☢ test - Í

States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-462(II) (114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362) (1994), what is interrogating officer’s obligation when defendant makes ambiguous reference to right to remain silent during custodial interrogation? Davis allows officers to continue interrogation when ambiguous reference is made to right to counsel; should the same rule apply to right to silence? Prior rule: “if the suspect makes only an ambiguous or equivocal request to end the questioning, ‘the police “may ask questions designed to clarify whether the suspect intended to invoke his right to remain silent,” but they may not simply continue the interrogation.’ [Cit.]” quoting Hatcher v. State , 259 Ga. 274, 277(2), fn. 2, 379 S.E.2d 775 (1989). Finding that “every circuit [including the Eleventh] that has addressed the issue squarely” has abandoned the old “clarification only” rule, Georgia does, too: “‘We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests [that they cease to do so].’ Davis v. United States, supra at 461(II). See also Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 444(1) (480 S.E.2d 18) (1997) (adopting Davis reasoning and holding that, after an initial waiver of his Miranda rights, a suspect must thereafter signify his intent to invoke the Sixth Amendment by making an unambiguous request for counsel). Accordingly, Hatcher v. State, supra, is hereby overruled insofar as it adopted the ‘clarification only’ rule which was subsequently rejected by Davis. ” Defendant’s statement here is found to be too equivocal to constitute a clear invocation of right to remain silent: “[in Spanish] Mm, no, how, the other thing, in any moment the paper says I can stop the interrogatory. Right? Or no?” Johnson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 41, 656 S.E.2d 200 (December 19, 2007). Trial court properly determined that defendant didn’t make an unequivocal request for counsel. Although defendant told officer that he needed to call his family “so they can know that I do need a lawyer,” and making references to his “family lawyer,” when officer finally asked if he wanted to talk to him without an attorney, defendant said “yeah. Yeah. Yeah.” “A suspect ‘must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’ Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362) (1994). But if the suspect’s reference to counsel is ambiguous or equivocal, cessation of the interrogation is not required. See id; Fitz v. State, 275 Ga. 349, 352(3)(b) (566 S.E.2d 668) (2002). In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s statement, ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ was ambiguous and therefore did not require that the police cease questioning. Davis, supra at 462. The Georgia Supreme Court has previously held that statements that a suspect would like to talk to an attorney in the future were not clear and unambiguous requests for counsel. See Ehle v. State, 275 Ga. 560, 563(6) (570 S.E.2d 284) (2002) (defendant’s statement that ‘“he should perhaps have an attorney look at [the state’s] evidence” was an equivocal request for counsel’); Moore v. State, 272 Ga. 359, 360(2) (528 S.E.2d 793) (2000) (‘I’d like to talk to ... the public defender, or whoever my attorney is going to be,’ does not constitute invocation of right to counsel); Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 444(1) (480 S.E.2d 18) (1997) (defendant’s statement that he ‘might need a lawyer’ was not an unambiguous request for counsel); Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174, 177-178(4) (465 S.E.2d 672) (1996) (‘I will still talk to my lawyer tomorrow’ was not clear invocation of counsel).” Accord, Simpson v. State , 293 Ga.App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (September 18, 2008) (No invocation of right to counsel: “both Simpson and his father signed a waiver of rights form, and it is undisputed that Simpson never requested counsel during his interview. The officer testified that, during the interview, Simpson's father was very emotional and was ‘thinking aloud’ while he, his wife and Simpson discussed whether Simpson needed an attorney.”); Wheeler (July 14, 2010), above; Landaverde v. State , 305 Ga.App. 488, 699 S.E.2d 816 (August 2, 2010) (defendant’s statement to officer that “I don’t have anybody here. I don’t have anyone to look out for me,” was insufficient to invoke his right to counsel). Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (June 25, 2007). Trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement where he re-initiated further communication with the police after invoking his right to counsel. During his initial interview, “after signing a waiver of counsel form, Rivera ‘stated that he thought he might need a lawyer’ when he learned that Barton had survived his attack on her. [Cit.] Police then advised Rivera that they could no longer speak with him because he had invoked his right to counsel and that, in the event Rivera decided that he wanted to speak further with them, he would have to reinitiate contact with them. Rivera then requested to talk with his wife, stating that he would decide about speaking further with the police after speaking with her. The investigators arranged for Rivera to speak with his wife by telephone and then exited his room. Subsequently, they were informed by the deputy guarding Rivera that he wished to speak with them again. … When the police returned to Rivera’s room, Rivera confirmed that he had sent for them and that he desired to reinitiate contact with them. The investigators re-read the Miranda rights to Rivera, Rivera himself read them aloud, and Rivera then re-signed a waiver of rights form. At no point did police make any promises to Rivera or attempt to coerce him in any way. We find no merit in Rivera’s contention that the investigators’ accommodation of Rivera’s request to speak to his wife in some way undermined the Edwards rule by prompting Rivera’s request to reinitiate contact with the police. This is not the ‘slightest hope of benefit’ that would render Rivera’s statement involuntary and inadmissible. See Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843, 844(2) (452 S.E.2d 115) (1995) (the