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recording clearly show[ed] that his voice was clear, strong and his responses to questions were promptly and clearly given. His speech was not slurred and the court could detect no other indicia of intoxication. On the recorded statement, [Powers] eloquently read the entire Miranda waiver form aloud, correctly pronouncing all of the words, without pausing or stumbling. He was also alert, responsive and detailed in his answers.’ The court noted that the F.B.I. agent testified that Powers did not appear to be under the influence of drugs, and the court concluded that Powers' statement was admissible because it ‘was the product of rational intellect and free will, that defendant was in control of himself, was coherent, knew what he was saying, and that he understood his rights and knew what was going on.’” McKenzie v. State, 294 Ga.App. 376, 670 S.E.2d 158 (November 5, 2008). Voluntary manslaughter conviction affirmed; no error in denying defendant’s motion to suppress defendant’s statements to police. “ McKenzie argues that because her interview was conducted while she was hysterical and distraught after being ‘abruptly and bluntly’ informed that her husband had died, she could not have understood either her Miranda rights or the consequences of her statements and that her statements were therefore not voluntarily made. The trial court found, however, that McKenzie was not upset to the degree that it would render her statements involuntary. The court also concluded that the officer did not try to interview McKenzie while she was upset, that she signed the document explaining her Miranda rights, and that there was an absence of testimony indicating that her statement was made against her will. These findings are supported by the record, which authorized the trial court to conclude that McKenzie's statements were voluntarily made.” Davis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (June 26, 2008). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statements to police. “ Although Davis may have been suffering the continued effects of pepper spray during the course of the interview, he was capable of waiving his rights. Testimony showed that at the time Davis knew where he was and what he was doing, that he made appropriate responses to questions asked by the officers, and that he did not appear to be under the influence of any intoxicant or drug. See LaRue v. State, 171 Ga.App. 371 (319 S.E.2d 468) (1984) (where [defendant] gave his statement approximately 12 hours after being shot and undergoing surgery, previous physical and emotional trauma did not make him incapable of waiving his rights).” Dorsey v. State, 285 Ga.App. 510, 646 S.E.2d 713 (May 23, 2007). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Trial court’s finding that defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights was not erroneous: “[Officer] Eckert testified that when Dorsey initiated the conversation regarding the shooting, he informed Dorsey of the Miranda warnings. According to Eckert, Dorsey appeared to understand the warnings and stated that he knew his rights, then provided his version of the events. Undoubtedly, Dorsey had been complaining of physical problems, and Eckert acknowledged that Dorsey was under the influence of alcohol at the time . Eckert also testified, however, that Dorsey was coherent and communicating effectively, and the videotape shows that Dorsey declined to go to the hospital after the ambulance arrived.” Williams v. State, 277 Ga.App. 884, 627 S.E.2d 897 (March 3, 2006). Terroristict threats and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to police. “Williams argues on appeal that he was under the influence of pain medication and therefore could not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. However, the trial court found that there was no evidence or testimony that indicated that the medication affected Williams’ ability to understand and give a free and voluntary statement. In fact, the only testimony relating to drug use came during cross-examination of the GBI agent, where he stated that it was probable that Williams may have been taking some pain medications on the day of the interview. Contrary to Williams’ argument, the fact that an individual is under the influence of some chemical agent will not, standing alone, render the confession inadmissible. See Shelby v. State, 265 Ga. 118, 119(2) (453 S.E.2d 21) (1995); Richardson v. State, 143 Ga.App. 846, 846-847(1) (240 S.E.2d 217) (1977). The trial court was authorized to accept the GBI agent’s testimony and reject Williams’ testimony. See Addison v. State, 254 Ga.App. 347, 348(1) (564 S.E.2d 204) (2002). We cannot say that the trial court’s ruling in favor of admissibility was erroneous here.” Adams v. State, 276 Ga.App. 319, 623 S.E.2d 525 (October 25, 2005). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to police. Although officers awakened defendant and he was initially groggy, they saw no evidence that he was under the influence of marijuana, as he contended at trial, when he gave his statement. “‘Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court was authorized to conclude that, despite [Adams’s possible intoxication], he gave a voluntary statement and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.’ (Citations omitted.) Cunningham v. State , 255 Ga. 727, 730 (2), 342 S.E.2d 299 (1986). Accord, Philmore v. State , 263 Ga. 67, 68(2), 428 S.E.2d 329 (1993) (although the defendant was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the police interview, the trial court was authorized to conclude the defendant made a voluntary statement to police).”