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indication by the defendant that he will only want counsel at some future time or for some other purpose is not an assertion of the right to counsel for Miranda purposes....’). At most, Reaves's question as to when she would have to come back with a lawyer was referring to ‘the future assistance of an attorney, not immediate assistance.’ Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 705(2), 699 S.E.2d 1 (2010) (footnote omitted).” 3. “On the third occasion when Reaves claims she unambiguously requested counsel, she said, ‘I would still feel more comfortable with a lawyer.’ Sergeant Smith responded, ‘Okay. So you don't want to talk to me right now?’, and Reaves answered, ‘not unless I can exercise my rights any time ... during the conversation.’ Sergeant Smith immediately reassured her that ‘[y]ou can do that.... It's your right, ma‘am.’ The meaning of Reaves's statement that she would ‘feel more comfortable’ with a lawyer is very similar to the statement ‘I prefer a lawyer,’ which has been considered ‘only an ambiguous mention of possibly speaking with an attorney’ and ‘insufficient to invoke the right to counsel.’ Delashmit v. State, 991 So.2d 1215, 1221(I) (Miss., 2008). A reasonable police officer would not understand the third statement on which Reaves relies to be an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel. Id.” 4. “A close examination of Reaves's references to a lawyer shows a ‘pattern of equivocation’ on her part, including the use of ‘hedge’ words and phrases like ‘maybe’ and ‘feel more comfortable,’ such ‘that a reasonable officer would have understood only that [she] might want an attorney present, not that [s]he was clearly invoking [her] right to deal with the officer[ ] only through counsel.’ United States v. Hampton, 675 F.3d 720, 727(II)(A) (7 th Cir., 2012) (citations omitted; emphasis in original).” Hunstein concurs in judgment only. Hawkins v. State, 316 Ga.App. 415, 729 S.E.2d 549 (June 26, 2012). Armed robbery and firearms convictions affirmed; co-defendant Woods’s custodial statement was properly admitted, as he didn’t make an unequivocal request for counsel. Woods, an adult, requested that his mother be present for the interview; in response to the investigator’s question, he said he didn’t know if she was a lawyer or not. “Because a reasonable officer would not necessarily have understood Woods's answer that he did not know whether his mother was his lawyer to be a clear request for counsel, the investigator was not required to end the interview on that basis. Fitz v. State, 275 Ga. 349, 353(3)(b), 566 S.E.2d 668 (2002). The investigator's further questioning and explanation of Woods's Miranda rights confirmed Woods's desire to talk without an attorney being present. Id. By administering Miranda warnings after Woods answered that he did not know whether his mother was his attorney, reviewing the waiver of rights form and obtaining Wood's signature, the investigator resolved any possible ambiguity that may have been created by Woods's statement. Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 445(1), 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997). The trial court did not err in admitting Woods's statement.” Dunlap v. State, 291 Ga. 51, 727 S.E.2d 468 (May 7, 2012). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Defendant’s statement prior to interrogation, “My lawyer don't have to be present right here or nothing? ... A lawyer,” wasn’t “an unambiguous and unequivocal request for an attorney.” Martin v. State, 290 Ga. 901, 725 S.E.2d 313 (April 24, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting recording of defendant’s statement to police, including his invocation of right to counsel. “Contrary to Martin's arguments otherwise, evidence of a defendant's invocation of the right to counsel is not automatically inadmissible as an improper comment on a defendant's right to remain silent. ‘[A]dmission of the videotape ending with [Martin's] request for an attorney did not amount to an improper comment on his right to remain silent warranting the reversal of his conviction.’ (Footnote and citation omitted.) Rowe v. State, 276 Ga. 800, 805(4) (582 S.E.2d 119) (2003). ‘[T]he videotape merely shows that [Martin] invoked his right to an attorney after giving a lengthy statement to police, and that the interview was then properly terminated. It did not purport to be evidence of [Martin's] guilt nor was it directed to undermining any of his defenses.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. Martin's request for an attorney did not negatively point directly at the substance of Martin's claim of self-defense or otherwise substantially prejudice Martin. See Benham v. State, 259 Ga. 249, 249–50(2) (379 S.E.2d 506) (1989) (‘To reverse a conviction the evidence of the defendant's election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of defendant's defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury’) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Accord, Jackson v. State , A15A2137, 336 Ga.App. 70, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 822115 (March 3, 2016). Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 467, 722 S.E.2d 72 (February 6, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “Contrary to his claims otherwise, Walker did not have either a Sixth Amendment right to counsel or a Fifth Amendment right requiring that his Miranda rights be repeated to him during the interview [with the court- appointed psychiatric evaluator on defendant’s insanity plea]. ‘[Walker did not] have a constitutional right to the presence of counsel during the state's psychiatric examination. He asserts no compelling reason for counsel's presence, and we have never ruled that counsel must be present during psychiatric evaluation ordered by a trial court. See Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 275 S.E.2d 29 (1981); Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496 (1977). It has been observed that an attorney present during a psychiatric interview could contribute little and might seriously disrupt the examination.