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‘slightest hope of benefit’ in OCGA § 24-3-50 is construed to mean the hope of a lighter sentence). Moreover, it is not uncommon for a suspect in custody to be allowed to speak with a family member. See Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 826(2) (514 S.E.2d 657) (1999) (‘Numerous cases hold that Miranda is not implicated when a suspect in custody is questioned or encouraged to confess by a father, mother, wife, or girl friend’). See also Harvell v. State, 275 Ga. 129 (562 S.E.2d 180) (2002) (accused’s statement was admissible where his request to speak with his mother, made at the same time that he invoked his right to counsel, was accommodated by the police, his mother subsequently informed police that he wished to reinitiate contact, and accused signed waiver form witnessed by his mother).” Swain v. State, 285 Ga.App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (May 25, 2007). Officers investigating an armed robbery stopped defendant, age 15, on the street, found a handgun in his possession, and arrested him for juvenile in possession of a concealed weapon. Defendant was appointed an attorney for the concealed weapon charge. Thereafter, “a police detective interviewed Swain about the armed robbery,” to which he confessed. Defendant moved to suppress the confession “because the detective interviewed him without first notifying his court-appointed attorney[;] we agree with the trial court that the confession did not have to be excluded on that basis. ‘The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee – and hence the purpose of invoking it – is to protect the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his expert adversary, the government, after the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified with respect to a particular alleged crime. The right does not apply with respect to one offense where adversary proceedings have been commenced with respect to a different offense, but not that offense.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Phillips v. State, 204 Ga.App. 698, 700(1) (420 S.E.2d 316) (1992). In this case, at the time of the interview, Swain had not yet been arrested for or charged with the armed robbery, and the juvenile court had only appointed an attorney to represent Swain on the separate offense of possession of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the fact that the detective did not contact the attorney before questioning Swain about the armed robbery does not require that Swain’s confession be suppressed. Id.” Accord, Crutchfield v. State , 291 Ga.App. 24, 660 S.E.2d 878 (April 10, 2008) (defendant voluntarily testified at friend’s trial and took responsibility for drugs; fact that defendant, at the time, had appointed counsel for unrelated charges did not make his testimony involuntary or inadmissible against him in his later prosecution on the drug charges). Swanson v. State, 282 Ga. 39, 644 S.E.2d 845 (May 14, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statement; “the videotape of the interview demonstrates that whenever Swanson made any mention of an attorney, the detective clearly advised him that he had the right to have an attorney present during questioning and that the interview would cease until an attorney could be present; the detective repeatedly and directly asked Swanson whether he wanted an attorney, and Swanson ultimately rejected the right to counsel.” “Swanson … read from the waiver form, commenting, ‘It says, “I do not want a lawyer at this time.” Yes, I would like to have one at this time but due to the officers want to ask me questions, I’m willing to answer . I understand and know what I am doing. At this particular minute, I’m answering questions pertaining to this case.’” Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 642 S.E.2d 812 (March 26, 2007). “Where, in the course of a custodial interrogation, a defendant invokes his right to counsel, subsequent statements in response to further questioning are admissible only if (1) the defendant initiated the subsequent discussions and (2) the waiver of his previously invoked right was knowing and intelligent. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477(II) (101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378) (1981); McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493, 500(1) (591 S.E.2d 788) (2004). In this case, it is undisputed that Height initiated the further discussions with police leading to the statement in question, was re-apprised of his Miranda rights in full, and signed a written waiver prior to giving his statement. The ‘taint’ of the prior Edwards violation was, thus, overcome. See, e.g., Prince v. State, 277 Ga. 230(2) (587 S.E.2d 637) (2003) (defendant’s inculpatory statements held admissible in spite of previous Edwards violation where [defendant] initiated contact with investigators, was advised of rights, and waived them).” Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (November 20, 2006). Person charged with DUI is not entitled to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to take a breath test; “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not come into play until the criminal process has progressed to a ‘critical stage’ after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. Michigan v. Jackson , 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); United States v. Gouveia , 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); see O’Kelley v. State , 278 Ga. 564, 604 S.E.2d 509 (2004) (an initial appearance hearing is a formal legal proceeding at which right to counsel attaches even though it is not often a critical stage). And Georgia’s constitutional right to counsel does not attach unless the proceeding constitutes a ‘critical stage.’ Ballard v.