☢ test - Í

1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321) (2001). See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306) (1932) (‘where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’) The charges against Harvill in this case fall well outside that test.” Stone v. State, 296 Ga.App. 305, 674 S.E.2d 31 (January 27, 2009). Trial court erred in denying motion to suppress defendant’s custodial statement, initiated by State after appointment of public defender at first appearance before magistrate. “The trial court, in ruling that Stone failed to assert his right to counsel, erroneously relied on State v. Hatcher, 264 Ga. 556 (448 S.E.2d 698) (1994), which held that an ‘eligibility affidavit form’ provided by police at the jailhouse as a ‘housekeeping measure’ did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel for Fifth Amendment purposes, i.e., whether the defendant had invoked his right to counsel for Miranda purposes in the context of a custodial interrogation prior to a first appearance. See id. at 558; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485(II) (101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378) (1981). However, with respect to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during critical stages of adversarial proceedings, Hatcher held that the same form did constitute ‘a request for court-appointed counsel once judicial proceedings were initiated for Sixth Amendment purposes....’ State v. Hatcher, supra, 264 Ga. at 557. In so holding, the Court in Hatcher emphasized that because the defendant in that case had filled out the form at the jailhouse prior to any adversarial criminal proceeding, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. See id.” Holmes v. State, 284 Ga. 330, 667 S.E.2d 71 (September 22, 2008). Defendant’s statements were admissible when he initiated new conversation with police after first invoking right to counsel: “When defendant was questioned initially, he informed the detective that he wanted a lawyer; the detective stopped the interview and told defendant he would be going to jail and charged with murder. Defendant then said that if he could speak with his family, he would tell the detective what happened. After speaking with his family, defendant was willing to converse with the detective. He was again advised of his constitutional rights, and he signed a waiver of rights form. Asked again if he was willing to talk without a lawyer, defendant replied affirmatively.” Accord, Haynes v. State , 287 Ga. 202, 695 S.E.2d 219 (May 17, 2010) (statement admissible where incarcerated, represented defendant asked to speak to detective seven weeks after invoking his right to counsel). State v. Darby, 284 Ga. 271, 663 S.E.2d 160 (June 30, 2008). 1. Trial court properly suppressed defendant’s statement, given to officers after they told him he couldn’t give a voluntary statement without first signing a Miranda waiver. Defendant had invoked right to counsel rather than be interrogated, but wanted to “tell his side.” “The trial court was authorized to find that Darby did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right by executing the Miranda waiver, because he signed that document only after receiving the erroneous information that it was a precondition to telling his ‘side of the story.’” Distinguished, Bunnell v. State , 292 Ga. 253, 735 S.E.2d 281 (January 7, 2013) (“the officer in this case did not mislead Bunnell or give him erroneous legal information when she said that this was his opportunity to tell her his side of the story before other persons were interviewed and began telling their version of events.”); Francis v. State , 296 Ga. 190, 766 S.E.2d 52 (November 17, 2014) (no indication that defendant wanted to make a spontaneous statement before being asked to sign a Miranda waiver). 2. Trial court properly suppressed second statement given to second officer, the day after he had invoked his right to counsel. “[Officer] Adkison picked up [Darby] from the jail for the five minute ride to his first appearance hearing more than ninety minutes before the hearing was scheduled. He was taken not to the Magistrate Court but to police headquarters, where he was placed in an interrogation room. [Officer] Adkison initiated conversation with [Darby] by telling him what to expect at the hearing.... [The officer] was not empowered to spontaneously advise [Darby] about his legal situation at the hearing. This information, properly obtained from the judge or through requested counsel, does not fall within the boundaries of the ‘booking exception’ from Miranda, nor does it serve any other administrative function.” “It is immaterial that the officer may not have been aware that the initial interview ended with Darby’s invocation of his right to an attorney. Roper v. State, 258 Ga. 847, 850(1)(a), 375 S.E.2d 600 (1989).” 3. Trial court properly suppressed videotape of conversation between defendant and his mother, made while defendant was in custody, after invocation of right to counsel, with officer sitting in the room explaining to the mother what defendant had told officers in his previous (also-suppressed) statements. “The trial court found the videotape of the meeting between Darby and his mother to be inadmissible because it ‘shows that, despite [Officer] Adkison’s constant urging, [Darby] would not talk to his mother about the events surrounding the victim’s death. [Officer] Adkison finally repeated to [Darby’s] mother what her son had told them during the second interrogation. All the dialogue between [Darby] and his mother was based on [Officer] Adkison’s recital of the events obtained from the illegal interview.” As the interrogation discussed in the videotape was suppressed, “it could not be admitted indirectly in the form of Officer Adkison’s recital on the videotape of what Darby had said to him during the illegal interview, followed by a discussion between Darby and his mother of his inculpatory admissions.” However, “[a]ny exchange between Darby