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that he could not talk because he was in the back of a patrol car, and asked her not to call him back. OCGA § 24-3-3. Further, Crane's recounting of recent events to his father was a narrative and not part of the res gestae.” Boone v. State, 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008). “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow any cross-examination of Investigator Askey as to that part of Boone's custodial statement in which he identified co-defendant Phillips as the individual to whom he rented the panel van used as a meth lab. Inasmuch as Boone did not testify, the admission of his custodial statement implicating Phillips was barred by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).” Bowe v. State, 288 Ga.App. 376, 654 S.E.2d 196 (November 9, 2007). Trial court erred in failing to sever co-defendants’ trials, as it prevented co-defendant Baker from tendering portions of his statements to police which were exculpatory as to Baker and incriminating to Bowe. Baker contended that Bowe coerced him into participating in string of armed robberies for which they were jointly tried. Neither defendant testified at trial, but State tendered incriminating portions of Baker’s prior statements. “Although the excluded portions of the statement were self-serving hearsay, ‘[w]here a part of a conversation, which amounts to an incriminatory admission, is admitted in evidence, it is the right of the accused to bring out other portions of the same conversation, even though it is self-serving in its nature, or exculpatory, in that it justifies, excuses, or mitigates the act.’ West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 569 (37 S.E.2d 799) (1946).” Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (November 8, 2004). “The trial court did not err in refusing to permit Watson to introduce a videotape of a statement he gave to [detective] at the time of his arrest. [Cit.] The statement was not offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, improper influence or improper motive. See Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317, 320, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998). Thus, the statement was properly ruled inadmissible as pure hearsay. Id. Contrary to Watson’s assertion, Parker v. State, 276 Ga. 598(2), 581 S.E.2d 7 (2003) does not hold that a self-serving declaration is admissible whenever a declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination. Nor did the court err in preventing Watson from questioning the detective about the existence of the videotape. That Watson cooperated with the detective was irrelevant.” Rust v. State, 264 Ga.App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (December 19, 2003). Even where defendant testified at trial, trial court properly prohibited defense from cross-examining officer about defendant’s self-serving pre-trial statement. “As a general rule, ‘in a criminal case, “self-serving declarations made by a defendant are not admissible.”’” Parker v. State, 276 Ga. 598, 581 S.E.2d 7 (May 19, 2003). “Self-serving declarations… are inadmissible hearsay unless the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination. Whitehead v. State, 255 Ga. 526, 528(5) (340 S.E.2d 885) (1986). ‘ The defendant is allowed to declare his innocence in court; he is not allowed to avoid this opportunity by pre-trial declarations of innocence.’ Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634, 641(6) (242 S.E.2d 55) (1978). Therefore, the trial court correctly granted the motion in limine, which conditioned the admissibility of Parker’s pre-trial statement on his election to testify in his own behalf. That ruling did not compel Parker to waive his constitutional right to remain silent, because he could decline to take the stand. ‘That the defendant faces such a dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self- incrimination.’ Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84(I) (90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446) (1970).” Accord, Mathis v. State , 265 Ga.App. 541, 594 S.E.2d 737 (February 11, 2004) (defendant’s pre-trial declarations of innocence to acquaintances were inadmissible where defendant did not testify at trial); Griffith v. State , 286 Ga.App. 859, 650 S.E.2d 413 (July 30, 2007); Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010); Clowers v. State , 324 Ga.App. 264, 750 S.E.2d 169 (October 16, 2013); Pena v. State , 297 Ga. 418, 774 S.E.2d 652 (June 29, 2015) (under pre-2013 Evidence Code). See also Watson (November 8, 2004), above. Felder v. State, 260 Ga.App. 27, 579 S.E.2d 28 (February 12, 2003). “Felder could not admit his own statements in which he denied committing the robberies. A defendant’s self-serving declarations to police are not admissible by him. McCartney v. State, 262 Ga. 156, 160(4), 414 S.E.2d 227 (1992); Smith v. State, 144 Ga.App. 294, 295(2), 241 S.E.2d 14 (1977). “‘The defendant is allowed to declare his innocence in court; he is not allowed to avoid this opportunity by pre- trial declarations of innocence.’” Jones v. State, 271 Ga. 516, 520 S.E.2d 454 (September 13, 1999). Evidence did not raise issue of self-defense where only testimony raising the subject came from State’s witness, who repeated defendant’s statement to him. “While [witness] Bell's testimony presents a version of events in which Jones fired the weapon only in self-defense, that testimony was the self-serving statement of a defendant and was inadmissible hearsay. McCartney v. State, 262 Ga.