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‘makes reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,’ cessation of the questioning is not required.” Defendant’s statement, “and best with my attorney .. with him I can talk a little better,” was, at best, an ambiguous request for counsel. The “officer had no duty to clarify the ambiguous statement,” but did so, and further questioning confirmed Defendant’s desire to talk without his attorney present. Woodard v. State, 256 Ga.App. 464, 568 S.E.2d 528 (June 24, 2002). After defendant was appointed counsel at a first appearance hearing, detective came to the jail, had him sign a Miranda waiver, and took an incriminating statement from him. Held, admission of the statement was error. “In the context of the 5th Amendment right to counsel, ‘once a defendant requests an attorney, all police-initiated interrogation is prohibited, and any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.’ Although the record does not contain direct evidence that Woodard requested an attorney at the first appearance hearing, we assume from the appointment of counsel that Woodard invoked his right thereto.” Result could be different if defendant initiated contact with police, but here he did not. Morgan v. State, 275 Ga. 222, 564 S.E.2d 192 (May 28, 2002). “[Defendant] enumerates as error the admission of his custodial statement. Prior to making the statement, he signed a waiver of rights form, but informed the officer that he did not want to talk. When the officer prepared to leave, Morgan said that he would talk if there was no tape recorder or note-taking. The officer then sat down and, without any questioning, listened to Morgan’s version of the events. Contrary to the argument on appeal, neither the transcript of the Jackson-Denno hearing nor the record shows that Morgan ever invoked his right to counsel. ‘Thus, we are not guided by Edwards [ v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)], but by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). [Cit.]’ Fields v. State, 266 Ga. 241, 242(1), 466 S.E.2d 202 (1996). Mosley permits further dialogue with a suspect after his invocation of the right to remain silent, so long as certain requirements are met, even if the police reinitiate the interrogation. Bright v. State, 251 Ga. 440, 445-446(2), 306 S.E.2d 293 (1983). In this case, Morgan himself initiated his statement, after previously expressing a different desire, thereby ‘clearly evincing his intent not to remain silent. [Cit.]’ Larry v. State, 266 Ga. 284, 286(2)(a), 466 S.E.2d 850 (1996).” Accord, Rabie v. State , 286 Ga.App. 684, 649 S.E.2d 868 (July 19, 2007). Carroll v. State, 275 Ga. 160, 563 S.E.2d 125 (April 29, 2002). Defendant’s question “How can I get an attorney?” is not such an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel as to require termination of a custodial interrogation under the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution. The 5th Amendment does not require police to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel. Accord, Braham (March 10, 2003), above, and cases cited therein. Two justices suggest in concurrence that a different result might obtain under the Georgia Constitution if defendant had argued on that basis . Wilson v. State, 275 Ga. 53, 562 S.E.2d 164 (March 29, 2002). Although “a person’s right to silence is not protected by any per se rule of ‘permanent immunity’ against further police-initiated interrogation..., [a] 16 to 17 hour break between the conclusion of the January 7 interrogation and the start of the January 8 interrogation fails to reflect the ‘significant period of time’ required by [ Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)], to warrant reinterrogation by police on the same crime that was the subject of the January 7 interrogation.” (Emphasis in original). However, the January 8 statement is admissible for a separate reason: defendant indicated to police that he wanted to see the autopsy photographs of the victim. Officers read defendant Miranda rights again, obtained his waiver of such rights, and an officer explained to defendant that the officer was there to show defendant the photos at defendant’s request and when defendant reaffirmed his desire to see the photos, the officer showed them. The officer asked no questions as defendant viewed the photos. Defendant stated he “wanted to know what had happened to [the victim’s] head” and the officer replied, “I would like for you to tell me that.” The interrogation continued. Held, “it is not error to admit a statement when the defendant chooses to continue the interrogation by initiating conversation with police, thereby evincing his intent not to remain silent.” Taylor v. State, 274 Ga.App. 269, 553 S.E.2d 598 (October 1, 2001). Interim review in defendant’s capital murder prosecution. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress custodial statement; defendant’s question “Can I have a lawyer present when I do that?” “was an unambiguous request for counsel that required the cessation of all questioning.” Distinguishing Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), and Jordan v. State , 267 Ga. 442(1), 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997). “Unlike the suspects in Davis and Jordan, Taylor did not use equivocal words such as ‘might’ or ‘maybe’ when referring to her desire for a lawyer. She was also not referring to a need for counsel sometime in the future, and she did not volunteer information at any time during her statement. See Moore v. State, 272 Ga. 359(2), 528 S.E.2d 793 (2000); Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174(4), 465 S.E.2d 672 (1996). Her desire for