☢ test - Í

Smith , 225 Ga. 416, 418, 169 S.E.2d 329 (1969). A critical stage in a criminal proceeding is that point at which rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or the outcome of the case can be substantially affected. Fortson v. State , 272 Ga. 457, 458, 532 S.E.2d 102 (2000); Ballard v. Smith , supra.” Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 637 S.E.2d 20 (October 30, 2006). “During a police interview, Rios requested an attorney and the interview immediately stopped. Moments later, and not in response to further questioning, Rios stated he was willing to talk and wanted to continue the interview. The interview resumed, Rios acknowledged that he wished to continue the interview, and he made several incriminating statements. Because Rios voluntarily reinitiated discussions with law enforcement, his statements were properly admitted into evidence.” Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (October 2, 2006). Arrested for theft in Dekalb County, defendant was appointed counsel thereon. Defendant was subsequently interviewed on a murder by Cobb County police, without notice to his Dekalb appointed counsel, and defendant gave a statement on the murder. Defendant contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Held, defendant’s right to counsel was not violated. “In Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321) (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is ‘offense specific’ and that, even if the right to counsel has attached to one offense for which the defendant has been charged, it does not attach to even a factually-related separate offense for which the defendant has not been charged. Id. at 167-174. The Court did, however, rule that, if an uncharged offense constitutes the same offense as a charged offense under the test established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.2d 306) (1932), the uncharged offense will be considered the same offense as the charged offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173-174.” Although defendant contends these charges are “factually related” in that the murder weapon was found when defendant was arrested for the theft, the Court disagrees. “Chenoweth’s crime of theft by receiving a stolen vehicle involved different victims from the murder, occurred well after the murder, and occurred at a different location than the murder. Thus … Chenoweth’s crime of theft by receiving would not be considered closely related to the Gwinnett county murder charge and Chenoweth’s right to counsel had not attached to the murder charge. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Gwinnett County officers’ questioning of Chenoweth did not violate his right to counsel, and we thus find no merit to this enumeration of error.” See also Smith (April 27, 2005), below. Copeland v. State, 281 Ga.App. 656, 637 S.E.2d 90 (September 26, 2006). Dicta: objection to statement was not timely raised, but even if it had been, “the trial court would have also been authorized to conclude that Copeland’s question of ‘would it be wise for me to do that [that is, make a statement] without legal counsel?’ was not a request for counsel. See Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. 202(2) (403 S.E.2d 38) (1991).” Mulvaney v. State, 281 Ga.App. 620, 636 S.E.2d 762 (September 20, 2006). Trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement, finding that it was not the product of police questioning. Defendant drove himself to police station at police request, to discuss injuries to his girlfriend’s child. “[T]he interviewing officer began by asking Mulvaney if he would spell his last name. Rather than answer the question, Mulvaney asked ‘[w]hat are we doing here?’ and ‘what’s that got to do with us?’” The officer explained that they were investigating the child’s injuries. “Mulvaney told the officer that C.R. fell off the toilet, slipped in the bathtub, and fell out of the front door. After additional statements, during which the officer’s only question to Mulvaney was ‘[h]ow old is she?,’ Mulvaney asked the officer what was wrong with the child. The officer responded ‘that is partly what I need to ask you.’” Defendant volunteered other statements about the child’s condition although the officer only asked for directory information. When the officer read Miranda rights, defendant at first said he wanted a lawyer, but continued to make unsolicited statements about the child’s condition. “‘In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297) (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court defined the ‘interrogation’ which must be preceded by Miranda warnings as the ‘express questioning [of a person in custody] or its functional equivalent ... that is, ... any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect....’ The court went on to note, however, that ‘the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions....’ The Innis definition of ‘interrogation’ is applicable to cases presenting an Edwards question....’ [on whether defendant’s right to counsel has been violated]. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717(4) (482 S.E.2d 330 (1997).” “As noted by our Supreme Court in Walton, ‘an accused’s response to an officer’s answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation.’ 267 Ga. at 718(4). Mulvaney continued to talk without being questioned by the officer.” Distinguishing Nash (September 19, 2005), below (officer questioned defendant after right to counsel invoked; statement inadmissible). “When Mulvaney expressed a desire not to say any more, the officer asked Mulvaney to sign a form showing that he had read Mulvaney his rights. Mulvaney then began to make additional statements without prompting or questioning by the officer. The officer