☢ test - Í

156(4), 414 S.E.2d 227 (1992); Beck v. State, 254 Ga. 51(11), 326 S.E.2d 465 (1985); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634(6), 242 S.E.2d 55 (1978). Since ‘hearsay evidence has no probative value even if it is admitted without objection’ ( Germany v. State, 235 Ga. 836(2), 221 S.E.2d 817 (1976)), there was no evidence of self-defense such as would require a charge on that defense.” Nunez v. State, 237 Ga.App. 808, 516 S.E.2d 357 (April 13, 1999). “It is well-settled that self-serving statements made by the accused, either before or after the commission of the alleged offense, are inadmissible hearsay. Smith v. State, 144 Ga.App. 294(1), 241 S.E.2d 14 (1977); Lane v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 228 Ga.App. 554, 560-561(2), 492 S.E.2d 317 (1997); see also Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 154(3), n. 3, 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996) ( Georgia does not recognize declarations against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule ).” 31. SILENCE, COMMENTARY ON/INVOCATION OF RIGHT See CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – SILENCE/TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT, above 32. STATEMENT, WHAT CONSTITUTES See also DUI – MIRANDA, and subheading STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT – CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION, WHAT CONSTITUTES, above Bell v. State, 293 Ga. 683, 748 S.E.2d 382 (September 9, 2013). Convictions for first degree vehicular homicide and related offenses affirmed; hit and run statute’s requirement to stop and identify oneself at scene of an accident doesn’t “violate a person's right against self-incrimination under both the U.S. and the Georgia Constitutions. … With respect to the U.S. Constitution, this issue has been decided adversely to Bell by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9) (1971).” “[L]ike the statute at issue in Byers, Georgia's hit-and run statute does not confront an individual with substantial hazards of self-incrimination through requiring certain disclosures, as the statute is not ‘directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.’ Id. at 429(1). … ‘So far as any available information instructs us, most accidents occur without creating criminal liability even if one or both of the drivers are guilty of negligence as a matter of tort law.... [D]isclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in [cases where such risks are present]. Furthermore, the statutory purpose is noncriminal and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 430–431(1).” “‘Whatever the collateral consequences of disclosing name and address [and vehicle registration number], the statutory purpose is to implement the state police power to regulate use of motor vehicles.’ Id. at 431–432(2).” Likewise, “we find no violation of Bell's right against self incrimination under the Georgia Constitution.” Austin v. State, 286 Ga.App. 149, 648 S.E.2d 414 (June 6, 2007). “Austin contends the court should not have admitted the testimony of the landlord’s daughter, who testified as to certain statements Austin made to her during their telephone conversation. Trial counsel objected to this testimony. The trial court did not err in allowing the testimony because voluntary, noncustodial, incriminating statements of defendants are admissible through the testimony of anyone who heard them . Hardeman v. State, 180 Ga.App. 632, 633-634(2) (349 S.E.2d 839) (1986).” Poole v. State, 270 Ga.App. 432, 606 S.E.2d 878 (November 15, 2004). Defendant seeks to suppress handwriting sample he gave officer. “Poole contends that he was forced to incriminate himself in violation of the broader protection offered by the Georgia Constitution or OCGA § 24-9-20(a), but we find no merit in this argument because he voluntarily provided the handwriting samples. Thomas v. State, 274 Ga. 156, 162(7) (549 S.E.2d 359) (2001) (‘ While a defendant cannot be compelled to produce a handwriting exemplar, it is not error for the [s]tate to use as a handwriting exemplar a voluntary writing by the defendant’ ) (Citation omitted); Hambrick v. State, 204 Ga.App. 668, 670(3) (420 S.E.2d 308) (1992) (no violation of Georgia Constitution or OCGA § 24-9-20(a) when defendant voluntarily provided handwriting sample during cross-examination).” United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (June 28, 2004). The defendant was not given his full Miranda warning. Detectives inquired about the location of his gun, which he illegally possessed as a convicted felon. The defendant volunteered the location of the gun. Trial court suppressed both defendant’s statements and the gun. By 5-4 majority, Supreme Court reverses suppression of the gun, holding that “ the Self-Incrimination Clause … is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements.” As the Self- Incrimination Clause protects “a fundamental trial right,” (emphasis in original) “[i]t follows that police do not violate a suspect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda . Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial. And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements … is a complete