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his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is ‘knowing and intelligent.’”). See also Fellers v. United States (January 26, 2004), above. State v. Langlands, 276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (June 30, 2003). Investigator Jarrell “questioned Langlands after his arrest. Jarrell read Langlands his Miranda rights and understood from Langlands' response that he was invoking his right to counsel. Although the investigator ceased questioning Langlands about the criminal case, he nevertheless repeatedly questioned Langlands about his attorney and stressed that once Langlands obtained counsel, Jarrell ‘really needed’ to talk to Langlands because he ‘really needed to know his side of the story.’ Then, as Jarrell started to leave, Langlands said he would talk to the investigator without an attorney.” Trial court could properly conclude that, after invocation of right to counsel, further discussion was initiated by officer, not defendant, and properly suppress subsequent statements. Rowe v. State, 276 Ga. 800, 582 S.E.2d 119 (June 9, 2003). Defendant gave a lengthy videotaped statement to police, then asked for an attorney. Held, it was not error to admit that portion of the video showing Defendant invoking his right to counsel. It “merely shows… that the interview was then properly terminated. It did not purport to be evidence of Rowe’s guilt nor was it directed to undermining any of his defenses. Rowe’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.” Accord, McClarin v. State , 289 Ga. 180, 710 S.E.2d 120 (April 18, 2011) (“The officer was asked if there came a time when appellant requested to terminate the interview; the witness replied in the affirmative.”). Braham v. State, 260 Ga.App. 533, 580 S.E.2d 256 (March 10, 2003). Defendant’s question during custodial interview, “Can we get [an attorney] quickly?” “failed to constitute an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel.” See also Carroll (April 29, 2002), below and Smith (July 26, 2004), and Willis (June 28, 2010), above. Accord, Wright v. State , 279 Ga.App. 155, 630 S.E.2d 656 (May 2, 2006) (Defendant’s “admittedly equivocal” request for counsel – “If I ask for an attorney will I be arrested?” – did not require officer to stop interrogation); Gonzalez v. State , 283 Ga.App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (March 1, 2007). Attaway v. State, 259 Ga.App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (February 24, 2003). “After being arrested and informed of Miranda rights, Attaway requested a lawyer, and Investigator Calvin Chew appropriately terminated his interview with Attaway at that time. As Attaway was leaving the interview room, he voluntarily stopped and asked Investigator Chew what type of weapons had been used in the crime. Investigator Chew told him that a handgun and a shotgun had been used, and Attaway stated: ‘Ain’t this the one with the stolen car that the police chased and two guys jumped out of the car and the guns were found in the car.... I don’t fit the description of them.’” Trial court properly held that defendant “freely and voluntarily initiated a renewed conversation” with the officer, and the statement was admissible. Accord, Anthony v. State , 315 Ga.App. 701, 727 S.E.2d 528 (April 26, 2012) (in patrol car after invoking his right to counsel, defendant “spontaneously offered to tell the detective about his involvement in the incident.”). Wilson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 113, 570 S.E.2d 416 (August 21, 2002). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant was in custody at time statement was given, and thus suppressing statement for lack of Miranda warnings. Police had probable cause to arrest, and considered defendant their prime suspect. Defendant knew the police thought he had done something wrong. Police repeatedly told defendant he didn’t need a lawyer, but wouldn’t let his brother in DFCS building where interrogation was conducted. Defendant was questioned for three hours although he had been awake for 18 hours at beginning of statement, hadn’t eaten all day, and had recently been hospitalized for pneumonia. Fitz v. State, 275 Ga. 349, 566 S.E.2d 668 (July 15, 2002). Police officer conducted a custodial interview of Defendant, who was not fluent in English, in Spanish. Initially, Defendant was told to remain silent until Miranda warnings were given. After Defendant’s rights were read in Spanish, Defendant asked, “Can I talk now?” The officer first ascertained that Defendant understood his rights, and then inquired whether Defendant wanted to talk about the three murder victims. Defendant answered affirmatively and executed a written waiver in Spanish. The officer remarked that they wanted the truth and Defendant stated: “Well, the real truth, ah, I have nothing to say to you. If you are going to take me to jail, take me, and best with my attorney. With him I can talk a little better.” To clarify Defendant’s intent, the officer asked, “So then you don’t want to talk to us?” Defendant replied: “Well, I have nothing to say to you because simply I am the guilty one and that’s it.” The officer attempted further clarification and told Defendant, “if you want an attorney, you tell me ... and we’ll end now. But if you want to talk to me, if you want to talk to us to see if we can come to the bottom of what happened, we can do that too. But the right that you have is an attorney.” Defendant replied, “the real truth, I’m going to tell you the real truth ... because I am going to talk.” Again the officer elicited Defendant’s response that Defendant wanted to talk “without an attorney,” and the interview proceeded until Defendant admitted his participation in the three murders. Held, trial court properly denied the motion to suppress on Sixth Amendment grounds. “[I]f the defendant