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counsel was not ambiguous simply because it was articulated in the form of a question; it is common for people to ask for things by saying ‘Can I have ... ?’ Under the circumstances, a reasonable police officer would have understood that Taylor asked if she could have a lawyer because she wanted one. See Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 891(2), 506 S.E.2d 124 (1998) (after advising suspect of his right to have an attorney present, police officer ceased interrogation when suspect asked ‘Can I have one?’). Her later response to Captain Simmons's request for her to ‘tell it just like it is’—‘How can I do that without a lawyer?’—further illustrates Taylor's belief that she needed a lawyer to assist during the police interrogation. In addition, we are troubled by Captain Simmons's response to Taylor's initial reference to a lawyer, which appeared to be an attempt to steer Taylor away from asking for the assistance of a lawyer. Taylor's request for counsel at the beginning of her interview was unambiguous and the police failure to cease the interrogation compels the suppression of her entire October 6, 1999, statement. See Edwards [ v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)].” Accord, Cody (November 19, 2013), above (request for counsel may be in form of a question). Taylor disapproved “to the extent that [it] can be read as indicating that the fruits of statements obtained in violation of § 24–8– 824 must be suppressed,” State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015)). Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (April 2, 2001). Reversing Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, trial court properly declined to suppress defendant’s statement to police. Arrested for burglary, defendant confessed to killing the two occupants of the house – crimes for which he was not then under arrest. At time of statement, defendant had counsel appointed to represent him on the burglary. Held, Texas Court of Appeals erred when it “held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches not only to the offense with which he is charged, but to other offenses ‘closely related factually’ to the charged offense.” Rather, “the Sixth Amendment right is ‘offense specific,’” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), and thus had not attached as to the murders when defendant confessed to them, despite his arrest and appointment of counsel for the factually-related burglary charge. Quoting McNeil at 175: ““The Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] ... is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Recognizing that the question of what the defendant is under arrest for is not always clear-cut, the Court adopts the Blockburger double jeopardy test: “In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), we explained that ‘where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ Id., at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. We have since applied the Blockburger test to delineate the scope of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which prevents multiple or successive prosecutions for the ‘same offence.’ See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164– 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). We see no constitutional difference between the meaning of the term ‘offense’ in the contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel. Accordingly, we hold that when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.” Breyer dissents, writing for Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, would define “offense” under the Sixth Amendment “in terms of the conduct that constitutes the crime that the offender committed on a particular occasion, including criminal acts that are ‘closely related to’ or ‘inextricably intertwined with’ the particular crime set forth in the charging instrument.” Lucas v. State, 273 Ga. 88, 538 S.E.2d 44 (October 30, 2000). The defendant surrendered himself to police three days after an alleged incident of cruelty to children. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement which the state attributed to him, based on an alleged assertion of his 5 th Amendment right to counsel. Contrary to police testimony, the defendant claimed that when he surrendered he repeatedly told the officers that he wished to talk to an attorney. The trial court resolved the conflict in favor of the police. However, there were two occasions on which there was no dispute that the defendant made reference to counsel. He stated that “My lawyer told me not to say nothing,” and later in the same interrogation “My attorney told me not to answer nothing.” Held, that under the circumstances of the case, a reasonable police officer would have understood the defendant’s statements to be a request for counsel to be present during the interrogation. Therefore, the statement should have been suppressed. State v. Watson, 244 Ga.App. 484, 536 S.E.2d 170 (June 13, 2000). In prosecution for attempted armed robbery and related offenses, trial court properly excluded defendant’s testimony from preliminary hearing, made when he was pro se. “[T]o determine whether Watson's testimony at the preliminary hearing was voluntary, we must determine whether he voluntarily chose to represent himself at that hearing.” Record hear fails to establish that defendant fails to establish that defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.