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suspect responded, ‘“the gun is over there,”’ where the police indeed found the gun. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the exclusion of the gun and his statement, Id. at 659–660, 104 S.Ct. 2626, reasoning that for the sake of public safety and their own safety, police in apprehending a suspect who they have reason to believe placed a gun in the building or nearby may ask as to the whereabouts of that gun without first giving a Miranda warning. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626. ‘[T]he need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.’ Id.” “To the extent that cases pre-dating Quarles limited the exception to only those instances where the sole reason for the inquiry was public or officer safety, See, e.g., State v. Overby, 249 Ga. 341, 290 S.E.2d 464 (1982), and cases cited therein. they must be deemed to have been overruled in part by Quarles, which held that the availability of the exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individuals involved. See 467 U.S. at 655–656, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The key is whether under the objective facts the officer had a reasonable basis for making the inquiry to protect public and officer safety. Here the arresting officer had information that (1) Davis was on probation for having carried a concealed weapon, (2) the landlord had reported that Davis had a gun in the apartment and that the tenant, who had a small child in the apartment, was frightened, (3) Davis had been bragging to the tenant about having a gun and about having shot someone, and (4) Davis was a possible suspect in the recent shooting of the pedestrians. The other officers were still sweeping the apartment and had not yet established who else or what else was present that could pose a threat to the officers or the infant. The officer further testified that he asked about the gun in part because of a concern for public safety, which the court found credible.” 27. RECORDING Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 738 S.E.2d 74 (February 4, 2013). Murder conviction affirmed; “we have held before that the law does not require that the voluntariness of a statement be proved by a recording of the interview. See, e.g., Monsalve v. State, 271 Ga. 523, 524–525(2), 519 S.E.2d 915 (1999) (affirming admission of confession, notwithstanding that video recording equipment malfunctioned and failed to record waiver of rights); Daniel v. State, 268 Ga. 9, 10(2), 485 S.E.2d 734 (1997) (‘[T]he State was not required to corroborate the officer's testimony by proffering a videotape of the session at which the statement was made. The trial court was authorized to base its ruling on the testimony and credibility of the officer himself.’) (citation omitted). See also 2 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.8(c) (3d ed.) (noting that most jurisdictions ‘have not imposed any recording requirement on any part of the interrogation process’) (footnote omitted).” Recording equipment here malfunctioned, but officer’s testimony about the statements was properly admitted. Segura v. State, 280 Ga.App. 685, 634 S.E.2d 858 (July 26, 2006). “Segura’s contention that, to be admissible into evidence, a custodial statement must be taped, written, or heard by more than one officer, is without merit. See Jowers v. State, 245 Ga.App. 773, 775(5) (538 S.E.2d 853) (2000).” Jowers v. State, 245 Ga.App. 773, 538 S.E.2d 853 (September 5, 2000). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no error in admission of defendant’s confession. Defendant’s “contention that a confession must be taped or written to be admitted into evidence … is without merit. Barrs v. State, 202 Ga.App. 520, 521(3), 414 S.E.2d 733 (1992).” Accord, Segura (July 26, 2006), above. Parker v. State, 244 Ga.App. 419, 535 S.E.2d 795 (June 12, 2000). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; videotape of defendant’s voluntary custodial statement was admissible although he didn’t know he was being videotaped. “ Carswell [ v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 533, 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997)] stated the general proposition that there can be no ‘reasonable subjective expectation of privacy associated with a suspect's statements made during an interrogation session held in a police station.’” 28. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS New case! State v. Philpot, S16A0344, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3144340 (June 6, 2016). In murder prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to suppress custodial statement, given after detective ignored defendant’s unequivocal invocation of right to counsel. As detective read his Miranda rights, defendant said they could call his girlfriend and “get her to call [defendant’s attorney] and have him come down here.” The detective instead continued reading the Miranda warning, prompting defendant to say again, “I need you to call my old lady to get the number,” and then gave the detective his girlfriend’s phone number. Detective instead began interrogating defendant. Held, “[a]lthough Philpot’s first mention of his lawyer, asking if the officers needed the lawyer’s phone number, may have not been an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel, in the discussion that followed, Philpot was firmer and clearer in his request that the police officers contact his lawyer directly or through his girlfriend so the lawyer could come there. By the time he reiterated that he needed the officers to call his girlfriend to get his lawyer’s number, he had