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for things by saying “Can I have ... ?”’). See generally Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (129 L.Ed.2d 362) (1994) (explaining that whether a defendant has invoked his right to counsel is an objective inquiry).” 2. Defendant initiated further conversation; officer’s response didn’t constitute interrogation. Following defendant’s question about counsel, the officer responded “We won't be able to provide you one right now. We can, uh, we can, you can ask for a public defender and we can do the interview later. That's your choice.” Cody then said “I would rather go on and get this over with, man, ‘cause I don't understand why she is doing this.” “Here, the detective's immediate response to Cody's questions … did not fall within that definition of ‘interrogation.’ [fn: See [ State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473, 697 S.E.2d 192 (2010)] (determining that, after the suspect invoked his right to counsel, the detectives' words and actions that answered or deflected a number of direct questions from the suspect regarding what he would be charged with, when he could go home, whether he would be arrested, when he could use the phone, how the victim was doing, and where he would go next, did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740– 741 (7 th Cir., 2001) (‘A police officer's response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute “interrogation.”’) (citations and punctuation omitted), cited in Brown, supra at 477(2), 697 S.E.2d 192. See generally Miranda, supra at 474 (rejecting the suggestion ‘that each police station must have a “station house lawyer” present at all times to advise prisoners’). ] The detective's response neither expressly questioned Cody nor equated to words or actions that the detective should have known were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information from Cody. [fn] Furthermore, the additional questioning that ensued was initiated by Cody. [fn: See Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 716–718(3)(4), 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997) (explaining that an accused may waive his previously-invoked right to counsel if he ‘initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police’ and that ‘an accused's response to an officer's answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation’), disapproved on other grounds, Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 57(2)(c), 734 S.E.2d 333 (2012). Cf. Taylor, supra at 271–272(1), 553 S.E.2d 598 (2001) (determining that the arrested suspect's statement, ‘Can I have a lawyer present when I [tell police my version of what happened]?’ followed by ‘Okay’ when told she could, was an unambiguous request for counsel). ] ” Dixon v. State, 294 Ga. 40, 751 S.E.2d 69 (November 4, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to police. Though defendant claims he had previously invoked his right to counsel, “‘an accused may waive the previously-invoked right [to counsel] by initiating further contact with the police,’ Tesfaye v. State , 275 Ga. 439, 441(2), 569 S.E.2d 849 (2002) (citations omitted). And the initiation of such communication can be done through a third person. See Borders v. State , 270 Ga. 804, 809(3), 514 S.E.2d 14 (1999). See also Harvell v. State , 275 Ga. 129, 130(2), 562 S.E.2d 180 (2002).” Interview here was initiated when defendant’s cousin told detective that defendant wanted to speak to them. Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 740 S.E.2d 158 (March 18, 2013). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no error in admitting defendant’s custodial statement. “Smith claims his statement was obtained improperly, asserting that an attorney that had been dispatched by Smith's father to assist him was denied access to him at the detective bureau at which he was questioned. … There is no evidence, nor even any allegation, that Smith had any knowledge during his time at the detective bureau that an attorney was attempting to make contact with him. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422(II), 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (facts unknown to defendant at time he waives rights cannot bear on validity of waiver). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in allowing Smith's custodial statement to be admitted at trial. Id.” Reaves v. State, 292 Ga. 582, 740 S.E.2d 141 (March 18, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly admitted portions of defendant’s custodial statement, finding that defendant’s references to counsel weren’t unequivocal invocations of the right to counsel. 1. ” On the first occasion, Sergeant Smith told Reaves that he was going to inform her of her Miranda rights, and Reaves asked: ‘Maybe I will need my lawyer? [fn] ... Is that what you're telling me?’ When Sgt. Smith asked, ‘What?’, Reaves answered, ‘That I need to have me a lawyer.’ Reaves claims that this answer was an unequivocal request for counsel. In context, however, it was not such a request, but rather, it was a statement clarifying and completing Reaves's earlier question about whether Sergeant Smith was telling her that she needed to have a lawyer. ‘The comments on which [Reaves] relies [must be] viewed in context....’ Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 698, 699(2)(a), 523 S.E.2d 866 (1999).” 2. “The second reference to a lawyer that Reaves claims to be an unambiguous request for counsel is her question: ‘When will I have to come back with a lawyer?’ [fn] … Reaves's inquiry as to ‘when’ she would ‘have to’ return with a lawyer was not an unambiguous request for counsel. See Carroll v. State, 275 Ga. 160, 161(2), 563 S.E.2d 125 (2002). Even a comment that a suspect would like counsel to be present in the future is not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel. Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174, 178(4), 465 S.E.2d 672 (1996), overruled on other grounds, Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 9–10(5), 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999); Johnson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 41, 43, 656 S.E.2d 200 (2007). See also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.9(g) (3 rd ed.) (‘An