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in second phase of bifurcated trial, addressing charge of possession of firearm by convicted felon, and fact of prior felony conviction was proven by certified copy. Felton v. State, 270 Ga.App. 449, 606 S.E.2d 649 (November 15, 2004). Burglary and related convictions affirmed. Defendant twice stopped his statement to officers and asked for an attorney, only to re-initiate discussion within minutes. Held, trial court did not err in admitting the statement. “‘A suspect who asks for a lawyer at any time during a custodial interrogation may not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement until an attorney has been made available or until the suspect reinitiates the conversation.’ Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 271-272(1) (553 S.E.2d 598) (2001).” Taylor disapproved on other grounds, State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015). O’Kelley v. State, 278 Ga. 564, 604 S.E.2d 509 (October 25, 2004). Defendant’s “indicating, at an initial appearance before a magistrate judge, his desire to have an attorney represent him renders his subsequent statement to an interrogator inadmissible at trial.” After arrest pursuant to a warrant, defendant made an initial appearance before a magistrate. “No prosecutor or defense counsel was present, no testimony or evidence was presented, and O’Kelley was informed that he was not to enter a plea. When asked, O’Kelley indicated his desire for a court-appointed attorney.” Two days later, detectives initiated questioning of defendant. Held, “an initial appearance hearing, although often not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding in its own right requiring the actual presence of a defense attorney, is a formal legal proceeding wherein the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.” “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the beginning of ‘formal legal proceedings’ and … it is not necessary that the ‘formal legal proceeding’ in question be a ‘critical stage’ of the criminal proceedings requiring the actual presence of counsel,” citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-630, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). Overrules Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 26-27(3)(b) (326 S.E.2d 194) (1985). Note, “the attachment of the right to counsel during critical stages of trial proceedings should not be confused with the right to have counsel actually present at the hearing wherein the defendant’s desire for counsel is determined. If, as was true in O’Kelley’s case, a defendant chooses to assert his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel at an initial appearance hearing, it would not be necessary for the magistrate to make defense counsel available immediately. However, the defendant’s exercise of the right does suspend the magistrate’s power to conduct further proceedings that would constitute critical aspects of the defendant’s trial proceedings. In fact, Rule 25.1(4) of the Uniform Magistrate Court Rules already requires that a pre-indictment commitment hearing be delayed if the defendant states during the initial appearance hearing that he or she wishes to consult with counsel. In summary, once the defendant’s wish to exercise his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been determined, the magistrate is limited to conducting scheduling and other ‘housekeeping’ measures and to fulfilling its duty to ensure that counsel is provided prior to the conducting of any critical proceedings.” Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 603 S.E.2d 445 (July 26, 2004). 1. “In this case, Smith’s statements to the police officer did not communicate an unambiguous request for counsel or constitute a clear invocation of her right to counsel. When the officer asked Smith if she were willing to talk with him, she said, ‘Well, I mean, I don’t have anything – yeah, why not. I mean I can have, can I have a lawyer?’ To this ambiguous response, the officer affirms that Smith can have a lawyer present if she wants one, saying, ‘It’s up to you. If you want a lawyer, I can’t make that decision for you.’ But, again, Smith’s reply is ambiguous: ‘Well, yeah, I would like one, but, I mean.’ When the officer again seeks clarification as to whether she wants to speak to him without an attorney, Smith still does not make an unequivocal request for counsel but, instead, agrees to speak: ‘Do I want to talk to you. I don’t see no reason why not to.’ Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Smith’s subsequent custodial statement.” Accord, Braham (March 10, 2003), below; Gonzalez v. State , 283 Ga.App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (March 1, 2007) . 2. During interrogation, Defendant invoked his right to counsel, refusing to answer further questions. Defendant was accompanied to the restroom by an officer other than the interrogator. Seeing that the defendant seemed “flustered,” the officer asked defendant “Are you okay?”, whereupon defendant said “I want to tell the truth.” The officer verified on tape that defendant wanted to make a statement without an attorney. Held, “[officer’s] question, ‘Are you okay?’ does not constitute interrogation under Miranda. It is not a communication that [officer] should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Simpson. Simpson, however, seized it as an opportunity to initiate further discussion with [officer] about the conditions under which he would tell the police what happened. In addition, besides initiating further discussion with the police, it is also clear that Simpson, after repeated questioning by [officer] about his understanding of his rights and his willingness to speak to the detectives, knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel which he had earlier invoked. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting his statement.” Wallace v. State, 267 Ga.App. 801, 600 S.E.2d 808 (June 14, 2004). Defendant’s assertions that he intended to hire an attorney were not enough to require termination of his custodial interview. “‘A suspect must make a clear and