☢ test - Í

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) n.14. [Walker] was given a full and proper Miranda warning at the time of his arrest, but it was not necessary to remind him (although the state did so) that he need not answer any of the interviewer's questions before the state psychiatric examination. A full, separate, second warning was not necessary. Anglin v. State, 244 Ga. 1, 257 S.E.2d 513 (1979).’ Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 657(5), 308 S.E.2d 806 (1983).” Higuera-Hernandez v. State, 289 Ga. 553, 714 S.E.2d 236 (July 11, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; testimony by cellmate, about defendant’s statements while in custody, didn’t violate defendant’s right to counsel absent evidence that defendant was working under an express agreement with the State at the time the information was gathered. “The overwhelming majority of federal and state jurisdictions recognize ‘that an informant must be a government agent before the protections in Massiah are implicated and further recognize that this agency inquiry is separate from whether the informant ‘deliberately elicited’ information. [Cits.] ... Although there are some differences in the approaches of the various jurisdictions, they are unified by at least one common principle: to qualify as a government agent, the informant must at least have some sort of agreement with, or act under instructions from, a government official.... And several courts have expressly held that the analysis does not change even if the government is aware of the entrepreneurial inmate's self-seeking tendencies and government officials believe — or even hope — that the inmate will elicit information from the defendant. [Cits.] ... Various jurisdictions also agree that a person's past service as a government informant in unrelated cases does not necessarily mean that the person is a government agent in the case at hand. [Cits.] ... [S]uch evidence is simply something the factfinder can consider in its discretion. [Cits.] ... [Three federal circuits go further and] hold that an informant is not a government agent in a given case unless he has been instructed to obtain information from that defendant; any general agreement to obtain information about crime is deemed irrelevant. [Cits.] Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 182–186(II)(B)(4) (Tex.Crim.App., 2003). Likewise, placement of an informant with such ‘past service’ into the defendant's cell may be a factor in some jurisdictions but is not in many others. Manns v. State, supra at 187(II)(B)(4). Furthermore, an informant's receipt of a benefit or reward for the information may constitute some evidence of a prior agreement if the ‘benefit had already been promised at the time the informant elicited the information; if not, later receipt of a benefit is of no consequence. [Cits.]’ Manns v. State, supra at 188(II)(B)(4). As this Court has stated, ‘“[a]n inmate who acts upon the expectation of an unpromised reward does not thereby become an agent for the state.” [Cit.]” Burgan v. State, 258 Ga. 512, 515(5) (371 S.E.2d 854) (1988).” Record here shows no detective and witness Calderon “did not have any agreement and that Calderon had not been promised any payment, lenient treatment, or other help in return for any evidence that he might produce.” Wheeler v. State, 289 Ga.App. 537, 713 S.E.2d 393 (July 11, 2011). Reversing 305 Ga.App. 501, 699 S.E.2d 745 (2010), trial court erred in admitting custodial statement. Defendant made an unequivocal request for counsel when officer said she was going to read Miranda : ““You know, I—I'm—I'm not trying to be hard to get along with — but the seriousness of my charges – and everything, I need to discuss it with a lawyer before I, you know, talk to you. I— I'm not really trying to be hard to get along with.” Defendant’s subsequent agreement to talk was thus invalid. Note that defendant previously made “a limited request for an attorney”: “Well, I mean I will to a certain extent, but I, you know, I can't incriminate myself or anything. I mean not until I talk to an attorney, you know, first.” “[T]hat ‘limited request did not require the cessation of the interrogation.’ Pitts v. State, 259 Ga. 745, 748(4)(a), 386 S.E.2d 351 (1989). The police officers were authorized at that point to take the opportunity provided by Wheeler to obtain a statement within the terms of his selective waiver of the right to counsel. See Baird v. State, [263 Ga. 868, 870(1), 440 S.E.2d 190 (1994)].” Also citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987). Crawford v. State, 288 Ga. 425, 704 S.E.2d 772 (January 10, 2011). Defendant’s murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement, as his question to the officers – whether he needed an attorney – did not rise to the level of an unequivocal request for counsel. Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly admitted custodial statement. “Willis' initial reference to an attorney was ambiguous as to whether he presently wanted an attorney or simply wanted one in the future. Under these circumstances, the interrogating officer reasonably attempted to clarify Willis' request, and Willis indicated that he was requesting the future assistance of an attorney, not immediate assistance.” When detective first asked defendant if he wanted an attorney, defendant responded, “No. I'm saying I don't have any problem answering any questions, but I still do want an attorney.” When detective attempted to clarify, defendant asked, “How long would that take before you could get one here?” Detective said she didn’t know, and defendant agreed to give statement. Benham, writing for Hunstein and Hines, dissents, citing Robinson (October 5, 2009), below. Accord, Braham (March 10, 2003), below .