer is involved.’ Harrison v. State, 192 Ga.App. 690, 691(1) (385 S.E.2d 774) (1989). Here, the indictment alleged that Clark kidnapped the victim from a specific place on a specific date. He admitted at trial that he drove off with the victim on that day, although he asserted she went with him voluntarily. The two eyewitnesses to the kidnapping referred to the victim, who also testified about her ordeal. No one indicated any confusion at trial regarding the victim’s identity, and thus the variance was not of a character that could have misled Clark during trial. Harris v. State, 197 Ga.App. 695, 695-696 (399 S.E.2d 284) (1990).” Accord, Duncan v. State , 278 Ga.App. 703, 629 S.E.2d 577 (April 10, 2006); Monfort v. State , 281 Ga.App. 29, 635 S.E.2d 336 (August 9, 2006); Brown v. State , 289 Ga.App. 421, 657 S.E.2d 322 (January 31, 2008); In re: M.S., 292 Ga.App. 127, 664 S.E.2d 240 (June 20, 2008) (school resource officer who heard juvenile’s threat was named as victim in delinquency petition, but officer testified that she didn’t feel threatened and understood juvenile’s statements to be directed to another student). Vincent v. State, 276 Ga.App. 415, 623 S.E.2d 255 (November 17, 2005). 1. “‘[I]t is not necessary to name the victim in an indictment for burglary, since it is a crime against property.’ Dennard v. State , 243 Ga.App. 868, 877(2), 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).” 2. No fatal variance where indictment for burglary incorrectly named occupant of residence, but correctly stated the address. “‘Even assuming that someone other than [James lived in] the house, the indictment did not mislead [Vincent] in such a manner that impeded his ability to present a subsequent defense or surprise him at trial, and he cannot be subjected to a subsequent prosecution for the burglary of the residence in question.’ Edward v. State, 261 Ga.App. 57, 59(2) (581 S.E.2d 691) (2003).” Taylor v. State, 264 Ga.App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (December 1, 2003). State was not required to prove that rape was