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“custodial interrogation”... .’ McNeil, supra, at 182, n. 3. What matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation – not what happened at any preliminary hearing.” Case remanded for consideration of whether Montejo’s waiver of counsel was voluntary in light of this ruling. Four dissent, would not overrule Jackson and would find that interrogation in this context violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Query: is this ruling unique to interrogations, or can police request a represented defendant to waive his right to counsel for critical stages other than interrogation, i.e., line- ups? If prosecuting attorneys participate in such conversations, violating bar Disciplinary Rules, would any exclusionary rule apply? Accord, Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010) (disapproving O'Kelley v. State, 278 Ga. 564, 568(2) (604 S.E.2d 509) (2004), holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, once attached, cannot be waived by the defendant during questioning that is initiated by interrogators.”); Edenfield v. State , 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013) . See also Gosdin (March 13, 2000), below. Accord, Dixon v. State , 294 Ga. 40, 751 S.E.2d 69 (November 4, 2013). Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 129 S.Ct. 1841, 173 L.Ed.2d 801 (April 29, 2009). A 7-2 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a statement obtained in violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel (here, by planting an informant in defendant’s jail cell to listen to his conversations) was admissible at trial to impeach his testimony. Defendant testified at murder trial that his co-defendant was the shooter, not himself. In rebuttal, the State called the informant, who testified that he’d heard defendant tell another inmate that Ventris himself was the shooter. Trial court admitted the testimony, but Kansas Supreme Court reversed. Scalia, writing for majority, agrees with the trial judge that a statement obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not admissible in State’s case in chief, but may be admitted as impeachment evidence. Distinghuished from Fifth Amendment cases: “Whether otherwise excluded evidence can be admitted for purposes of impeachment depends upon the nature of the constitutional guarantee that is violated. Sometimes that explicitly mandates exclusion from trial, and sometimes it does not. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, and so is violated whenever a truly coerced confession is introduced at trial, whether by way of impeachment or otherwise. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 458- 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979). The Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, guarantees that no person shall be subjected to unreasonable searches or seizures, and says nothing about excluding their fruits from evidence; exclusion comes by way of deterrent sanction rather than to avoid violation of the substantive guarantee. Inadmissibility has not been automatic, therefore, but we have instead applied an exclusionary-rule balancing test. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954). The same is true for violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prophylactic rules forbidding certain pretrial police conduct. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); [ Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348-350, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990)].” Concluding that the violation of defendant’s rights took place when the statement was obtained, not when the evidence was tendered in court, the Court finds that “[t]he interests safeguarded by such exclusion are ‘outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process.’ Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). ‘It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can ... provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.’ Walder, supra, at 65, 74 S.Ct. 354. Once the defendant testifies in a way that contradicts prior statements, denying the prosecution use of ‘the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process,’ Harris, supra, at 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, is a high price to pay for vindication of the right to counsel at the prior stage.” Stevens and Ginsberg dissent, would draw no distinction between use of the statements at any time during trial. Accord, Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010); Delarosa v. State , 304 Ga.App. 4, 695 S.E.2d 346 (May 7, 2010) (“Delarosa’s prior inconsistent statements … were admissible for purposes of impeachment even if they resulted from an illegal arrest,” where otherwise apparently voluntary). Harvill v. State, 296 Ga.App. 453, 674 S.E.2d 659 (March 5, 2009). After posting bond for aggravated stalking, defendant made a false report accusing stalking victim of damaging his car with her car, then leaving scene. Based on his report, officers took a recorded statement from defendant without counsel present, and later charged him with making false statements. Held, trial court properly found that defendant’s statement was not taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Although defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights had attached as to the stalking charge, the trial court properly found that the statement “concerned only the alleged hit-and-run.” “‘The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. …’ (Footnote omitted.) Smith v. State, 273 Ga.App. 107, 109(2) (614 S.E.2d 219) (2005).” Fact that statement was taken at the direction of the detective investigating the stalking case doesn’t change this result: “in order for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach to a second offense, even if not formally charged, that offense must be ‘considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.’ Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 173 (121 S.Ct