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on in Cairo, if that’s what you’re talking about.... I’m going to ... put refused to talk [on the waiver of rights form].’ The GBI agent then proceeded to ask Nash a series of questions [fn] which culminated in Nash saying, ‘You can talk to me now,’ and giving an inculpatory statement. [Footnote: The agent then asked Nash the number, gender, age, and location of any children he had; where Nash was born; his hair color, height, and weight; the state of his teeth; the source and descriptions of the tattoos covering Nash’s arms, chest, and back; his facial hair; the status of his driver’s license; his marital status; his father’s name; and whether he had siblings. He then told Nash he would be returned to the sheriff’s office after Nash signed a sheet containing the information the agent had obtained. The agent then said ‘That’s the picture your mama gave us when we were looking for you. You did turn yourself in, though? I want to make that part of the record. You did turn yourself in.’ Nash responded, ‘Yeah, I could have ran,’ and the agent noted Nash had a number of places to which he could have gone had he run. Nash then alluded to reasons why altercations happen, and the agent said, ‘That’s why I wanted to talk to you. That’s why I wanted to talk to you.’ Nash responded, ‘You can talk to me. I told you, you can talk to me now .’ Nash noted that statements can be harmful, and the agent told him officers had only one side of the story after talking to a number of persons. Nash then said he wanted the agent and lieutenant to listen to him.”] Held, trial court could find that agent improperly continued interrogation after defendant invoked his right to counsel and right to silence, and that agent’s questions were not mere booking information requests. “As we observed in Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 239-40 (486 S.E.2d 594) (1997), ‘Georgia courts have confined the booking exception to requests for basic biographical data such as the suspect’s name, age, address, educational background, marital status, and other information required to complete an arrest form.... Like most federal and state courts, we are unwilling to create a broad exception to the Fifth Amendment for police questions asked during booking “without investigative intent” or pursuant to “administrative procedure” once an accused has invoked his rights.’” Agent’s question about whether defendant turned himself in was not a routine booking question. “Inasmuch as questions concerning how a suspect came to be in police custody are likely to elicit an incriminating response, they are not exempt from Miranda as questions seeking routine biographical data for booking purposes. See Franks, supra, 268 Ga. at 240.” Lawson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 334, 620 S.E.2d 600 (September 1, 2005). Trial court could find that defendant’s statement was voluntary where he initiated conversation with detective, even though he already had attorney and attorney advised against making statement. Smith v. State, 273 Ga.App. 107, 614 S.E.2d 219 (April 27, 2005). Defendant was arrested in Fulton County on certain felony offenses, and appointed counsel on those charges. While still in custody, and after appointment of counsel, he was interviewed by a Henry County detective on other charges. Held, defendant’s statement to the Henry County officer was properly admitted. Defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he gave the statement; his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached because he had not yet been charged with the Henry County offense. The fact that defendant had invoked his right to counsel on the Fulton County case is immaterial. “As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific: ‘It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings -- whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’ (Punctuation omitted.) McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158) (1991).” Vasser v. State, 272 Ga.App. 327, 612 S.E.2d 543 (March 21, 2005). When investigator mentioned the right to a lawyer during Miranda warnings, defendant said, “That’s what I want. I want a lawyer.” Investigator continued with Miranda warning, then asked, “do you wish to speak to me now without an attorney?” Defendant replied, “It doesn’t matter. I don’t have nothing to hide.” Held, defendant’s subsequent statement should have been suppressed. “[O]nce an accused has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he ‘is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’ Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378) (1981).” See also Smith v. Illinois , 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). Defendant’s question about whether he might qualify to be a policeman if he beat the rap was not sufficient to “initiate” further conversation about the charges. “In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405) (1983), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court clarified what it means for an accused to ‘initiate’ further conversation. The court held that an inquiry or a statement that can be fairly said ‘to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation’ will generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards, id. at 1045, whereas routine inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone, would not be said to ‘initiate’ a conversation in the same sense. Vasser’s question about whether he could become a police officer, although made while the gunshot residue test was being conducted, was made during the same interrogation in which he invoked his right to counsel.” Harmless error, however, since statement was only admitted