☢ test - Í

Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 698 S.E.2d 301 (April 9, 2010). Defendant’s murder conviction reversed; trial court erred by refusing to suppress defendant’s custodial statement made after request for counsel. “When detectives told Manley his mother was contacting a lawyer, Manley responded: ‘All I want to know is if I can talk to my lawyer. I'll be honest. I just don't want to go down for something that I didn't do.’ The detectives responded: ‘Well, the question is whether you want to talk to us right now, or whether you'd like to talk to your lawyer.’ Thereafter, the detectives began to read Miranda rights, and, as soon as Manley heard that he had the right to a lawyer, he interrupted: ‘That's what I want right there.’ A detective responded: ‘[Y]ou don't want to talk to us without a lawyer being with you?’ Manley returned: ‘I just want a lawyer right here with me. No, I'll talk to y'all, but I just want a lawyer with me.’ Detectives again questioned: ‘So do you want a lawyer present, or do you want to talk to us?’ At that point, Manley stated that he would talk, Miranda rights were read, and questioning continued. At this time, Manley made the statement in issue. Under these facts, Manley unambiguously requested the presence of his lawyer and any questioning should have stopped immediately,” citing Robinson (October 5, 2009), below. Stewart v. State, 286 Ga. 669, 690 S.E.2d 811 (March 15, 2010). At defendant’s murder trial, no error in admission of defendant’s statement, where he initiated discussion with officers hours after invoking Miranda . Wanted in Liberty County for murder, defendant was captured in Atlanta. “At the time of his arrest, he was read his Miranda [cit.] rights, but chose to remain silent at that time. Officers then proceeded to transfer appellant to Liberty County by car. Four hours into the drive, appellant advised officers that he wanted to speak to them. The officers went to the nearest local sheriff's station, which was in Tatnall County, to interview appellant. The officers read appellant his Miranda rights a second time and provided him with a waiver form, which appellant signed before any statements were made. Upon signing the waiver, appellant gave a verbal statement, which was recorded, and a written statement. In the absence of any evidence of coercion or receiving a hope of benefit, it was not erroneous for the trial court to conclude that statements were voluntary since, after invoking his right to silence, appellant re-initiated conversation with police, was given his Miranda rights a second time, and signed a waiver of rights.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (February 24, 2010). Reversing Maryland Court of Appeals, U.S. Supreme Court unanimously holds that second interrogation of defendant, three years after he invoked Miranda right to counsel, did not violate Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1978), where defendant was during that time in custody on an unrelated conviction. “The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of ‘prolonged police custody,’ [ Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988)] by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is ‘badgered into submission,’ id., at 690, 108 S.Ct. 2093 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).” Edwards’s “fundamental purpose, however, is to ‘[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel,’ Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988), by ‘prevent[ing] police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,’ [ Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990)].” Sets new limit on Edwards exclusion. “We think it appropriate to specify a period of time to avoid the consequence that continuation of the Edwards presumption ‘will not reach the correct result most of the time.’ Coleman [ v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)]. It seems to us that period is 14 days. That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.” Shatzer’s continued detention in state prison on unrelated charges counts as a break in custody for these purposes. Stevens and Thomas concur specially, criticizing the arbitrary 14-day rule. Accord, Haynes v. State , 287 Ga. 202, 695 S.E.2d 219 (May 17, 2010) (statement admissible where incarcerated, represented defendant asked to speak to detective seven weeks after invoking his right to counsel). Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47, 685 S.E.2d 258 (October 5, 2009). Trial court properly admitted statements made by defendant: “Finley invoked his right to counsel as the detective was reading his Miranda rights. The detective completed his explanation of those rights and asked only if Finley understood. After answering in the affirmative, Finley went on to state that there had been no confrontation and that he and Dennis had only been ‘playing.’ Finley repeated his request to speak with a lawyer and when the detective indicated his understanding, Finley spontaneously stated that ‘it was an accident’ before again requesting an attorney. The detective concluded the session. We find that Finley's comments were the result of his initiation of communication with police, and conclude that the resulting waiver of his previously-invoked right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently.” Robinson v. State, 286 Ga. 42, 684 S.E.2d 863 (October 5, 2009). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to