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renewed conversations with the captain and thus repeatedly and intentionally relinquished his right to remain silent. See id.” Roundtree v. State, 270 Ga. 504, 511 S.E.2d 190 (February 8, 1999). “‘“ If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. ” [Cit.]’ Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 445(1), 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997).” Defendant’s statement here made no reference to counsel at all: “Basically, I don’t even want to talk to you no more, man, ’cause y’all trying to stick a murder on me.” 29. SELF-INCRIMINATION, PRIVILEGE AGAINST See WITNESSES – PRIVILEGES – SELF- INCRIMINATION, below 30. SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS Hammill v. State, 327 Ga.App. 588, 758 S.E.2d 336 (May 30, 2014). Conviction for serious injury by vessel and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s objection to testimony about defendant’s self-serving statements to officer wasn’t improper comment on defendant’s right not to testify. When defense counsel asked about defendant’s statements at the scene (heard on video recording already in evidence), “[t]he prosecutor objected to the question, arguing that Hammill's statement was self-serving and that if Hammill ‘wants it in he can come testify about it.’” “[T]he prosecutor's remark was made as part of an evidentiary objection and argument between counsel over whether Hammill's alleged self-serving statement was admissible if he elected not to testify. See generally Mathis v. State, 265 Ga.App. 541, 544(2)(c) (594 S.E.2d 737) (2004) (‘Self-serving declarations are inadmissible hearsay unless the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination. The defendant is allowed to declare his innocence in court; he is not allowed to avoid this opportunity by pre-trial declarations of innocence.’) (citations and punctuation omitted). [FN3 . It is unlikely that the exclusion of ‘self-serving’ statements established by Georgia precedent survived the adoption of the new Evidence Code. See OCGA §§ 24–8–803; 24–8–804; State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413, 423(2), n. 3 (728 S.E.2d 582) (2012) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially) (pointing out that ‘the blanket policy against “self-serving” statements, established by our case law, may not survive’ adoption of the new Evidence Code). See also Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules Of Evidence § 16:9 (2013) (noting that the new Evidence Code ‘leaves no room for excluding hearsay that otherwise qualifies for an exception simply because it is “self-serving.”’). ] For this reason, the prosecutor's remark is reasonably construed as nothing more than a comment pertaining to the admissibility of certain evidence, and, as such, provides no basis for a new trial in this case. See Locke v. State, 238 Ga.App. 705, 707–708(2) (521 S.E.2d 587) (1999).” Sharpe v. State, 291 Ga. 148, 728 S.E.2d 217 (May 29, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; trial court properly “refused to admit a recording of a 911 call appellant made to report the fire. However, appellant chose not to testify at trial and was not subject to cross-examination, thus the trial court did not err in holding that the 911 call was a self-serving declaration and inadmissible hearsay. Parker v. State, 276 Ga. 598 (581 S.E.2d 7) (2003). While a defendant is allowed to declare his innocence in open court, he is not allowed to avoid this opportunity by ‘pre-trial declarations of innocence.’ Id. Although appellant argues that the 911 call could have been admitted under the res gestae exception to hearsay pursuant to OCGA § 24–3–3, a determination of admissibility under this exception is left to the trial court's sound discretion. See Bonilla v. State, 289 Ga. 862, 863 (717 S.E.2d 166) (2011). We find no abuse of discretion and hold that this enumeration lacks merit.” Phillips v. State, 307 Ga.App. 366, 705 S.E.2d 287 (December 13, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; defendant wasn’t entitled to jury charge on mistake of fact, because only evidence raising the defense was his self-serving out-of-court statement to police, which, as hearsay, had no probative value, though admitted at trial. “‘[I]t is well-settled that self-serving statements made by the accused, either before or after the commission of the alleged offense, are inadmissible hearsay.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Robinson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 576, 581(4) (541 S.E.2d 660) (2000) (trial court properly excluded defendant's self-serving statements to police). See Nunez v. State, 237 Ga.App. 808, 811(4) (516 S.E.2d 357) (1999) (self-serving custodial statement inadmissible hearsay). Though admitted into evidence, Phillips's self-serving statement was without probative value and could not support a charge on mistake of fact. See Jones v. State, 271 Ga. 516, 517(2) (520 S.E.2d 454) (1999) (hearsay is without probative value though admitted without objection and so no evidence supported a charge on self defense notwithstanding the testimony as to defendant's out-of-court statement); Clausell v. State, 302 Ga.App. 472, 474(1) (691 S.E.2d 312) (2010).” Crane v. State, 300 Ga.App. 450, 685 S.E.2d 314 (September 23, 2009). At defendant’s homicide trial, trial court properly excluded defendant’s statements on scene to father and a female, tendered by defendant as “res gestae.” “Although Crane made statements to, and in the presence of, [DA’s intern] shortly after the shooting, we cannot conclude that such statements were ‘free from all suspicion of device or afterthought’ since Crane advised the female caller