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assistance. Of course, diplomatic avenues – the primary means of enforcing the Convention – also remain open.” Four dissenters would find that Vienna Convention creates enforceable rights in foreign nationals; three of the dissenters would provide that suppression is an available remedy for violation of those rights and remand these cases for consideration of that remedy. 37. VOLUNTARINESS – DEFENDANT IN PAIN/ INTOXICATED/ DRUGGED/ SLEEP- DEPRIVED/EMOTIONAL Lewis v. State, S16A0389, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1628486 (April 26, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress custodial statements. “‘The mere fact that [a defendant] was intoxicated at the time of the statements does not automatically render them inadmissible. [Cit.]’ Jones v. State, 285 Ga. 328, 329(2), 676 S.E.2d 225 (2009).” “The investigator testified that, with respect to Lewis’ initial statement to police on February 12, 2012, at about 4:50 am, Lewis was read his Miranda rights and Lewis indicated that he understood the waiver of rights form when he signed it; Lewis knew that the police were investigating Thompson’s death; Lewis consented to the interview and knew what he was talking about during the interview; and Lewis did not appear to be intoxicated. About thirty minutes into the interview, Lewis claimed that he had been up for a couple of days straight and was high on methamphetamine. The police decided to terminate the first interview at that time, not because of any concern about Lewis being intoxicated or not knowing what was going on, but because Lewis had also indicated that he was tired and needed to get some sleep. The police proceeded with a second interview of Lewis on the afternoon of February 12, 2012, about twelve hours after they had terminated their first interview with him. Before this second interview, the investigator again reminded Lewis of his Miranda rights and Lewis again consented to be interviewed. Lewis was more forthcoming in this interview, and he appeared to know what he was doing—even stating to police that he knew what was going on. … Here, ‘[t]here was nothing to indicate that [Lewis’] statements, even if made while he was intoxicated, were not the product of rational intellect and free will. Based on our careful review of the evidence before the trial court, we find that the trial judge was authorized to find that [Lewis] was rational and coherent and that his statements were given knowingly and voluntarily. [Cit.]’ Jones, supra, 285 Ga. at 329–330(2), 676 S.E.2d 225.” Leonard v. State, 292 Ga. 214, 735 S.E.2d 767 (November 27, 2012). Malice murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no error admitting defendant’s custodial statement. “Although Leonard testified during the hearing that he had taken two pills of Ecstacy three or four hours before the interview, he admitted that he had not told the detective this during the interview. Again, the trial court was able to view Leonard's demeanor on the recording of the interview, and the court's determination that Leonard gave his statement freely and voluntarily is not clearly erroneous. See Farris v. State, 290 Ga. 323, 325–326(2), 720 S.E.2d 604 (2012); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 111(4), 686 S.E.2d 239 (2009).” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (March 19, 2012). Interim review of capital murder prosecution; trial court properly found that three statements given to police by defendant were involuntary, “because he ‘did not make [his statements] as the result of rational intellect, did not appear or sound coherent at the time, did not have an appreciation for the situation in which he found himself, and clearly exhibited signs of intoxication and withdrawal symptoms.’ The trial court's conclusions were based in part on its review of the videotape of Statement 2 and the audiotapes of Statements 3 and 4, from which it made the following factual findings. During Statement 2, Clay stumbled into the room, was visibly shaking, appeared to lapse in and out of consciousness, was incoherent at times, and did not understand the circumstances under which he was being interviewed. During Statement 3, Clay had difficulty answering questions, had slurred speech, and did not recall his interview from four hours earlier or recognize Investigator Hogue from that interview. The trial court noted that, in contrast, Clay was alert and focused and spoke clearly during Statement 4 when he was not intoxicated.” Three experts “‘agreed that [Clay] was severely intoxicated at the time he arrived at the ER, was unconscious, without cognitive functioning, and was obtunded, or dulled to the sensation of pain or stimuli to the point of being unresponsive.’ Finally, the trial court found credible the testimony of Clay's expert witnesses, both of whom opined that Clay ‘could not appreciate’ his situation and testified that Clay told them that he could not recall any interview with police except the fourth interview two weeks after his arrest.” The involuntary statements are thus 'inadmissible for all purposes at Clay's trial. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398(II) (98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290) (1978) (holding that ‘ any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law’).” Powers v. State, 314 Ga.App. 733, 725 S.E.2d 848 (March 12, 2012). Rape and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s statement to FBI agent properly admitted at trial. “The trial court found that, although Powers testified during the Jackson–Denno hearing that he had been under the influence of prescription drugs when he gave his statement, ‘the