☢ test - Í

655, 657(2) (581 S.E.2d 518) (2003) ( where suspect did not reassert his right to counsel, confessions obtained from police initiated interrogation were admissible without violating the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights in light of an intervening break in custody ).” Smith v. State, 273 Ga.App. 107, 614 S.E.2d 219 (April 27, 2005). Defendant was arrested in Fulton County on certain felony offenses, and appointed counsel on those charges. While still in custody, and after appointment of counsel, he was interviewed by a Henry County detective on other charges. Held, defendant’s statement to the Henry County officer was properly admitted. Defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he gave the statement; his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached because he had not yet been charged with the Henry County offense. The fact that defendant had invoked his right to counsel on the Fulton County case is immaterial. “As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific: ‘It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings – whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’ (Punctuation omitted.) McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158) (1991).” See also Chenoweth (October 2, 2006), above. Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 563, 629 S.E.2d 213 (April 25, 2006). “Around 9:00 a.m., an attorney arrived at the police barracks and advised the officers that he had been retained by Bell’s mother to represent him. When the attorney asked to speak with Bell, an officer sought guidance from the district attorney’s office and was instructed to deny the attorney’s request. At least 30 minutes later, Bell executed a waiver of Miranda rights and the police obtained a confession. As a result of Bell’s statement, a second search warrant was obtained that led to discovery of the murder weapon. Bell submits on appeal that his second statement and all that flowed from it are inadmissible because he was denied his right to counsel. The evidence is uncontroverted that Bell never expressed a desire to speak with an attorney, nor did he invoke his right to counsel after Miranda warnings were administered. ‘[T]he rights guaranteed under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are personal and must be invoked or waived by the individual defendant. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698(7) (278 S.E.2d 398); Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856(2) (268 S.E.2d 339).’ Edwards v. State, 167 Ga.App. 681, 682(1) (307 S.E.2d 264) (1983). As in Edwards, ‘ the attorney, acting on his own and without having consulted [Bell], was not empowered to invoke [Bell’s] personal rights. ’ Id.” Gonzalez v. State, 277 Ga.App. 362, 626 S.E.2d 569 (January 25, 2006). “[T]he trial court did not err in finding that Gonzalez’s statement was spontaneous and not the result of interrogation.” “Evidence adduced at the hearing showed that Gonzalez, whose native language was Spanish, was interviewed by an English-speaking detective. The interviewing detective was accompanied by a second officer, who served as a Spanish language translator. After hearing his Miranda rights, Gonzalez asked for an attorney, and the officers left to question another suspect. Upon their return the interviewing officer picked up Gonzalez’s shoes, which had been removed and placed outside the room, and, referring to the shoes, asked the other officer, in English, ‘does that look like blood to you?’ Gonzalez then stated, in Spanish, ‘that was where [Lopez] hit the man in the head.’ Gonzalez accompanied the statement with a chopping motion. The trial court concluded that the statement was not the result of questioning, but spontaneous and therefore admissible. See Pierce v. State, 255 Ga.App. 194, 196(2) (564 S.E.2d 790) (2002) (‘[v]oluntary, spontaneous outbursts that are not made in response to any form of custodial questioning or interrogation are admissible at trial’) (citation omitted).” “According to the officers’ testimony, they were speaking to each other in reference to the material on Gonzalez’s shoes. There is no evidence that the officers were intentionally engaging in a practice designed to elicit a response from Gonzalez. Compare [Cottingham v. State, 206 Ga.App. 194, 201(4) (424 S.E.2d 797) (1992)] (officer admitted his intent in discussing the case in front of the defendant was to elicit an incriminating response). Furthermore, the officer’s conversation was in English in front of a Spanish-speaking suspect who had been interrogated in Spanish, and under the circumstances we cannot say the officers should have known their actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response from Gonzalez. See generally Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718(4) (482 S.E.2d 330) (1997) ([defendant’s] statement was not in response to an express question or by actions the detective should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response).” State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 619 S.E.2d 684 (September 19, 2005). “The trial court found that [defendant], when asked whether he wanted to talk without an attorney present, said, ‘No,’ and clearly shook his head in the negative when the GBI agent asked, ‘You don’t want to talk about it?’ The trial court ruled the interview should have been terminated immediately when Nash told the investigators that he did not wish to talk without an attorney present and invoked his right to remain silent. Instead, as reflected in the videotape and the transcript thereof, stipulated as accurate by Nash and the State, the GBI agent said, ‘There'll be some small talk. We’ll talk about, you know, your mama and what’s going