☢ test - Í

Wyatt v. State, 272 Ga. 490, 532 S.E.2d 390 (June 12, 2000). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Defendant first invoked, then waived, right to counsel. “The record is clear that upon receiving Wyatt's unambiguous statement that he did not want to talk until he was represented by counsel, the officers immediately ceased their interrogation. The record is also clear that Wyatt thereafter changed his mind, informed the officers of his decision, reiterated this decision when the officers asked him about it, and chose voluntarily to answer the officers' questions about the crime. The trial court was thus authorized to find that Wyatt knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel he had previously invoked, [ Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 445, 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997)], and the admission of Wyatt's statement was not clearly erroneous. See generally Bruce v. State, 263 Ga. 273(2), 430 S.E.2d 745 (1993).” Moore v. State , 272 Ga. 359, 528 S.E.2d 793 (May 1, 2000). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s custodial statement. Defendant’s reference to having a lawyer in the future wasn’t a clear and unambiguous request for counsel during interrogation. “We have previously held that statements that ‘I might need a lawyer’ and ‘I will still talk to my lawyer tomorrow’ were not clear and unambiguous requests for counsel. See Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 444, 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997); Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174, 178, 465 S.E.2d 672 (1996). Similarly, we conclude that Moore's statement that he would like to talk to someone about who his attorney was going to be is not a clear request for counsel. Therefore, the police detective was not required to cease questioning Moore based on his reference to an attorney.” Gosdin v. State , 272 Ga. 205, 528 S.E.2d 230 (March 13, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Although defendant had an attorney who volunteered to represent him in California extradition proceeding, “Gosdin did not fill out a form requesting the appointment of an attorney. Although an attorney who was at the extradition hearing volunteered to represent Gosdin at that hearing, it is clear that Gosdin did not invoke his right to counsel and that the attorney's representation of Gosdin was limited to extradition issues. It follows that Chief Montgomery did not initiate the interview with Gosdin in violation of Edwards. See Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80, 287 S.E.2d 531 (1982), in which this Court found that a confession was not obtained in violation of Edwards [ v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)] because extradition counsel had been discharged before the police questioned the defendant.” Also distinguishing Roper v. State, 258 Ga. 847, 375 S.E.2d 600 (1989), where “the defendant, who had been arrested in New Jersey, signed a form requesting the assistance of a lawyer.” See also Montejo v. Louisiana ( May 26, 2009), above. York v. State, 242 Ga.App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823 (January 21, 2000). Convictions of some co-defendants for armed robbery and related offenses, and of armed robbery victims at same trial for cocaine trafficking, affirmed; although defendant York invoked his right to counsel upon arrest, he waived it when he approached police hours later and asked to speak with them. Tillman v. State, 240 Ga.App. 78, 522 S.E.2d 557 (September 15, 1999). No error in admitting custodial statement: after defendant’s arrest, “a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent wanted to interview him. Before the GBI agent spoke with him, Tillman asked a police detective if he could have a lawyer present during the questioning. The detective told Tillman that he could have a lawyer and that he did not have to talk with the agent, but that if he did want to talk at that time he could not wait for an attorney to arrive because he was about to be transferred to another county. Tillman then agreed to talk with the agent without an attorney present .” GBI agent also verified that defendant wanted to talk with him before taking statement. “[E]ven if we assume that Tillman's question to the detective about an attorney was an unequivocal assertion of his right to have a lawyer present during any police questioning, Tillman thereafter initiated further communication with the police by indicating to both the detective and the GBI agent that he wanted to speak with the agent at that time without waiting for a lawyer. See Ottis v. State, 269 Ga. 151, 153-154(2), 496 S.E.2d 264 (1998); Tatum v. State, 203 Ga.App. 892(1), 418 S.E.2d 152 (1992).” Snoke v. State, 237 Ga.App. 686, 516 S.E.2d 541 (April 16, 1999). Trial court properly admitted defendant’s statements made during custodial interrogation. “Custodial interrogation continued for about five hours at Snoke’s house and resumed at the sheriff’s office. During this time, Snoke and the captain would argue, and Snoke would indicate to the captain that he no longer wanted to talk to him. The captain testified that whenever Snoke so indicated, questioning stopped and did not resume until Snoke initiated further discussion by saying he wanted to talk again. During the questioning, Snoke never requested a lawyer.” “Even if Snoke had adequately asserted his right to remain silent, the captain could renew interrogation if Snoke initiated that communication. Underwood [ v. State, 218 Ga.App. 530, 462 S.E.2d 434 (1995)]. Viewing the captain’s testimony in its entirety, we find that Snoke freely and voluntarily initiated all