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occurring outside of Francis' presence, which were entirely unknown to him, have no bearing on Francis' capacity to waive his rights”). Qureshi v. State, 291 Ga.App. 708, 662 S.E.2d 806 (May 29, 2008). No error in admitting officer’s testimony that defendant, after being Mirandized , “initially agreed to talk to the officer” and explained his conduct, but then “refused to respond to additional questioning in the absence of an attorney.” “[T[he defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel marked the termination of permissible evidence. No curative instruction was given to the jury because no objection was made. In cross-examining Qureshi after the investigating officer had testified, the prosecuting attorney did not attempt to impeach him with his failure to inform the investigating officer of the explanation he provided at trial. Nor did the prosecuting attorney comment on this in closing argument.” Heath v. State, 291 Ga.App. 594, 662 S.E.2d 362 (May 20, 2008). Where defense counsel asked officer why defendant’s statement wasn’t reduced to writing, defendant couldn’t object to answer: “I hadn’t gotten to that because she had lawyered up or she had requested an attorney at that point.” Accord, Ferrell v. State , 312 Ga.App. 122, 717 S.E.2d 705 (October 18, 2011) (defendant couldn’t complain about officer’s testimony, elicited by defense counsel, that defendants “invoked their right to remain silent.”). State v. Sammons, 283 Ga. 364, 659 S.E.2d 598 (March 31, 2008). Trial court properly suppressed defendant’s statement, made after invocation of right to counsel. Defendant was giving custodial statement to police when her attorney arrived at the jail. “The attorney and Sammons conferred, Sammons ceased writing her statement, the custodial interrogation terminated with Sammons’ invocation of counsel, and Sammons was placed in a jail cell. The trial court found that the parties agreed that the interview would be continued after Sammons had been given the opportunity to rest. On July 10, 1998, the day after the termination of the custodial interrogation, the investigator removed Sammons from her cell and resumed the videotaped interview without counsel being present.” “The State contends … that because Sammons was allowed to meet with counsel on July 9, the rule in Edwards v. Arizona was satisfied and it had the right to continue its interrogation on July 10 outside the presence of counsel. This contention is inconsistent with the law. We have held that merely allowing the accused to have a conversation with counsel does not obviate the rule propounded by Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477,484-85 (101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378) (1981) . See Roper v. State, [258 Ga. 847, 849 (375 S.E.2d 600) (1989)] (‘We cannot agree with the state that any opportunity to speak with counsel, no matter how brief, dissolves the Edwards presumption’). Indeed, Edwards is rigid and only allows continued custodial interrogation under very narrowly-defined circumstances. Walton v. State, [267 Ga. 713, 715 (482 S.E.2d 330) (1997)]. Accordingly, the fact that Sammons was able to meet with an attorney on July 9 did not absolve the authorities’ mandate under Edwards to refrain from interrogating Sammons outside the presence of her attorney.” “[T]he matter of whether Sammons’ waiver was knowing and intelligent need not be analyzed because the interview was initiated by the authorities. Walton v. State, 267 Ga. at 715.” “The investigator admitted … that no one told him that Sammons could be interviewed without her attorney being present.” Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268, 658 S.E.2d 599 (March 10, 2008). Non-custodial statement was admissible regardless of request for counsel. “Petty maintains that any questioning by police after his request for an attorney violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378) (1981). However, the bright-line rule of Edwards, requiring that all questioning cease after an accused has requested counsel, applies only to custodial interrogation. Id. at 485(II) (‘it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel’). To the extent that Nobles v. State, 191 Ga.App. 594(1)(a), 382 S.E.2d 637 (1989) can be read to hold that Edwards also applies in a non- custodial situation, it is hereby overruled. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n. 3 (111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158) (1991)( Miranda rights cannot be invoked anticipatorily in context other than custodial interrogation). Because Petty was not in custody at the time he made the … statement, it follows that there was no Edwards violation and that the statement was properly admitted.” Accord, Green v. State , 291 Ga. 287, 728 S.E.2d 668 (June 25, 2012). Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was interviewed by detective after requesting counsel at first appearance in Magistrate Court. Defendant had been arrested for murder; interview related to search for drugs. Both statement and drugs discovered as a result should have been suppressed. Opinion treats the drug charge as related to the murder charge; compare Swain (May 25, 2007),and Chenoweth (October 2, 2006), both below. Perez v. State, 283 Ga. 196, 657 S.E.2d 846 (February 25, 2008). Case of first impression: in light of Davis v. United