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unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. See McDougal v. State , 277 Ga. 493, 499 (591 S.E.2d 788) (2004) (‘A suspect’s statement that he wants to call his lawyer or, as in this case, that he wants to contact his wife so she may call his lawyer, is a clear request for an attorney.’); Ellis v. State , 332 Ga.App. 883, 885-887 (775 S.E.2d 238) (2015) (physical precedent only) (holding that the defendant’s request to call his attorney was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel). ‘There was no ambiguity or equivocation in [Philpot’s] statement. ... Any ambiguity was created solely by the ... subsequent questioning. [Philpot] did not use equivocal words such as “might” or “maybe” when referring to his desire for a lawyer. He was also not referring to a need for counsel sometime in the future.’ Wheeler [ v. State , 289 Ga. 537, 539-540 (713 S.E.2d 393) (2011)] (quotation marks, citations, and parentheses omitted).” Contrary to State’s argument, there was never any reinitiation of the interrogation by the defendant, as “the detectives never stopped interrogating Philpot, and all the statements Philpot made were in response to police questioning.” Ellis v. State, 332 Ga.App. 883, 775 S.E.2d 238 (July 8, 2015). Physical precedent only. Convictions for theft by receiving and related offenses reversed; trial court erred by admitting defendant’s custodial statement made despite his clear request for counsel. At commencement of custodial interview, detective reviewed the Miranda warning with defendant. When detective advised that Ellis had “the right to talk to an attorney and have him present with you while you are being questioned,” Ellis responded, “So I can call him now?” and affirmed that he had an attorney. Detective didn’t answer the question, insisting instead on completing review of the Miranda waiver, then launching into questioning with further discussion of counsel. Held, this was an unequivocal, unambiguous request for counsel. “In asking whether he could call his attorney, Ellis ‘did not use equivocal words such as “might” or “maybe” when referring to his desire for a lawyer. He was also not referring to a need for counsel sometime in the future[.]’ (Citation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 286 Ga. 42, 44 (684 S.E.2d 863) (2009).” Context also made clear that Ellis was requesting to call his attorney, not someone else. “The Supreme Court has also held that a defendant's request for counsel is not rendered ambiguous simply because it is articulated in the form of a question. See Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 272(1) (553 S.E.2d 598) (2001) (statement ‘Can I have an attorney?’ was a clear request for counsel), disapproved on other grounds in State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 783(3)(b) (770 S.E.2d 808) (2015). … Given this more recent Supreme Court precedent, Ellis's request to call his attorney was a clear invocation of his right to counsel, and the fact that Ellis agreed to talk to the detective after the detective finished reading the form did not vitiate his earlier request. [Cits.]” Mann v. State, 297 Ga. 107, 772 S.E.2d 665 (May 11, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s statement to police. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his request for counsel was “ambiguous and equivocal.” While reviewing the Miranda waiver, defendant asked, “well, y’all going appoint me a attorney?” Detective responded, “naw, I’m going to keep talking to you.” Defendant made no further reference to counsel and proceeded to give a statement. Dubose v. State, 294 Ga. 579, 755 S.E.2d 174 (February 24, 2014). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress custodial statement. Defendant failed to make unequivocal request for counsel: “During the interview, Dubose apparently asked whether [Agent] Durden [fn] could ‘find out about giving me a lawyer now. I can't talk to nobody. I don't even think my mama (and them) know where I'm at.’ [fn] Durden assured Dubose that his parents did know where he was, told Dubose that lawyers ‘come around’ through the jail, and that he could talk with one. Durden then said that, since Dubose had ‘mentioned talking to a lawyer,’ the rules were ‘clear,’ and that if Dubose wanted to talk to a lawyer before speaking with Durden any further, Durden needed to ‘make sure they were clear on that’; he also said that if Dubose was asking for a lawyer, Durden needed to stop talking to Dubose, but if Dubose wanted to talk more, Durden needed to make sure they were ‘clear on that.’ Dubose apparently asked what Durden would do in his place,[fn] and Durden said that he could not discuss that until it was clear whether Dubose was asking for a lawyer, or wished to talk further. Dubose responded that he would talk further, was not asking for a lawyer right now, but was ‘gonna need one eventually,’ and that he and Durden could talk more.” Supreme Court calls defendant’s reference to an attorney “unclear.” “Dubose's mention of a lawyer was coupled with what appeared to be a renewal of his request to speak with his family, and it was uncertain what he was communicating; Durden proceeded to clarify that uncertainty, and Dubose clearly stated that he did not wish to speak with a lawyer at that point, but anticipated wanting one later,” citing Reaves v. State, 292 Ga. 582, 586-587 (740 S.E.2d 141) (2013). Cody v. State, 324 Ga.App. 815, 752 S.E.2d 36 (November 19, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Even if defendant’s question “Can I get a lawyer now? Right now?” is construed as a request for counsel, defendant reinitiated conversation with officer. 1. Request for counsel. “See Taylor [ v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 271-272(1), 553 S.E.2d 598 (2001)] (recognizing that a suspect's desire for counsel may not be ambiguous simply because it was articulated in the form of a question, and noting that ‘it is common for people to ask