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unambiguous request to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation to require law enforcement officers to stop their questioning.’ (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied) Moore v. State , 272 Ga. 359, 360(2), 528 S.E.2d 793 (2000). At most, [defendant’s] comments indicate an intention to speak with a lawyer in the future and do not constitute a clear request for counsel. See id. ” Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L Ed.2d 1016 (January 26, 2004). Defendant’s statement to police arresting him pursuant to grand jury indictment suppressed. Although defendant was not interrogated, and thus perhaps Miranda warnings were not required under the Fifth Amendment, the statement was “deliberately elicited” from him by the police in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel, thus violating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Massiah v. United States , 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). “The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered ‘at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated … “whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”’ Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois , 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)).” Remanded to consider “whether the Sixth Amendment requires suppression of [defendant’s subsequent, Mirandized ] statements on the ground that they were fruits of previous questioning conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-elicitation standard,” a question not yet answered by the Supreme Court. McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493, 591 S.E.2d 788 (January 12, 2004). “A suspect’s statement that he wants to call his lawyer or, as in this case, that he wants to contact his wife so she may call his lawyer, is a clear request for an attorney.” See also “Gissendaner v. State, 269 Ga. 495, 497, 500 S.E.2d 577 (1998) (‘Gissendaner’s request to telephone her attorney before leaving her home must reasonably be construed as a request to have her attorney present.’).” Later, defendant called detectives to jail. “Before McDougal could speak, though, Detective Lee immediately confronted him with the statement that Todd, whom McDougal had implicated as the shooter, had a strong alibi.” As officers began further interrogation before defendant had chance to waive right to counsel, these statements likewise must be suppressed. On a later occasion, however, defendant called officers to jail and made a statement not prompted by officer interrogation; this last statement is admissible. Accord, Mack v. State , 296 Ga. 239, 765 S.E.2d 896 (November 17, 2014) (fact that defendant asked to speak to investigator didn’t conclusively establish that defendant “initiated” the conversation, citing McDougal ). Moore v. State, 263 Ga.App. 548, 588 S.E.2d 327 (October 3, 2003). “In this case, the investigator who interviewed Moore testified that Moore read the Miranda warning and waiver of rights form out loud. Moore was asked if he understood his rights and Moore said, ‘So, if I needed a lawyer – right – I would have to wait?’ The detective answered yes and asked again if he understood his rights. Moore responded, ‘Yes.’ The detective again asked if he wanted to talk to them and Moore said, ‘Yeah, I(sic) talk to you. I guess I'll get a lawyer, too.’ Moore then signed the waiver of rights form which provided that he was willing to make a statement and did not want a lawyer at that time. The investigator testified that Moore was coherent and understood the form he signed.” “Where as here, an [defendant’s] limited request for counsel was accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities, that officials took the opportunity provided to obtain a statement is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose between speech and silence, and Moore chose to speak.” State v. Pinkerton, 262 Ga.App. 858, 586 S.E.2d 743 (August 22, 2003). In prosecution for misdemeanor furnishing harmful materials to minors, pro se defendant’s statements to prosecutor during plea negotiations were not admissible because trial court failed to adequately advise defendant of his right to counsel. Court advised defendant of right to counsel and to appointed counsel. “[T]he court must do more than simply inform defendant of his right to counsel; the court must give the defendant sufficient information and guidance for him to make a voluntary, knowing and intelligent decision about whether to proceed pro se. The accused should understand, for example, the nature of the charges against him, any statutory lesser-included offenses, the range of possible punishments for the charges, possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts necessary for a broad understanding of the matter. Otherwise there is no valid waiver.” Based on Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Para. 14; makes no reference to U.S. Const., Amend. 6. Comment: although Pinkerton speaks in terms of right to counsel at arraignment, real issue addressed is not entering a plea without counsel, but making incriminating statements to prosecutor. Generally, nothing more than Miranda warnings is required under Sixth Amendment when defendant is questioned by state’s attorney post-indictment – see Patterson v. Illinois , 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (Type of “rigorous” waiver warning called for in Pinkerton is only required at trial. “Because the role of counsel at questioning is relatively simple and limited, we see no problem in having a waiver procedure at that stage which is likewise simple and limited. So long as the accused is made aware of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation’ during post-indictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings,